

Sacred and Barbaric Names



Excerpts and scholia from Aristotle, Cicero, Diogenes Laërtius, Hesiod, Iamblichus, Marcus Aurelius, Plato, Plutarch, Proclus, Simon Magus, and the Chaldean Oracles of Zoroaster.

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¹ *Illustrations*: Front page and page 45, Euterpe and Urania, by Chandra Valli Paetsch. Page 14, Landscape by Jerome Peabody. Page 34, Pallas-Athena.

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Excerpts and scholia from Plato

Unless otherwise stated, our preferred translations of *The Cratylus* are Thomas Taylor's (Prometheus Trust) and Harold Fowler's (Loeb Classical Library):

Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (tr. & Comm.). *The Works of Plato: The Cratylus*. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); pp. 461-526, with Introduction and Additional Notes by T. Taylor

Fowler H.N. (tr.) *Plato: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias*. Vol. IV (1st ed. 1926). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, revised 1939 (Loeb Classical Library, Series Ed. J. Henderson); pp. 6-191.

The king's name is a tower of strength.

— WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE¹

Cratylus, 386a-412c

From Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (tr. & Comm.). *The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus*. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); *The Cratylus*. (pp. 502-4 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 386a-411e)

Such as these however are the men who are *ignorantly* called men of learning, who are celebrated as prodigies of genius, who form the literary taste of the present generation; and who, like Homer's mice, impiously *nibble* the veil of *Wisdom*, and would willingly destroy the work of her celestial hands!²

[Socrates says to Hermogenes that it was Protagoras] who said that man was the measure of all things;³

Socrates A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.

Hermogenes Certainly

Socrates But is not the shuttle textorial?

Hermogenes Should it not?

Socrates The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns the art of weaving; but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.⁴

¹ Shakespeare, *King Richard III*, Act v, scene 3

² Taylor T. (Tr. & Annot.) *The Cratylus, Phædo, Parmenides, Timæus and Critias of Plato*. (1st ed. 1793); Minneapolis: Wizards Bookshelf, 1976. (*Secret Doctrine Reference Series*); intr. p. 22; [Taylor on society's "men of learning."]

³ Plato, *Cratylus* 386a (tr. Taylor)

⁴ *ibid.*, 388

Socrates It appears to me, that the most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name.¹

Socrates Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes What then?

Socrates All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the ancient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation: for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name: or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wise and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating; for εἰπῆν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians, and sophists is, in consequence of this, a heroic tribe.²

Socrates It appears indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.

Hermogenes But what then?

Socrates It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And indeed, if any one considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call οὐσία, *essence*, there are some who call it εὐσία, and others again ὠσία. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things Eotia, according to one of these names, εὐσία: and because we denominate that which participates of essence Eotia *essence*, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called Eotia: for our ancestors were accustomed to call οὐσία, *essence*, εὐσία.³

¹ Plato, *Cratylus* 397d (tr. Taylor)

² *ibid.*, 398d-e

³ *ibid.*, 401b-c

Socrates Will not then the purifying god, who *washes* and *free* us from evils of this kind be *Apollo*?

Hermogenes Perfectly so.

Socrates According, therefore, to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called ἀπολύων, or *the liberator*; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called απλός, or simple, as he is denominated by the Thessalians since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple.¹

Socrates But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from *always running in a flowing progression, about the air*; and on this account it may be called αειθεήρ. But γῆ, or earth, will more plainly signify its meaning, if any one denominates it γαία. For γαία may be properly called γεννήτειρα, *the producer*, as Homer says; for he calls γεγάασι, γεγενήσθαι or *that which is produced in itself*.²

Socrates But fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than contrary fluxion. If anyone, therefore, takes away the δ from this name ανδρία, *fortitude*, the name ανρία, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the just*; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner το άρρεν, that is, the male nature, and ανήρ man, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from άνω ροή, or *a flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes! seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.³

Socrates But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of επιθυμία *desire*: for it evinces a power proceeding to θυμός *anger*. But θυμός, *anger*, derives its appellation from θύσεως and ζέσεως, *raging* and *ardour*. And again, ιμερος, *amatory desire*, was so called from ρω, or *a flowing which vehemently attracts the soul*; for because it flows *excited*, and *desiring the possession of things*, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called ιμερος. But πόθος, *desire*, was so called, from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, and its effluxive streams, like ιμερος, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But έρωσ, *love*, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors έπος, from εσπεiv, *to*

¹ Plato, *Cratylus* 405b-c (tr. Taylor)

² *ibid.*, 410b

³ *ibid.*, 413e-414a

flow inwardly. But at present it is called ἐρως, through the insertion of an ω instead of ο.¹

Socrates It appears then that this word ὄνομα, *a name*, was composed from that discourse which asserts that ὄν, *being*, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that we call ονομαστόν, or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that *name* is *an enquiry about being*. With respect to ἀλήθεια, *truth*, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, [421b] and therefore implies that it is θεία ἀλή, *a divine wandering*. But ψεύδος, *falsehood*, signifies the contrary to lation, For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels anything to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the ψ conceals its meaning. But ὄν, *being*, and οὐσία *essence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an ι; for then they [421c] will signify ἰόν, or that which is in progression. And again, το οὐκ ον, or *non-being*, is by some denominated οὐκ ἰόν; that is, *not proceeding*.²

Socrates It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted.³

Socrates . . . for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain di-anoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called κόρος, it does not signify *a boy*, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect. But, according to report, Saturn is the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this name οὐράνια, from beholding things situated on high.⁴

Socrates It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which *carries* and *contains* nature, φυσικήν: but it may more elegantly be called ψυχή.⁵

Socrates And, in the first place, the first name which we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind [*v.s.* “certain names were established as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.”]

Hermogenes Which is that?

¹ Plato, *Cratylus* 419e-420b (tr. Taylor)

² *ibid.*, 421a-c

³ *ibid.*, 387c

⁴ *ibid.*, 396c

⁵ *ibid.*, 400b

Socrates *Prudence*, or *φρόνησις*: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that is plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, γνώμη, or *consideration*, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for το νωμόν is the same as το σκοπεῖν, *to speculate*. Again, νόησις, or *intelligence*, if you please, is του νέου ἐσις, or *the desire of that which is new*: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name νεόησις: for it was not as first called νόησις, but two ε ε ought to be substituted instead of η, so as to produce νεόεσις. But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies {412a} that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which account, by inserting ε, it ought to be called επιστήμενης. But σύνεσις appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. And when συνιέναι is said to take place, the same things happen in every respect, as when any one is said επιστάσθαι, *to know*; for συνιέναι asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obscure and foreign to us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express anything which accedes on a sudden, they say εούθη, *it rushed forth*: and the same of certain illustrious Lacedæmonian was Σούς, *i.e., one who rushes forwards*; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate *a swift impulse*. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along.¹

Cratylus, 419d-421a

From Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (tr. & Comm.). The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); The Cratylus. (pp. 502-4 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 419d-421a)

Socrates . . . but τέρπις [419d] delight, was derived from τερπνός, the pleasant. But το τερπνόν was called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through soul; it was therefore justly called ερπνόν, *i.e., inspiring*; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated τερπνόν. But, with respect ευφροσύνη, or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain *the why* of denomination; for it is obvious to everyone, that it was so called from ευ and συμφέρεσθαι, that is, from the soul's being well borne along conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in justice, to be denominated ευφερωσύνη; but, notwithstanding this, we call it ευφροσύνη.

Hermogenes What *opinion*, and such-like names, appear to you to signify?

Socrates *Opinion*, δόξα, was denominated from the *pursuing* which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from *the darting of an arrow*; and this last appears to be [420c] the most likely derivation. Hence οἴησις, *opinion*, harmonizes with δόξα; for it signifies the οἴησις, or ingress of the soul, in considering the οἶόν, or quality of a thing. Just as βουλή, counsel or deliberation, is so called from βολή, *hurling forth*: and βούλεσθαι, *to be willing*, signifies το ἐπιεσθαι, *to desire*, and βουλευεσθαι, *to consult*. For all these following δόξα, opin-

¹ Plato, *Cratylus* 411-412c (tr. Taylor)

ion, appear to be certain resemblances of βολή, *hurling forth*; just as the contrary of this αβουλία, or *a want of counsel*, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.

[420d]

Hermogenes You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleasing [503] to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of *necessity*, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

Socrates Το εχούσιον, therefore, or *the voluntary*, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say, εικόν τω ἰόντι, *yields to that which is in progression*; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to βούλησις, *the will*. But το αναγκαῖον and ἀντίτυπον, *i.e., the necessary and the resisting*, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about *guilt* and *ignorance*. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted [420e] with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, *necessity* was denominated from an assimilation to *a progression through a valley*. But as long as our strength remains we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.

[421a]

Hermogenes I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, *viz. truth, falsehood, and being*; and *why name*, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?

Socrates What therefore do you call μαίεσθαι?

Hermogenes I call it ζητεῖν, *to inquire*.

Cratylus on επιστήμη, 437a

. . . This name *επιστήμη*, *science*, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (*ἰστησω*) our soul at certain things, than that it is born along with them; and thence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of ε, *πιστήμη*, and to insert an ι instead of ε.¹



¹ Plato, *Cratylus* (pp. 502-3 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 437a)

Cratylus on άνθρωπος, 399b-c

Σωκράτης [399b]

ο αντι ρηματος ονομα ημιν γενηται, το τε ετερον αυτοθεν ιωτα εξειλομεν και αντι οξειας της μεσης συλλαβης βαρειαν εφθεγξαμεθα. αλλων δε τουναντιον εμβαλλομεν γραμματα, τα δε βαρύτερα <οξύτερα> φθεγγομεθα.

Ερμογένης

αληθη λεγεις.

Σωκράτης

τουτων τοινυν εν και το των ανθρωπων ονομα πεπονθεν, ως εμοι δοκει. εκ γαρ ρηματος ονομα γεγονεν, ενος γραμματος του αλφα εξαιρεθεντος και βαρύτερας της τελευτης γενομενης.

Ερμογένης

πως λεγεις;

Σωκράτης [399c]

ωδε. σημαινει τουτο το ονομα ο ανθρωπος οτι τα μεν θηρια ων ορα ουδεν επισκοπει ουδε αναλογιζεται ουδε αναθρει, ο δε ανθρωπος αμα εωρακεν — τουτο δ' εστι [το] οπωπε — και αναθρει και λογιζεται τουτο ο οπωπεν. εντευθεν δη μονον των θηριων ορθως ο ανθρωπος ωνομασθη — αναθρων α οπωπε.

Cf. translations by Taylor and Jowett:

Thus. This name man signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon what he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated άνθρωπος, viz. *contemplating what he beholds*. [TT]

I mean to say that the word “man” implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a oopen. [BJ]



Cratylus on motion, 426c-427d

From Fowler H.N. (tr.) *Plato: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias*. Vol. IV (1st ed. 1926). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, revised 1939 (Loeb Classical Library, Series Ed. J. Henderson); pp. 145-47.

Rho indicates motion

[426c] First, then, the letter rho seems to me to be an instrument expressing all motion. We have not as yet said why motion has the name *κίνησις*; but it evidently should be *ἴσις*, for in old times we did not employ eta, but epsilon. And the beginning of *κίνησις* is from *κίειν*, a foreign word equivalent to *ίέναι* (go). So we should find that the ancient word corresponding to our modern form would be *ἴσις*; but now by the employment of the foreign word *κίειν*, change of epsilon to eta, and the insertion of nu it has become *κίνησις*, though it ought to be *κείνεισις* or *εἴσις*.

[426d] And *στάσις* (rest) signifies the negation of motion, but is called *στάσις* for euphony. Well, the letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to be a fine instrument expressive of motion to the name-giver who wished to imitate rapidity, and he often applies it to motion.

For rho agitates and vibrates the tongue

In the first place, in the words:

ῥεῖν (flow) and *ῥοή* (current) he imitates their rapidity by this letter, [426e]

then in:

τρόμος (trembling) and in *τρέχειν* (run), and also in such words as *κρούειν* (strike), *θραύειν* (break), *ἐρείκειν* (rend), *θρύπτειν* (crush), *κερματίζειν* (crumble), *ῥυμβεῖν* (whirl),

he expresses the action of them all chiefly by means of the letter rho; for he observed, I suppose, that the tongue is least at rest and most agitated in pronouncing this letter, and that is probably the reason why he employed it for these words.

Iota makes words subtle and invisible

Iota again, he employs for everything subtle, which can most readily pass through all things.

[427a] Therefore he imitates the nature of

ίέναι (go) and *ἴεσθαι* (hasten) by means of iota,

Phi, psi, sigma, and zeta require breath for blowing

— just as he has imitated all such notions as

ψυχρόν (cold, shivering), *ζέον* (seething), *σειεσθαι* (shake), and *σεισμός* (shock) by means of phi, psi, sigma, and zeta, because those letters are pronounced with much breath.

Whenever he imitates that which resembles blowing, the giver of names always appears to use for the most part such letters.

Delta and tau bind and rest

And again he appears to have thought that the compression and pressure of the tongue in the pronunciation of delta and tau was naturally fitted [427b] to imitate the notion of binding and rest.

Lambda makes words glide

And perceiving that the tongue has a gliding movement most in the pronunciation of lambda, he made the words *λεῖα* (level), *όλισθάναι* (glide) itself, *λιπαρόν* (sleek), *κολλῶδες* (glutinous), and the like to conform to it.

Gamma stops any further gliding

Where the gliding of the tongue is stopped by the sound of gamma he reproduced the nature of *γλισχρόν* (glutinous), *γλυκύ* (sweet), and *γλωῶδες* (gluey).

Nu suggests internal sound

[427c] And again, perceiving that nu is an internal sound, he made the words *ἐνδον* (inside) and *ἐντός* (within), assimilating the meanings to the letters,

Alpha is assigned to greatness

and alpha again he assigned to greatness,

Eta gives length

and eta to length, because the letters are large.

Omicron suggests sphericity

He needed the sign O for the expression of *γόγγυλον* (round), and made it the chief element of the word. And in this way the lawgiver appears to apply the other letters, making by letters and syllables a name for each and every thing, and from these names he compounds all the rest by imitation.

[427d] This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the theory of the correctness of names, unless, indeed, Cratylus has some other view.



Cratylus decodes philosophically significant names

He never read a book without making extracts from it.
He also used to say, "No book was so bad, but what
some part of it might be found of use."

— Said of the elder Pliny¹

Abstinence–Frugality | Innocency–Αβλαβεια | Moderation– Modesty | Temperance–Σωφροσυνη

And from these considerations we may get at a very probable definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call σώφρων: and they call that virtue σωφροσύνη, which I at one time call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks; for they call frugal men χρησίμους, which implies only that they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for, though they might use the word αβλάβεια, for innocency is that disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other virtues are comprehended under frugality;²

Aether–Αιθηρ

From always running in a flowing progression, about the air; and on this account it may be called αιθεήρ. (tr. Taylor)³

Angels–Αγγελιοι, and Archangels

The most celebrated of the Babylonians, together with Ostanes and Zoroaster, very properly call the starry spheres *herds*; whether because these alone among corporeal magnitudes, are perfectly carried about a centre, or in conformity to the oracles, because they are considered by them as in a certain respect the bonds and collectors of physical reasons, which they likewise call in their sacred discourses herds, and by the insertion of a *gamma*, angels.

¹ *Plinius Epistolæ* 3, 5, 10. (Nihil enim legit, quod non exciperet. Dicere etiam solebat, nullum esse librum tam malum, ut non aliqua parte prodesset.) — *King's Quotation* 3308

² Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, III viii; (tr. Yonge). Full text in our Down to Earth Series. — ED. PHIL.

³ Cf. "Aether and Ether," in our Confusing Words Series. — ED. PHIL.

Wherefore the stars which preside over each of these herds are considered demons similar to the angels, and are called archangels: and they are seven in number.^{1, 2}

Aphrodite–Αφροδίτη

As for Aphrodite, we need not oppose Hesiod; we can accept his derivation of the name from her birth out of the foam (ἀφροῦ). (*tr.* Fowler)

Apollo, Dianas, Dionysi

I have already spoken of the most ancient of the Apollos, who is the son of Vulcan, and tutelar God of Athens. There is another, son of Corybas, and native of Crete, for which island he is said to have contended with Jupiter himself. A third, who came from the regions of the Hyperborei to Delphi, is the son of the third Jupiter and of Latona. A fourth was of Arcadia, whom the Arcadians called Nomio, because they regarded him as their legislator. There are likewise many Dianas. The first, who is thought to be the mother of the winged Cupid, is the daughter of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is more known, is daughter of the third Jupiter and of Latona. The third, whom the Greeks often call by her father's name, is the daughter of Upis and Glauce. There are many also of the Dionysi. The first was the son of Jupiter and Proserpine. The second, who is said to have killed Nysa, was the son of Nilus. The third, who reigned in Asia, and for whom the Sabazia were instituted, was the son of Caprius. The fourth, for whom they celebrate the Orphic festivals, sprung from Jupiter and Luna. The fifth, who is supposed to have instituted the Trieterides, was the son of Nysus and Thyone.³

Apollo, the Liberator, and the Simple

According to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called ἀπολύων, or the liberator; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called απλός, or simple, as he is denominated by the Thessalians since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple. (*tr.* Taylor)

Art–Τεχνη

Does not this denote possession of mind, if you remove the tau and insert omicron between the chi and the nu and the nu and the eta (making ἐχονόη)? *tr.* Fowler

¹ [The Greek text of this oracle is as follows:

Τῶν Βαβυλωνίων οἱ δοκιμωτάτοι, καὶ Οὐσανῆς, καὶ Ζῶροαστρῆς, ἀγέλας κυρίως καλοῦσιν τὰς ἀστρικός φαιρας. Ἦτοι παρ' ὅσον τελειῶς ἀγονταὶ περὶ τὸ κέντρον μόναι παρα τὰ σωματικά μεγαθη; ἢ ἀπο τοῦ συνδεσμοῦ πῶς καὶ συναγωγῆς χρηματίζειν δογματίζεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων, ἄς ἀγεοῦς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς λόγοις; κατὰ παρεμπύων δὲ τοῦ γαμμά, ἀγγελοῦς. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστην τούτων ἀγέλων ἐξαρχόντες ἀστέρων, καὶ δαιμόνων ὁμοίους ἀγγελοῦς, καὶ ἀρχαγγελοῦς προσαγορευεσθαι, οἵτερ, εἰσὶν ἑπτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν. — ED. PHIL.]

² Chaldæan Oracle No. 142 (Z. | Anon. in *Theologumenis Arithmetis*. — Tay.) in I.P. Cory's *Ancient Fragments*, 1832 (2nd ed.); p. 268. [Full text of the 3rd ed. in our Theosophy and Theosophists Series. — ED. PHIL.]

³ Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods*, III xxiii; (*tr.* Yonge).

Athena Pallas | Αθηνά Παλλάς

Those of us are right, I fancy, who think this name is derived from armed dances, for lifting oneself or anything else from the ground or in the hands is called shaking (πάλλειν) and being shaken, or dancing and being danced. . . . So that is the reason she is called Pallas. (tr. Fowler)

Body–Σωμα

Some say [that the human body] is the tomb (σῆμα) of the soul, their notion being that the soul is buried in the present life; and again, because by its means the soul gives any signs which it gives, it is for this reason also properly called “sign” (σῆμα). But I think it most likely that the Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing punishment for something; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe (σώμα) for the soul, until the penalty is paid, and not even a letter needs to be changed. (tr. Fowler)

Chaos–Χαος

“Water is the best of things, but gold is like burning fire,” says Pindar.¹ Therefore he positively assigns the second place to fire; with whom Hesiod agrees, where he says, “First of all Chaos being had.”² For most believe that by the word chaos he meant water, from χύσις, signifying diffusion. But the balance of argument as to this point seems to be equal. For there are some who will have it that fire is the principle of all things, and that like sperm it begets all things out of itself, and resolved all things again by conflagration.³

Consciousness [comprehension?] Συνεσις

Is a syllogism. And when *συνιέναι* is said to take place, the same things happen in every respect, as when any one is said *επιστάσθαι*, *to know*; for *συνιέναι* asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions. (tr. Taylor)

Plato derives σύνεσις from *συνιέναι* (σύνειμι), come together, neglecting the unwritten aspiration (*συνιέναι*). But the form and signification points to *συνιήμι*, to perceive, apprehend. Cf. Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea*, 114a, 17. (Liddell & Scott)

Consideration–Γνωμη

Signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for *το νομῶν* is the same as *το σκοπεῖν*, to speculate. (tr. Taylor)

Contrivance–Μηχανη

But do not, my friend, demand too much precision, lest you “enfeeble me of my sight.”⁴ For now that τέχνη (art) is disposed of, I am nearing the loftiest height of my subject, when once we have investigated μηχανή (contrivance). For I think μηχανή signifies ἄνευ ἐπι πολὺ (much accomplishment); for μήκος (length) has about the

¹ Pindar, *Olymp.* I, 1

² Hesiod, *Theog.* 116

³ Goodwin W.W. *et al.* (Tr. & Ed.). *Plutarch’s Morals*, Vol. V; Boston. Little, Brown & Co, 1878; [WHETHER WATER OF FIRE BE MOST USEFUL] § 1, p. 331; (tr. Fetherston).

⁴ [Homer, *Iliad* vi, 265]

same meaning as τὸ πολὺ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μήκος and ἄνειν. (*tr.* Fowler)

Cowardice–Δειλία | Perplexity–Απορία

But the nature of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι) is made clear, I think, also in the word δειλία (cowardice), which we have not yet discussed. We passed it by, when we ought to have examined it after ἀνδρεία (courage); and I fancy we passed over a good many other words. Now the meaning of δειλία is “a strong bond of the soul”; for λίαν (excessively) is, in a way, expressive of strength; so δειλία would be the excessive or greatest bond (δεσμός, δεῖν) of the soul; and so, too, ἀπορία (perplexity) is an evil, as is everything, apparently, which hinders motion and progress (πορεύεσθαι). This, then, seems to be the meaning of evil motion (κακῶς ἰέναι), that advance is halting and impeded; and the soul that is infected by it becomes filled with wickedness (κακία). If these are the reasons for the name of wickedness, virtue (ἀρετή) would be the opposite of this; it would signify first ease of motion, and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always unimpeded, and therefore it has received this name, which designates that which always flows (ἄει ρέον) without let or hindrance. It is properly called ἀειρεπτή, or perhaps also αἰρεπτή, indicating that this condition is especially to be chosen; but it has been compressed and is pronounced ἀρετή. (*tr.* Fowler)

Delight–Τερψις

Derived from τερπνός, the pleasant. But τὸ τερπνόν was called from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through soul; it was therefore justly called ερπνόν, *i.e.*, inspiring; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated τερπνόν. (*tr.* Taylor)

Desire–Επιθυμία

Evinces a power proceeding to θυμός anger. But θυμός, anger, derives its appellation from θύσεως and ζέσεως, raging and ardour. And again, ἡμερος, amatory desire, was so called from ῥω, or a flowing which vehemently attracts the soul; for because it flows excited, and desiring the possession of things, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called ἡμερος. (*tr.* Taylor)

Desire–Love–Ερως

Implies that it flows inwardly from an external source; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors ἔσπος, from εσπεῖν, to flow inwardly. But at present it is called ἔρως, through the insertion of an ω instead of ο. (*tr.* Taylor)

Desire–Ποθος

Was so called from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, and its effluxive streams, like ἡμερος, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. (*tr.* Taylor)

Dianoia–Διανοία

Thought, intention, purpose, process of thinking. Discursive thought (*opp.* νόησις)¹ Διάνοια is *opp.* of ρητόν, *i.e.*, spirit, *opp.* letter.² Aristotle’s “Διεξοδική του λόγου ενέργεια,” the discursive energy of reason, or “that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.”³

Ο εντός της ψυχής προς αυτήν διάλογος επωνομάσθη διάνοια.⁴

Ταχίστη η διανοίας κινήσις.⁵

Drasis–Praxis, Δρασις–Πραξις

Δράσις, strength, efficacy, action (*opp.* of passivity).

Δράττομαι, to grasp with the mind (but not as in grasping a drachma).

Δράω, to accomplish, to do.

Πράξις, the result or issue of business (*esp.* good results), action.

Earth–Γη

May be properly called γεννήτειρα, the producer, as Homer says; for he calls γεγάασι, γεγενήσθαι or that which is produced in itself. (*tr.* Taylor)

Energy–Ενέργεια vs. Movement–Κινήσις

Ενέργεια (activity, operations, *opp.* ἐξις-disposition, αργία) vs. Κινήσις (*opp.* rest-στάσις, ηρεμία) | In Aristotelian metaphysics:

opp. 1. δύναμις, actuality (Aristoteles: *Metaphysica* 1048a.26, al.);

opp. 2. ὕλη, substance in the sense of actuality (*ibid.*, 1042b.10);

opp. 3. εντελέχεια-entelecheia (εντελής + ἔκων) as actuality, to full reality (*ibid.*, 1050a.22 & 1047a.30); ενέργεια actually;

opp. 4. δυνάμει (*ibid.*, 1045b.19, al., etc.).

Energy is complete; movement, incomplete (*ibid.*, 1048b).⁶

Ennoia–Εννοία

The act of thinking, reflection, cogitation, notion, conception, intent, good sense. *Rhet.* Εννοία is thought, *opp.* of λέξις, diction.⁷

¹ Proclus, *Institutio Theologica* 123

² Hermogenes, *Περί των Στάσεων* 2

³ “An Explanation of Certain Terms Used by Aristotle, and His Greek Commentators” in: Taylor T. (*Tr. & Comm.*). *A Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle*. (Vol. XXVIII of the Thomas Taylor Series); Sturminster Newton: The Prometheus Trust, 2004; p. 525.

⁴ Plato, *Sophista* 263d

⁵ Aristoteles, *de Lincis Insecabīlicus* 968a

⁶ Liddell & Scott

⁷ Hermogenes, *Περί Ιδεών* 2.4

Enthusiasm–Ενθουσιασμός

[Plutarch quoting Plato on the etymology of enthusiasm, which is] . . . a kind of fury, partaking something of divine inspiration; neither it is engendered within, but is an insufflation from without, and a disturbance of the rational and considerative faculty, deriving its beginning and motion from some stronger power; the common affection of which is called the enthusiastic passion. For as *ἐμπνοος* signifies *filled with breath*, and *ἐμφορον* denotes *replete with prudence*; so this commotion of the soul is called enthusiasm (from *ένθεος*) by reason it participates of a more divine power. Now the prophetic part of enthusiasm derives itself from the inspiration of Apollo possessing the intellect of the soothsayer;¹

Equality–Ισονομία

Surely the mighty power of the Infinite Being is most worthy our great and earnest contemplation; the nature of which we must necessarily understand to be such that everything in it is made to correspond completely to some other answering part. This is called by Epicurus *ισονομία*; that is to say, an equal distribution or even disposition of things. From hence he draws this inference; that, as there is such a vast multitude of mortals, there cannot be a less number of immortals; and if those which perish are innumerable, those which are preserved ought also to be countless.²

Essence–Ουσία | Being–Ον

Ουσία harmonizes with truth by receiving the addition of an *ι*; for then it will signify *ιόν*, or that which is in progression. And again, *το οὐκ ον*, or non-being, is by some denominated *οὐκ ιόν*; that is, not proceeding. (*tr.* Taylor)

Essence–Ουσία | Vesta–Εστία

There are some who call it *εσσία*, and others again *ωσία*. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things *Εστία*, according to one of these names, *εσσία*: and because we denominate that which participates of essence *Εστία* essence, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called *Εστία*: for our ancestors were accustomed to call *ουσία*, essence, *εσσία*. (*tr.* Taylor)

Fatal Necessity–Ειμαρμένη

Hence first arose your *Ειμαρμένη*, as you call it, your fatal necessity; so that, whatever happens, you affirm that it flows from an eternal chain and continuance of causes. Of what value is this philosophy, which, like old women and illiterate men, attributes everything to fate?³

¹ Goodwin W.W. *et al.* (*Tr. & Ed.*). *Plutarch's Morals*, Vol. IV; Boston. Little, Brown & Co, 1878; [OF LOVE] 16, p. 279; (*tr.* Philips).

² Yonge C.D. (*Tr.*). *Marcus Tullius Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*. (1st ed. London: H.G. Bohn, 1853, was part of "The treatises of M.T. Cicero.") New York: Prometheus Books, 1997; Bk. I, xix, p. 19.

³ *ibid.*, Bk. I, xx, p. 20; [commenting upon Epicurean philosophy.]

Flourish–Θάλλειν

The word θάλλειν (flourish) seems to me to figure the rapid and sudden growth of the young. Something of that sort the namegiver has reproduced in the name, which he compounded of θεῖν (run) and ἄλλεσθαι (jump). You do not seem to notice how I rush along outside of the race-course, when I get on smooth ground. But we still have plenty of subjects left which seem to be serious. (*tr.* Fowler)

Fortitude is Aner–Ανηρ

Fortitude is derived from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than contrary fluxion. If anyone, therefore, takes away the δ from this name ανδρία fortitude, the name ανρία, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to the just; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner το ἄρρεν, that is, the male nature, and ανήρ man, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from ἄνω ροή, or a flowing upwards. (*tr.* Taylor)

Good–Αγαθόν

The word αγαθόν (good) is intended to denote the admirable (αγαστόν) in all nature. For since all things are in motion, they possess quickness and slowness; now not all that is swift, but only part of it, is admirable; this name αγαθόν is therefore given to the admirable (αγαστόν) part of the swift (θοοῦ). (*tr.* Fowler)

Governing part of the universe is Hegemonikon–Ηγεμονικόν

It is nature, consequently, that continues and preserves the world, and that, too, a nature which is not destitute of sense and reason; for in every essence that is not simple, but composed of several parts, there must be some predominant quality — as, for instance, the mind in man, and in beasts something resembling it, from which arise all the appetites and desires for anything. As for trees, and all the vegetable produce of the earth, it is thought to be in their roots. I call that the predominant quality,¹ which the Greeks call ηγεμονικόν; which must and ought to be the most excellent quality, wherever it is found. That, therefore, in which the prevailing quality of all nature resides must be the most excellent of all things, and most worthy of the power and pre-eminence over all things.²

¹ The Latin word is *principatus*, which exactly corresponds with the Greek word here used by Cicero; by which is to be understood the superior, the most prevailing excellence in every kind and species of things through the universe. [Chrysippus' and Cleanthes' "governing part of the Universe" or Zeno's "authoritative part of the Soul." — ED. PHIL.]

² Yonge C.D. (*Tr.*). *Marcus Tullius Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*. [1st ed. London: H.G. Bohn, 1853, was part of "The treatises of M.T. Cicero."] New York: Prometheus Books, 1997; Bk. II, xi, p. 55.

Happiness–Ευδαιμονία

What is *ευδαιμονία*,¹ or happiness: but *αγαθός δαίμων*, or, a good *dæmon*, or spirit? What then dost thou do here, O opinion? By the Gods I adjure thee, that thou get thee gone, as thou earnest: for I need thee not. Thou earnest indeed unto me according to thy ancient wonted manner. It is that, that all men have ever been subject unto. That thou camest therefore I am not angry with thee, only begone, now that I have found thee what thou art.²

Harts–Ελαφοι

Called *έλαφοι*, not from their swiftness (*ελαφρότης*), but from a faculty which they have of drawing serpents to them (*έλκειν όφεις*). So sheep call the wolf by the sound of their feet, and the panther allures to her paws both apes and other creatures by the fragrant smell of her body.³

Hero–Ηρως

The word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name: in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians, and sophists is, in consequence of this, a heroic tribe. (*tr.* Taylor)

Hilarity–Ευφροσυνη

It was so called from *ευ* and *συμφέρεσθαι*, that is, from the soul's being well borne along conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in justice, to be denominated *ευφερωσώνη*; but, notwithstanding this, we call it *ευφροσώνη*. (*tr.* Taylor)

Hubris–Υβρις and Via–Βία, two words for violence

Characteristics of Eris–Ερις

Υβρις-hybris is wanton violence arising from the pride of strength; *βία* is bodily force, act of violence, outrage:

“*υβρις* is that pride and contempt which leads one who feels that he is in a superior position to treat with injustice and violence his inferior. It is joined with *βιη* in *Od.* XV 329 of the arrogance and outrageous conduct of the suitors, and is here the opposite of *δικη*. . . . It is exemplified by the fable of the hawk and nightingale . . . ”⁴

¹ [*ευδαιμονία* contains the word *δαίμων* in composition.]

² Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, 7, xiv; [full text in our Living the Life Series. — ED. PHIL.]

³ Goodwin W.W. *et al.* (*Tr. & Ed.*). *Plutarch's Morals*, Vol. V; Boston. Little, Brown & Co, 1878; [WATER OR LAND ANIMALS?] § 24, p. 197; (*tr.* Philips).

⁴ Cf. Hays H.M. *Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod with Introduction and Appendix: a Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*. Chicago, University of Chicago Libraries, 1918 [Private Edition]; note 213, p. 107. Also cf. “*βιη* is a result of *υβρις* and both are characteristic of (the bad) *Ερις*, and hence we have the maxim of the seven sages (Stobæus III 79): *πραπε δικαία, υβριν μισει, ερω μισει*. Compare *Il.* XVI 386-7, where Zeus is angry with men, who *βιη* render perverse decisions and drive out *δικη*. So the suitors (*Od.* XIV 90-92) are not willing to woo *δικαιως*, but consume another's property *υπερβιον*.” *ibid.*, note 275, p. 118.

Incorporeal–Ασώματων

[Plato] asserts that God is a being without any body — what the Greeks call *ασώματος*.¹

Injustice–Αδικία | Courage–Ανδρεία

What remains to consider after justice? I think we have not yet discussed courage. It is plain enough that injustice (ἀδικία) is really a mere hindrance of that which passes through (τοῦ διαϊόντος), but the word ἀνδρεία (courage) implies that courage got its name in battle, and if the universe is flowing, a battle in the universe can be nothing else than an opposite current or flow (ροή). Now if we remove the delta from the word ἀνδρεία, the word ἀνρεία signifies exactly that activity. Of course it is clear that not the current opposed to every current is courage, but only that opposed to the current which is contrary to justice; for otherwise courage would not be praised. (*tr.* Fowler)

Intelligence–Νόησις

Is του νέου ἔσις, or the desire of that which is new: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name νεόησις: for it was not as first called νόησις, but two ε ε ought to be substituted instead of η, so as to produce νεόεσις. But temperate signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered. (*tr.* Taylor)

Νόησις (intelligence) is merely ἔσις (desire) τοῦ νεοῦ (of the new); but that things are new shows that they are always being generated; therefore the soul's desire for generation is declared by the giver of the name νεόεσις; for in antiquity the name was not νόησις, but two epsilons had to be spoken instead of the eta. (*tr.* Fowler)

Intuition–Νοερα επιβολη

Thomas Taylor renders Plotinus' *νοερα επιβολη* as intuition through the projecting energies of intellect. "All the Gods are venerable and beautiful, and their beauty is immense. What else however is it but intellect through which they are such? and because intellect energizes in them in so great a degree as to render them visible [by its light]?"²

Jupiter–Ζευς

Is the offspring of a certain dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called κόρος, it does not signify a boy, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect. But, according to report, Saturn is the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this name οὐράνια, from beholding things situated on high. (*tr.* Taylor)

¹ Yonge C.D. (*Tr.*). *Marcus Tullius Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*. [1st ed. London: H.G. Bohn, 1853, was part of "The treatises of M.T. Cicero."] New York: Prometheus Books, 1997; Bk. I, xii, pp. 12-13.

² Cf. Taylor T. (*Tr. & Annot.*). *Collected Writings of Plotinus*. (Vol. III of The Thomas Taylor Series) Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 2000; [*Introduction to Select Works of Plotinus*, p. 168; quoting *Intelligible Beauty*].

Just–Δικαιον

It is easy to conjecture that the word δικαιοσύνη applies to the understanding (σύνεσις) of the just (τοῦ δικαίου); but the word δίκαιον (just) is itself difficult. Up to a certain point, you see, many men seem to agree about it, but beyond that they differ. For those who think the universe is in motion believe that the greater part of it is of such a nature as to be a mere receptacle, and that there is some element which passes through all this, by means of which all created things are generated. And this element must be very rapid and very subtle; for it could not pass through all the universe unless it were very subtle, so that nothing could keep it out, and it must be very swift, so that all other things are relatively at rest. Since, then, it superintends and passes through (διδιόν) all other things, this is rightly called by the name δίκαιον, the sound of the kappa being added merely for the sake of euphony. Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice (δίκαιον); and I, Hermogenes, being very much in earnest about it, have persistently asked questions and have been told in secret teachings that this is justice, or the cause — for that through which creation takes place is a cause — and someone told me that it was for this reason rightly called Zeus (Δία). (*tr.* Fowler)

Justice–Δικαιοσύνη is Higher Mind–Νους

But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless ask them quietly, “What then, my most excellent friend, if this is true, is justice?” they think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches.¹ They say I have been told enough; they try to satisfy me by saying all sorts of different things, and they no longer agree. For one says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning (διδιόντα καὶ καίοντα) them. Then when I am pleased and tell this to someone, thinking it is a fine answer, he laughs at me and asks if I think there is no justice among men when the sun has set. So I beg him to tell me what he thinks it is, and he says “Fire.” But this is not easy to understand. He says it is not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. Another man says he laughs at all these notions, and that justice is what Anaxagoras says it is, mind [νοῦς]; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself, is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. Then, my friend, I am far more perplexed than before I undertook to learn about the nature of justice. But I think the name — and that was the subject of our investigation — was given for the reasons I have mentioned. (*tr.* Fowler)

Knowledge–Επιστήμη

And ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) indicates that the soul which is of any account accompanies (ἔπειται) things in their motion, neither falling behind them nor running in front of them; therefore we ought to insert an epsilon and call it ἐπεῖσθήμη. Σύνεσις (intelligence) in its turn is a kind of reckoning together; when one says συνιέναι (understand), the same thing as ἐπίστασθαι is said; for συνιέναι means that the soul goes with things. (*tr.* Fowler)

¹ [A trench was the limit of the leap for the pentathletes.]

Law–Νόμος–Νεμῶν

He that runs away from his master is a fugitive. But the law is every man's master. He therefore that forsakes the law, is a fugitive. So is he, whosoever he be, that is either sorry, angry, or afraid, or for anything that either hath been, is, or shall be by his appointment, who is the Lord and Governor of the universe. For he truly and properly is *Νόμος*, or the law, as the only *νέμων*, or distributor and dispenser of all things that happen unto any one in his lifetime. Whatsoever then is either sorry, angry, or afraid, is a fugitive.¹

Labour and Pain differ

There is some difference between labour and pain; they border upon one another, but still there is a certain difference between them. Labour is a certain exercise of the mind or body, in some employment or undertaking of serious trouble and importance; but pain is a sharp motion in the body, disagreeable to our senses. — Both these feelings, the Greeks, whose language is more copious than ours, express by the common name of Πόνος: therefore they call industrious men painstaking, or, rather, fond of labour; we, more conveniently, call them laborious; for labouring is one thing, and enduring pain another. You see, O Greece! your barrenness of words, sometimes, though you think you are always so rich in them. I say, then, that there is a difference between labouring and being in pain. When Caius Marius had an operation performed for a swelling in his thigh, he felt pain; when he headed his troops in a very hot season, he laboured. Yet these two feelings bear some resemblance to one another; for the accustoming ourselves to labour makes the endurance of pain more easy to us. And it was because they were influenced by this reason that the founders of the Grecian form of government provided that the bodies of their youth should be strengthened by labour, which custom the Spartans transferred even to their women, who in other cities lived more delicately, keeping within the walls of their houses; but it was otherwise with the Spartans.

The Spartan women, with a manly air,
Fatigues and dangers with their husbands share;
They in fantastic sports have no delight,
Partners with them in exercise and fight.

And in these laborious exercises pain interferes sometimes. They are thrown down, receive blows, have bad falls, and are bruised, and the labour itself produces a sort of callousness to pain.²

Madness–Insania and Raving–Furor differ

They, then, who are said not to be masters of themselves, are said to be so because they are not under the government of reason, to which is assigned by nature the power over the whole soul. Why the Greeks should call this mania, I do not easily apprehend; but we define it much better than they, for we distinguish this madness (*insania*), which, being allied to folly, is more extensive, from what we call *furor*, or raving. The Greeks, indeed, would do so too, but they have no one word that will ex-

¹ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 10, xxv; full text in our Living the Life Series. — ED. PHIL.

² Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, II xv (tr. Yonge); full text in our Down to Earth Series. — ED. PHIL.

press it: what we call *furor*, they call μελαγχολία, as if the reason were affected only by a black bile, and not disturbed as often by a violent rage, or fear, or grief. Thus we say Athamas, Alcmaeon, Ajax, and Orestes were raving (*furere*); because a person affected in this manner was not allowed by the Twelve Tables¹ to have the management of his own affairs; therefore the words are not, if he is mad (*insanus*), but if he begins to be raving (*furiosus*). For they looked upon madness to be an unsettled humour that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (*furor*), but cannot possibly be afflicted by insanity (*insania*). But this is another question: let us now return to our original subject.²

Man–Ανηρ vs. Woman–Γυνή

The words ἄρρεν (male) and ἀνήρ (man) refer, like ἀνδρεία, to the upward (ἄνω) current or flow. The word γυνή (woman) seems to me to be much the same as γονή (birth). I think θῆλυ (female) is derived from θηλή (teat); and is not θηλή, Hermogenes, so called because it makes things flourish (τεθηλέναι), like plants wet with showers? (tr. Fowler)

Man–Ανθρώπος

This name man signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon what he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ἀνθρώπος, viz. *contemplating what he beholds*. (tr. Taylor)

Man is the measure of all things

Attributed to Protagoras.

Members and Parts

As several members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dispersed, all made and prepared for one common operation. And this thou shalt apprehend the better, if thou shalt use thyself often to say to thyself, I am μέλος, or a member of the mass and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say I am μέρος, or a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bounty, is not yet grounded upon a due ratiocination and right apprehension of the nature of things.³

¹ [Lex Duodecim Tabularum or, simply, Duodecim Tabulae was the ancient legislation that stood at the foundation of Roman law.]

² Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, III v; (tr. Yonge)

³ *ibid.*, 7 x

Name–Όνομα

A name is an instrument endowed with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web. The word was composed from that discourse which asserts that ὄν, being, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that we call ονομαστόν, or capable of being named; for in this it clearly appears that name is an enquiry about being. (tr. Taylor)

Names of divine origin–Όνοματα θεοσδοτα

There are many names of divine origin in every nation, which possess an ineffable power in mystic ceremonies. (Εστι γαρ ονοματα παρ' εκαστοις θεοσδοτα, | Δυναμιν εν τελεταις αρρητον εκοντα.)¹

Names of Gods

The most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name.

Names were first established by no despicable persons, but by men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study. (tr. Taylor)

Necessity–Αναγκαίον | Voluntary–Εχουσιον

To εχουσιον or the voluntary, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say, εικόν τω ιόντι, yields to that which is in progression; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to βούλησις, the will. But το αναγκαίον and αντιτυπον, i.e., the necessary and the resisting, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about guilt and ignorance. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, necessity was denominated from an assimilation to a progression through a valley. (tr. Taylor)

Noble Death–Ευθανασια

This kind of easy death, or *euthanasia*, has an esoteric meaning. It symbolises the death of any adept who has reached the power and degree, as also the purification, which enable him to die only in the physical body and *still live and lead a conscious life* in his astral body. The variations on this theme are endless, but the secret meaning is ever the same. The Pauline expression “that he should not see death” — *ut non videret mortem*² — has thus an esoteric meaning, but nothing *supernatural* in it. The mangled interpretation given of some Biblical hints to the effect that Enoch, “whose years will equal those of the world,” (of the *Solar* year, 365 days), will share with Christ and the prophet Elijah the honours and bliss of the last advent and of the de-

¹ *Chaldean Oracle* 157; (tr. Taylor).

² *Hebrews* xi, 5

struction of Antichrist — signify, *esoterically*, that some of the great adepts will return in the Seventh Race, when all Error will be made away with, and the advent of TRUTH will be heralded by those *Sishtas*, the holy “Sons of Light.”¹

Nous–Νους

Mind as active principle in the Universe.²

Nous is the Pythagorean name for monad.³

Η του κόσμου γένεσις εξ ανάγκης και του νου συστάσεως.⁴

Nous–Higher Mind is Δικαιοσυνη–Justice

One says the sun is justice, for the sun alone superintends all things, passing through and burning (δαιϊόντα και καίοντα) them. [Another says is Fire], not actual fire, but heat in the abstract that is in the fire. . . . Anaxagoras says it is, mind [νούς]; for mind, he says, is ruled only by itself [αυτοκράτωρ], is mixed with nothing, orders all things, and passes through them. (tr. Fowler)

Nymph is Lymph

If the reader turns to Webster’s *Dictionary* he will find therein a curious explanation of the words “lymphatic” and “lymph.” Etymologists think that the Latin word *lympa* is derived from the Greek *nymphē*, “a nymph or inferior Goddess,” they say. “The Muses were sometimes called *nymphs* by the poets. Hence [according to Webster] all persons in a state of rapture, as seers, poets, madmen, etc., were said to be caught by the nymphs (νυμφόληπτοι).”⁵

The Goddess of Moisture (the Greek and Latin *nymph* or *lymph*, then) is fabled in India as being born from the pores of one of the Gods, whether the Ocean God, Varuna, or a minor “River God” is left to the particular sect and fancy of the believers.⁶

Occult meaning–Υπονοια

On the subject of the Gods, we hold to the esoteric method of the *hyponoia* taught by Ammonius Saccas, in other words to the occult meaning of the term.⁷

Opinion–Δοξα

Was denominated from the pursuing which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from the darting of an arrow; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence οἴσις, opinion, harmonizes with δόξα; for it signifies the οἴσις, or ingress of the soul, in considering the οἶον, or quality of a thing. Just as βουλή, counsel or deliberation, is so called from βολή, hurling forth: and βούλεσθαι, to be willing, signifies το ἐπιεσθαι, to desire, and

¹ *Secret Doctrine*, II p. 531

² Anaxagoras, fr. 12

³ Iamblichus, *Theologumena Arithmetice* 6

⁴ Plato, *Timæus* 48a

⁵ [Consult “Lymph is a masque for Nymph,” in our Constitution of Man Series, and “Porphyry on the Cave of the Nymphs - tr. Taylor,” in the same series. — ED. PHIL.]

⁶ *Blavatsky Collected Writings*, (KOSMIC MIND) XII pp. 148-49

⁷ *ibid.*, (THE NEW CYCLE) XI p. 123

βουλευέσθαι, to consult. For all these following δόξα, opinion, appear to be certain resemblances of βολή, hurling forth; just as the contrary of this αβουλία, or a want of counsel, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire. (tr. Taylor)

Otherness–Ετεροτητι

[On rendering Plotinus' *ετεροτητι* as *otherness*:] In the original *ετεροτητι*, which is derived from *ετερος* *another*. And this word is *properly* used when we speak of two things only. Hence, *ετεροτης* must not be considered in this place as merely signifying *difference*; for universally one thing is separated from another by difference, but as denoting the greatest proximity and alliance.¹

Παντα (all) is derived from πεντε (five)

This is the reason why the ancients were used to express numbering or reckoning by *πεμπάσασθαι*, to count by fives. And I am of opinion that that word *πάντα*, *all*, is derived from *πέντε*, which is to say *five*, five being compounded of the first numbers. For all the other numbers being afterwards multiplied by others, they produce numbers different from themselves; whereas five, being multiplied by an even number, produceth a perfect ten, and multiplied by an odd number, representeth itself again; not to insist that it is composed of the two first tetragons or quadrature numbers (unity and four), and that, being the first number whose square is equivalent to the two squares before it, it composeth the fairest of right angled triangles, and is the first number which containeth the sesquilateral proportion.²

Preconception–Προληψις

For what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity? Epicurus calls this *πρόληψις*;³ that is, an antecedent conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus concerning the Rule and Judgment of Things.⁴

Providence–Προνοια

. . . the old prophetic dame, the *Πρόνοια* of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence.⁵

¹ Taylor T. (Tr. & Annot.). *Collected Writings of Plotinus*. (Vol. III of The Thomas Taylor Series) Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 2000; [*Ennead* V, i ¶ 6, p. 307 fr.].

² Published under the title "Why the Oracles cease to give answers" In: *Plutarch's Morals*. Translated from the Greek by Robert Midgley, M.D. Corrected and revised edition by William W. Goodwin with an Introduction by Ralph Waldo Emerson. (1st ed. 1684-94, London, 5-vols.) This excerpt is from the 1878 ed. (based on the 5th ed. of 1718), Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.; Vol. III, p. 44.

³ Preconception, mental picture or scheme into which experience is fitted. (*Liddell & Scott*)

⁴ Yonge C.D. (Tr.). *Marcus Tullius Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*. [1st ed. London: H.G. Bohn, 1853, was part of "The treatises of M.T. Cicero."] New York: Prometheus Books, 1997; Bk. I, xvi, p. 7.

⁵ *ibid.*, Bk. I, viii, p. 8

Prudence–Φρονησις

It is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that is plainly conversant with agitation. (*tr.* Taylor)

Psyche–Ψυχη

That power which carries and contains nature, is φυσικήν: but in may more elegantly be called ψυχή. (*tr.* Taylor)

I think those who gave the soul its name had something of this sort in mind: they thought when it was present in the body it was the cause of its living, giving it the power to breathe and reviving it (ἀναψύχον), and when this revivifying force fails, the body perishes and comes to an end therefore, I think, they called it ψυχή. (*tr.* Fowler)

Science [knowledge] Επιστημη

Implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. (*tr.* Taylor)

Scythia

The Scythians of Herodotus and those of Ptolemy and Roman writers are two entirely different nationalities. The former gave the name of Scythia to the extension of land from the mouth of the Danube to the Sea of Azov (according to Niebuhr), and to the mouth of the Don (according to H.C. Rawlinson); whereas the Scythia of Ptolemy is a country exclusively Asiatic, including the whole of northern Asia between the Volga and Serikos (China). Furthermore, this Scythia was divided by the western Himalayas, which the Roman historians called *Imaus*, into Scythia *intra Imaum* and Scythia *extra Imaum*.¹

Self-Restraint–Σωφροσυνη

Σωφροσύνη (self-restraint) is σωτηρία (salvation) of φρόνησις (wisdom), which we have just been discussing. (*tr.* Fowler)

Sophia–Σοφια and Phronesis–Φρονησις, two words for Wisdom

Wisdom (φρόνησις) is perception (νόησις) of motion (φορᾶς) and flowing (ροῦ); or it might be understood as benefit (ὄνησις) of motion (φορᾶς); in either case it has to do with motion. (*tr.* Fowler)

Soul–Ενδελχεια

Aristotle, a man superior to all others, both in genius and industry (I always except Plato), after having embraced these four known sorts of principles,² from which all things deduce their origin, imagines that there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the soul; for to think, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent anything, and many other attributes of the same kind, such as to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be pleased or displeased — these, and others like them, exist, he thinks, in none of those first four kinds: on such account he adds a fifth kind, which

¹ *Caves and Jungles of Hindostan*, p. 224

² [*i.e.*, “the heart, the blood, the brain, air, or fire.” *v.s.*]

has no name, and so by a new name he calls the soul ενδελέχεια, as if it were a certain continued and perpetual motion.¹

Stars are not Στερέμνια

Epicurus, who not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls Στερέμνια;² but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.³

Sunbeams are extensions of the Sun

The sun seemeth to be shed abroad. And indeed it is diffused but not effused. For that diffusion of it is a τάσις or an extension. For therefore are the beams of it called ακτίνες from the word εκτείνεσθαι, to be stretched out and extended. Now what a sunbeam is, thou mayest know if thou observe the light of the sun, when through some narrow hole it pierceth into some room that is dark. For it is always in a direct line. And as by any solid body, that it meets with in the way that is not penetrable by air, it is divided and abrupted, and yet neither slides off, or falls down, but stayeth there nevertheless: such must the diffusion in the mind be; not an effusion, but an extension. What obstacles and impediments soever she meeteth within her way, she must not violently, and by way of an impetuous onset light upon them; neither must she fall down; but she must stand, and give light unto that which doth admit of it.⁴

Suns, Five

Though *Sol* (the sun) is so called, you say, because he is *solus*, single; yet how many suns do theologists mention?

There is one, the son of Jupiter and grandson of Æther;

Another, the son of Hyperion;

A third, who, the Egyptians say, was of the city Heliopolis, sprung from Vulcan, the son of Nilus;

A fourth is said to have been born at Rhodes of Acantho, in the times of the heroes, and was the grandfather of Jalysus, Camirus, and Lindus;

A fifth, of whom, it is pretended, Aretes and Circe were born at Colchis.⁵

¹ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, I x; (tr. Yonge). Full text in our Down to Earth Series. — ED. PHIL.

² Στερέμνια is the word which Epicurus used to distinguish between those objects which are perceptible to sense, and those which are imperceptible; as the essence of the Divine Being, and the various operations of the divine power.

³ Yonge C.D. (Tr.). *Marcus Tullius Cicero: The Nature of the Gods*. [1st ed. London: H.G. Bohn, 1853, was part of "The treatises of M.T. Cicero."] New York: Prometheus Books, 1997; Bk. I, xviii, pp. 18-19.

⁴ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 8, liv; [full text in our Living the Life Series. — ED. PHIL.]

⁵ Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods*, III xxi; (tr. Yonge)

Theophania–Θεοφανεια

“ . . . the Greek, rarely-used word, ‘Theophania,’ meant more with the Neo-Platonists than it does with the modern maker of dictionaries. The compound word, *Theophania* (from *theos*, ‘God,’ and *phainesthai*, ‘to appear’) does not simply mean ‘a manifestation of God to man by *actual* appearance’ — an absurdity, by the way — but the actual presence of a God in man, a *divine* incarnation. When Simon the Magician claimed to be ‘God the Father,’ what he wanted to convey was just that which has been explained, namely, that he was a *divine* incarnation of his own Father, whether we see in the latter an Angel, a God, or a Spirit; therefore he was called ‘that power of God which is called great,’¹ or that power which causes the Divine Self to enshrine itself in its lower self — man.”²

Thought–Γνώμη

And γνώμη (thought), if you please, certainly denotes contemplation and consideration of generation (γονῆς νόμησις); for to consider is the same as to contemplate. (*tr.* Fowler)

Titans

The ancients termed Titans, that is *tormented* and *punished* (from *τινω*).³

Tragedy–Τραγωδία

Well, the true part [of speech] is smooth and divine and dwells aloft among the gods, but falsehood dwells below among common men, is rough and like the tragic goat; for tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life.

[The chorus of the primitive performances from which tragedy developed appeared as satyrs, clad in goat-skins. Hence the name τραγωδία (goat-song). The adjective τραγικός may mean either “goat-like” or “tragic.” In this passage it has both meanings.]⁴

Truth–Αληθεια vs. Falsehood–Ψευδος

This name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being and therefore implies that it is θεία ἀλη, a divine wandering. But, signifies the contrary to lation, for here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels anything to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the ψ conceals its meaning. (*tr.* Taylor)

Underworld Hades–Αἴδης

The name “Hades” is not in the least derived from the invisible (αειδής), but far more probably from knowing (εἰδέναι) all noble things, and for that reason he was called Hadēs by the lawgiver. (*tr.* Fowler)

¹ [Acts viii, 10; RV]

² *Blavatsky Collected Writings*, (SOME REASONS FOR SECRECY) XIV pp. 52-53

³ Goodwin W.W. *et al.* (*Tr. & Ed.*). *Plutarch's Morals*, Vol. V; Boston. Little, Brown & Co, 1878; [OF EATING FLESH] Tract II, p. 10; (*tr.* Baxter).

⁴ *Cratylus* 408c (*tr.* & note by H.N. Fowler)

Virtue–Αρετή vs. Wickedness–Κακία

As I was just saying, we must go on to the loftiest height of our subject; we must search for the meaning of the words ἀρετή (virtue) and κακία (wickedness). Now one of them I cannot yet see; but the other seems to be quite clear, since it agrees with everything we have said before. For inasmuch as all things are in motion, everything that moves badly (κακῶς ἰόν) would be evil (κακία); and when this evil motion in relation to its environment exists in the soul, it receives the general name κακία (evil) in the special sense of wickedness. (*tr.* Fowler)

Wisdom–Phronesis–Φρόνησις

Wisdom (φρόνησις); for it is perception (νόησις) of motion (φορᾶς) and flowing (ροῦ); or it might be understood as benefit (ὄνησις) of motion (φορᾶς); in either case it has to do with motion. (*tr.* Fowler)

Wisdom–Phronesis and Sophrosyne–Σωφροσύνη differ

Σωφροσύνη (self-restraint) is σωτηρία (salvation) of φρόνησις (wisdom). Ευφροσύνη (mirth) needs no explanation, for it is clear to anyone that from the motion of the soul in harmony (εὐ) with the universe, it received the name ευφροσύνη, as it rightfully is; but we call it ευφροσύνη. (*tr.* Fowler)

Wisdom–Σοφία

Signifies the touching upon [grasp of] local motion . . . when [the poets] wish to express anything which accedes on a sudden, they say εὐύθη, it rushed forth: and the same of certain illustrious Lacedæmonian was Σοῦς, *i.e.*, one who rushes forwards; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate a swift impulse. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. (*tr.* Taylor)

Certainly σοφία (wisdom) denotes the touching of motion. This word is very obscure and of foreign origin; but we must remember that the poets often say of something which begins to advance εὐύθη (it rushed). There was a famous Laconian whose name was Σοῦς (Rush), for this is the Laconian word for rapid motion. Now σοφία signifies the touching (ἐπαφή) of this rapid motion, the assumption being that things are in motion. (*tr.* Fowler)

Woman–Γυνή

Appears to me to imply begetting; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated. (*tr.* Taylor)

Zoe–Ζωή and Bios–Βίος differ

Zoe (ζωή) in the sense of:

- 1 Living, *i.e.*, one's substance, property, etc.,
- 2 Life, existence, opp. death,
- 3 Way of life. Bios (βίος) in the sense of life, *i.e.*, not animal life (ζωή), but mode of life and manner of living. (*Liddell & Scott*)

Zōē and Bios are often used interchangeably with additional meanings ascribed to them by different authors. A distinction that students of Occultism may find helpful is Zoe as the “ocean of life,” a self-moving Kosmos embracing all beings;¹ and bios, as individualised, sentient life. To the Vital Self, the 1st aspect of Man, H.P. Blavatsky assigns bios in the sense of *zotike dynamis* (ζωτική δύναμις) or *vis vitalis*, to denote the life-sustaining force, a breath and shadow of the One Life, appropriated by an embodied existence. (ED. PHIL.)



¹ Cf. *Timæus* 30b

Proclus on Cratylus

Proclus on Cratylus, 16-43

Additional notes from Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (*tr. & Comm.*). The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); (*pp.* 546-49 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 16-43)

16 That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus; but Democritus and Aristotle of Hermogenes. Pythagoras therefore being asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number; and being asked what was the next in wisdom said, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the first and properly number¹ subsists after the superessential one. This likewise supplies the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself, subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence are the same, so there also number and wisdom are the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesses the images, and essential transitive reasons of them, as statues of beings. Being therefore is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with wisdom; but that they are denominated is from soul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things. Names therefore are from nature.

But Democritus, who said that names subsist from position, inferred this from four arguments:

- 1 From sameness of appellation; for different things are called by the same name. Names therefore are not from nature.
- 2 From the variety of names, for if different names are adapted to one and the same thing, they are also adapted to each other, which is impossible.
- 3 From the change of names: for why was Aristocles called Plato, but Turtamus Theophrastus.
- 4 If names are from nature, but yet from a defect of similars, why do we say φρονεῖν from φρόνησις but from δικαιοσύνη (οὐκ ἐστὶ παρονομάζειν) we do not derive a word which alludes to this?

Names therefore are casual and not from nature. But he calls the first argument πολύσημος, (*i.e.*, *having a manifold signification*); the second, ἰσόροπος, (*i.e.*, *equiva-*

¹ That is, number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number, according to hyparxis, subsists at the summit of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual order.

lent, or *equiponderant*); and the fourth, *ώνυμος* (i.e., *nameless*). In answer to the first of these arguments, some say, that it is nothing wonderful, if one name shadows forth many things, as *έρως*, *love*, both from *ρώμη*, *strength*, and from *πτερόν* *a wing*, manifests different things. In answer to the second, it is said, nothing hinders that different names, in a different respect, may manifest the same thing. Thus, for instance, in the words *merops* and *man*, the same thing may be called by the former of these words, according to the possession of a distributed life, and [547] by the latter according to *αναθρεῖν αὐτὸν ὡς ἔβλεπεν* *considering what he has seen*. In answer to the third, it is said, that this very thing signifies that names are by nature, *viz.* that we transfer those that are not properly established, and which are contrary to nature, to a position according to nature. And in answer to the fourth, that it is nothing wonderful, if names which were established at first should fail through a great length of time.

17 That a subsistence according to nature is fourfold. For it is either as the essences of plants and animals, as well the wholes as the parts; or it is as *the* energies and powers of these, such as the levity and heat of fire; or it is as shadows and appearances in mirrors; or as artificial images are assimilated to their archetypes. Epicurus therefore thought that names had a subsistence from nature according to the first signification, as works precedaneous by nature, such as voice and sight. And as to see and to hear are according to nature, so also to denominate; so that a name is from nature, as being the work of nature. But Cratylus was of this opinion according to the second signification; and hence he says that the peculiarity of everything is a name, as being appropriately assigned by the founders of names, artificially and scientifically. For Epicurus said, that the founders of names did not establish them scientifically, but in effecting this were moved physically, like those that snore, howl, roar, and sigh. But Socrates said, that names are from nature, according to the fourth signification, as being the progeny of scientific conceptions, and not of physical appetite (*ορεξις*), but of the soul energizing according to imagination, and at the same time establishing names from the first, as much as possible, appropriately to things. He likewise said, that, according to form, all names are the same, have one power, and are from nature. For, according to form, they are similar to things, but differ from each other according to matter.

18 That the name Cratylus appears to have been assigned *παρὰ τὸ περικρατήσαι ἀραρότως τῶν Ἡρακλείτου δογμάτων*, from *firmly obtaining the dogmas of Heraclitus*, and that on this account he despised flowing things, as not properly having a subsistence. But the name Socrates is *παρὰ τὸ σωτήρα εἶναι τοῦ κράτους τῆς Ψυχῆς*, from *being the saviour of the strength of his soul*, that is of his reason, and from not being drawn down under the senses.

19 That things eternal receive their denomination from powers or energies, but things generated from use and communion.

20 That he who wishes to imitate anything, ought to be scientifically knowing in two things, *viz.* the archetype, and demiurgic art.

22 That the Heraclitics are accused as arrogant, as dissemblers, and as despisers, by Theodorus in the *Theaetetus*, and now by Hermogenes. It must be observed, however, that these two are not philosophers; for the [548] former was a geometrician, and the

latter a youth. And a true philosopher has not leisure to consume his time in things of this kind.

23 That Socrates did not think that the speculation about the rectitude of names was to be despised, but according to the proverb he considered fine things to be difficult.

25 That investigation is imparted to souls from Maia the mother of Hermes; but invention is from the Hermaic series. For the more total genera of the gods energize prior to, together with, and posterior to, such as are more partial. Hence we see that investigation is imperfect, and is as matter previously prepared, from the donation of more elevated causes to their participants, such as form supervening from things inferior.

26 That sophists rejoice in indicative assertions, but philosophers in such as are dialectic. And again, the sophists, as framers of images, assume the person of one skilled in dialectic; and thus their contentious molestation is produced.

28 That of the Hermaic gift, some things are intellectual and first goods; but others are secondary; and perfective of the dianoetic power; and others rank in the third degree, purify the irrational nature, and in a particular manner measure the phantastic motions. Others again give subsistence to the reasons of nature; and others are the suppliers of externally proceeding powers, and of gain. For these are the last and the material gifts of the god, which, as astrologers say, the god imparts in ignoble dispositions (αδόξοις διαθέσειν).

29 That it very little belongs to a philosopher, says Plato, to speak about particulars; for it is his business to ascend to the speculation of wholes, and things common.

30 The reasoning of Hermogenes is as follows: If there is a transposition of names, names are from position, and are the symbols of things. But the first is true, and therefore the second. But the reasoning of Proclus is this: If names are symbols of things, and are from position, we have no longer any occasion for the transposition of names. The first is true, and therefore the second. The followers of Hermogenes therefore speak erroneously; for they look to particulars only, and not also to things eternal. For the names of things eternal are divine and venerable, as being sacred to the gods, whose powers and energies they express. These Socrates, in the *Philebus*, venerates, and says, that his caution about them is attended with the greatest dread.

36 That the truth of an enunciative sentence (του αποφαντικού λόγου), means one thing with Aristotle,¹ and another with Plato in the present place, in which he says, that names essentially predicated (καθ' αὐτὰ λεγόμενα) are true. For that of Aristotle speaks of the composition and division of that which is predicated, and has for its subject both the false and the true. But the great Plato knew how to use the significant of truth [549] and falsehood in a fourfold respect. For he uses it either according to the hyperxes themselves of things, as when he says that real beings truly are, but that unreal beings have a false subsistence. Or he uses it according to the passions which are consequent to preceding motions, as when Socrates, in the *Philebus*, divides pleasure into the true and false. Or according to knowledge, as when he defines false opinions according to the true. Or according to the instruments of the gnostic

¹ [De Interp. 17a, 25]

life, as, for instance, assertions, names, and elements. For in these the true and the false are seen, according to their adaptation and symphony with things. Rhetoricians also have a certain form of diction which they call truth.

37 That Antisthenes said, that nothing could be contradicted; for according to him every assertion is true. For he who speaks says something. He who says something, speaks of that which has a being. And he who speaks of that which has a being, speaks the truth. In answer to this we must say, that there is also that which is false, and that nothing hinders but that the man who speaks of being may speak falsely. For he who speaks, speaks *about* something, and does not speak *something*.

40 That bad are more known by good men, than the virtue of good men is by the bad. For vice is blind; and in the first place is ignorant of itself, and in the next place of others.

41 That the dogma of *Protagoras* is different from that of *Euthydemus*. For the former says, that though the subject has no existence, yet it appears to beholders to possess a particular quality, through the commixture of the agent and patient. But the dogma of *Euthydemus* makes everything to be all things, and asserts that all things are at the same time always true. As he that says, that a piece of wood is white and black, small and great, moist and dry, and likewise, that all the negations of these are true. Hence beginning from different principles, those sophists end in the same thing.

42 That the power of the first infinity imparts from itself progression to all things whatever which are capable of subsistence; but bound, limits and circumscribes everything, and establishes it in its proper boundaries. Thus in numbers form pervades to all things from the monad and bound; but the never-failing according to progression from the prolific duad; so that every being has a certain nature, bound, idiom, and proper order, through the first bound. There is therefore contradiction in words, which definitely exhibits the false and the true.

43 That the word $\rho\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\epsilon\iota\nu$, to act, is asserted of those only who energize according to the dianoetic power, but the word $\rho\rho\acute{\alpha}\iota\nu$, to do, is asserted of those who energize in a different manner from this. Actions therefore and makings have their proper boundaries, instruments, and times; nor does any casual thing do or act any casual thing.¹



¹ Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (Tr. & Comm.). *The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus*. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); Additional notes to The Cratylus. (pp. 546-49 — *Trübner text*, ed. Pasquali 16-43).

Proclus on Cratylus, 71-74

Taylor T & Sydenham F. (tr. & Comm.). *The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus*. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); Additional notes to *The Cratylus*. (pp. 557-61 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 71-74, starting p. 557.

First order impressions, on “the ineffable cause of all” of which “there is an impression in every being.”

71 This is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with things inanimate; and has not [558] an intellectual power; since it lies in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective idioms, and through these convert all things to themselves, in like manner all the gods impart to their progeny symbols of their cause, and through these establish all things in themselves. The impressions therefore of the hyparxis of the higher order of gods, which are disseminated in secondary natures, are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the gods unfold themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in the gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divisibly, and accompanied with form. Hence the gods¹ exhort “To understand the forerunning form of light.” For subsisting on high without form, it becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the essence by which it is received.

Second order impressions, “Inarticulate invocations.”

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain respect media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the primary gifts of the gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (*i.e.*, angels, dæmons, and heroes) previously participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting appropriately in each of their participants, and coordinately in all things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind are the symbols of the gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (αδιάρθρων εκφωνήσεων).

Third order impressions, “Divine Names.”

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual essences to all idioms, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the gods themselves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify something

¹ Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldean oracles. [fr. 145]

to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the gods. Different nations however participate differently of these, as, for instance, the Egyptians, according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the gods; but the Chaldeans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper [559] tongue; and in a similar manner the Greeks, according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldeans, we must nevertheless admit, that each of these names is the progeny of the gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and, in short, of things denominated, the names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those that are more remote.

Not every genus of the gods however can be denominated: for Parmenides evinces that the god who is beyond all things is ineffable. “For,” says he, “he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of.” And of the intelligible gods, the first genera, which are conjoined with The One Itself, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that the progression of intelligibles should be terminated¹ in this order; in which, there is the first effable, and that which is called by proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic art energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus speaks,

Μήτην σπέρμα φέροντα θεῶν κλυτὸν ὄντε φάνητα
Πρωτόγονον μακάρες καλέον κατά μακρὸν ὄλυμπον. [fr. 61]

i.e., “Metis bearing the seed of the gods, whom the gods about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus.” In the gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a union of the intellective and [560] onomastic energy. The transportive name (*διπόρθμιον ὄνομα*) of lynxes² (*ιγγύων*), which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation *teletarchic* (*το τελεταρχικόν*), which some one of the gods³ says, “leaps into the worlds, through the rapid reproof of the father,” *κόσμοις εὐθρόσκειν κραιπνήν δια πατρός ἐνιπήν*. For all these things are occultly with the gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied to the gods.

¹ The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.

² *The lynx, Synoches, and Teletarchai* of the Chaldeans, compose that divine order, which is called by the Platonists *intelligible, and at the same time intellectual*. This order is celebrated by Plato in *the Phædrus* under the names of the *supercelestial place, Heaven, and the subcelestial arch*.

³ This is one of the Chaldean oracles. [fr. 87]

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the gods, through which the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter, in Plato, gives names to the unapparent periods of souls. For fathers define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their producing causes, through the intellectual impressions which they bear. Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the gods, and which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank; and these are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing enthusiastically about the gods, and at another time energizing according to science; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving, perfection; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as geometricians, physicians, and rhetoricians, give names to the things the idioms of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by Phoebes (των ποιητῶν οἱ φοιβόληπτοι) ascribe many names to, the gods, and to human names give a division opposite to these; receiving the former from enthusiastic energy, and the latter from sense and opinion; concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some names to the gods, and others to men.

That the names which are assigned to things by the gods are smooth, well sounding, and of fewer syllables, than those which are assigned by men, as for instance, {391e} Xanthus than Scamander, Chalcis than Cymindis, and; Myrine than Batieia. And it seems that the first of these names manifests how the gods comprehend and denominate according to a definite cause the whole of a flowing essence; but the second, how the gods bound in [561] intellectual measures a life conversant with generation; and the third, how they divide and permit in a separate manner a life separate from generation. And with respect to Xanthus, Aristotle relates¹ that the skin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the causes of all things, thus denominate it. But the apparent cause of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water passes through a drain made by the hand (ὅτι διὰ τινὸς χειροποιήτου σκάφης διέρχεται τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ); and thus by men of superficial conceptions was called Scamander. Chalcis, perhaps, was so called from the shrill and canorous, like sharp sounding brass; for thus certainly the Chaldeans call it, having heard this name from the gods. [fr. 210] But Cymindis is from the leaping of the bird (παρὰ τὴν σκιρτότητα τοῦ ορνέου); and Myrine, from the soul allotted that place from the gods. Lastly, Batieia perhaps was thus called, through the plant which abounds in it. In these too, we have the three-fold differences of divine and human knowledge; the efficacious and passive, in Xanthus and Scamander; the logical and physical, in Myrine and Batieia; and the enharmonic and unharmonic, in Chalcis and Cymindis.

72 That if the nature of the gods is unfigured, uncoloured, and unapparent, the dialectic work is not in them, but a thing of this kind is conversant with things that subsist in these inferior realms and about generation.

¹ [Hist. An. iii, 519, 18ff]

That of the gods, some are incorporeal, but others use bodies, and these such as are spherical: for the spherical figure is peculiarly adapted to things which are converted to themselves. But of dæmons some are good and divine, and have spheric vehicles; and others are material, and their vehicles are rectilinear.

73 With respect to our prayers, they are heard both by gods and dæmons, not externally; but both these comprehend in themselves causally our deliberative tendency to things in our power, and have a causal knowledge of our energies.

74 That there are Pans¹ with the feet of goats, such as was that which appeared to the courier Philippides, as he was passing over the mountain Parthenion and also Minerval souls using various forms, and proximately ruling above men; such as was the Minerva which appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus. But Panic and Minerval dæmons, and much more the gods themselves, are exempt from all such variety.²



The Women of Amphissa (1887) Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema

¹ After essential heroes, there is an order of souls who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal κατὰ ὁξέον, according to habitude, or alliance, but not essentially. Of this kind are the nymphs that sympathize with water, and the Pans now mentioned by Proclus.

² Taylor T. & Sydenham F. (Tr. & Comm.). *The Works of Plato: Extracts from the Ms. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus*. Vol. V (XIII of the Thomas Taylor series); Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1996 (1st ed.); (pp. 559-61 — Trübner text, ed. Pasquali 71-74).

Scholia on the divine origin of barbarous names

Diogenes Laërtius on Zeus

They [the Stoics] say that god is an animal which is immortal and rational or intelligent, perfect in happiness, not admitting of any evil, provident towards the world and its occupants, but not anthropomorphic. He is the creator of the whole and, as it were, the father of all, both generally and, in particular, that part of him which pervades all things, which is called by many descriptions according to his powers. For they call him Zeus [*Dia*] as the cause [*di' hon*] of all things; Zēn in so far as he is responsible for, or pervades, life [*zēn*]; Athena because his commanding-faculty stretches into the ether; Hera because it stretches into the air; . . . (etc.)¹

Simon Magus on barbarous names

Jamblichus tells us that the language of the Mysteries was that of ancient Egypt and Assyria, which he calls “sacred nations,” as follows:

But, you ask, why among our symbolical terms (σημαντικά) we prefer barbarous (words) to our respective native (tongues)? There is also for this a mystic reason. For it was the gods who taught the sacred nations, such as the Egyptians and Assyrians, the whole of their sacred dialect, wherefore we think that we ought to make our own dialects resemble the speech cognate with the gods. Since also the first mode of speech in antiquity was of such a nature, and especially since they who learnt the first names concerning the gods, mingled them with their own tongue — as being suited to such (names) and conformable to them — and handed them down to us, we therefore keep unchanged the rule of this immemorial tradition to our own times. For of all things that are suited to the gods the most akin is manifestly that which is eternal and immutable.²

The existence of this sacred tongue perhaps accounts for the constant distinction made by Homer between the language of the gods and that of men.³ Diodorus Siculus also asserts that the Samothracians used a very ancient and peculiar dialect in their sacred rites.⁴

¹ Long A.A. & Sedley D.N. (Comp., Tr., & Annot.). *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary. (1st ed. 1987). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; p. 323.

² *De Mysteriis Liber*, vii. 4

³ Compare also *Herodotus* ii, 54 — φωνη ἀνθρώπων.

⁴ *Lib.* v

These “barbarous names” were regarded as of the greatest efficacy and sanctity, and it was unlawful to change them. As the Chaldaean Logia say:

Change not the barbarous names, for in all the nations are there names given by the gods, possessing unspeakable power in the Mysteries.¹

And the scholiast² adds that they should not be translated into Greek. (p. 60)

Socrates on illegally changed words

Socrates My friend, you do not bear in mind that the original words have before now been completely buried by those who wished to dress them up, for they have added and subtracted letters for the sake of euphony and have distorted the words in every way for ornamentation or merely in the lapse of time. Do you not, for instance, think it absurd that the letter rho is inserted in the word *κάτοπτρον* (mirror)?^{414d} I think that sort of thing is the work of people who care nothing for truth, but only for the shape of their mouths; so they keep adding to the original words until finally no human being can understand what in the world the word means. So the sphinx, for instance, is called sphinx, instead of phix, and there are many other examples.

Hermogenes Yes, that is true, Socrates.

Socrates And if we are permitted to insert and remove any letters we please in words, it will be perfectly easy to fit any name to anything. [414e]

Hermogenes True.

Socrates Yes, quite true. But I think you, as a wise director, must observe the rule of moderation and probability.

Hermogenes I should like to do so.³

Theosophy or Theosophia?

Theosophy has been Anglicised from the Greek term Θεοσοφία (Theosophia), divine, superhuman knowledge or wisdom. However, the distortion of foreign words is not a new phenomenon. Ancient Greeks kept twisting primeval names⁴ as much as modern tongues, thus disregarding the Chaldean Logion:

Never change barbarous Names [barbara nomina];
For there are Names in every Nation given from God,
Which have an unspeakable power in [Sacred] Rites.⁵

¹ Psel. 7

² Psel. *Schol. in Orac. Magic*, p. 70

³ *Cratylus* 414c-d (tr. Fowler)


⁴ Cf. *Blavatsky Collected Writings*, IX p. 271, and *Caves & Jungles of Hindostan*, pp. 609 fn. & 615.

⁵ *The Oracles of Zoroaster*, Collection by Franciscus Patricius p. 36. In: Stanley, T. *The Chaldaick Oracles of Zoroaster and his Followers*. (Poems in Greek, Latin and English translations) London: Printed for Thomas Dring, 1661; [quoting Pselus 7; Nicephorus Z. or T.] — <http://www.esotericarchives.com/oracle/oraclesj.htm>

Contrary to common belief, then and now,

. . . “barbarous names” were regarded as of the greatest efficacy and sanctity,
and it was unlawful to change them,

as G.R.S. Mead points out.¹



¹ Mead G.R.S. *Simon Magus, An Essay on the Founder of Simonianism based on the Ancient Sources with a Re-Evaluation of his Philosophy and Teachings*. London, 1892; p. 60; [full text in our Buddhas and Initiates Series. — ED. PHIL.]

Divine and human knowledge differ

The efficacious and passive: in Xanthus and Scamander. The logical and physical: in Myrine and Batieia; Td the enharmonic and unharmonic: in Chalcis and Cymindis.

	Divine Knowledge	Human Knowledge
Difference 1	Efficacious <i>e.g.</i> , Xanthus (Stream of Troad, <i>Liddell & Scott</i>) The skin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the causes of all things, thus denominate it.	Passive <i>e.g.</i> , Scamander But the apparent cause of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water passes through a drain made by the hand (ὅτι διὰ τινός χειροποιήτου σκάφης διέρχεται το ὕδωρ αυτού); and thus by men of superficial conceptions was called Scamander. Σκάμανδρος, river or tray. (River of Troy, <i>Liddell & Scott</i>) Ὀν ξανθὸν καλεοῦσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δε Σκάμανδρον. (<i>Iliad</i> , 20.74)
Difference 2	Logical <i>e.g.</i> , Myrine From the soul allotted that place from the gods. (Sweet wine probably flavoured with μύρον, <i>Liddell & Scott</i>)	Physical <i>e.g.</i> , Batieia From the plant which abound in it. Βάριον is Salaminian name for mulberry.
Difference 3	Enharmonic <i>e.g.</i> , Chalcis (Sweet-singing bird? <i>Liddell & Scott</i>) From the shrill and canorous, like sharp sounding brass. Ἦν τ' ἐν ὄρεσσι χαλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δε κύμινδιν. (<i>Iliad</i> , 1c)	Unharmonic <i>e.g.</i> , Cymindis From the leaping of the bird. Unknown bird, (<i>Cratylus</i> , 392a, <i>Liddell & Scott</i>)



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