First Edition,
1900.

Thompson & Co.,
"Minerva" Press, Broadway, May
1908.
INSCRIBED

TO

ANNIE BESANT,
BY WHOSE WISH AND UNDER WHOSE GUIDANCE
THIS WORK WAS WRITTEN.
दुनिखितपुख्य भवतान्मम श्रमः पाषाढङ्गोपि भूयादनेन मे ॥
कर्माधिपा पममुखा महर्षयो युध्मान्तु नमामि मन्नता द्यामयानृ ॥
Learn to look intelligently into the hearts of men. Regard most earnestly your own heart. . . . Regard the constantly changing and moving life which surrounds you, for it is formed by the hearts of men; and as you learn to understand their constitution and meaning, you will by degrees be able to read the larger word of life.—Light on the Path.

यातु सर्वाणि स्तुतानि आत्मन्येवानुपस्थिति।
सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विज्ञुगुप्ते।

“He that seeth all things in the Self, and the Self in all things—he hateth no more.” Isha Upaniṣhāt.
CONTENTS.

Page.

FOREWORD. ... 1—8.

CHAPTER I.—PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE ANALYSIS AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS:

The view that such analysis and classification are impossible—The possibility and the need and use of such—The nature of the present sketch—Its introspective method—Psycho-physical parallelism, from the empirical standpoint. ...9—14.

CHAPTER II.—THE FACTORS OF EMOTION:

The Self—The Not-Self—Pleasure and Pain—Attraction and Repulsion or Love and Hate—Irreducibility of this pair into one. ...15—20.

CHAPTER III.—THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF EMOTION:

Sub-divisions of mind—Eastern and Western views—Cognition, desire and action—The ‘mentality’ or psychic nature of action also—Feelings Proper, Pleasure and Pain—Preliminary definition of Emotion—Metaphysical problems—The two primary forms of Desire Emotion, viz., Love and Hate—Their place in a psychological scheme. ...21—30.
CHAPTER IV.—THE DEFINITION OF EMOTION AND THE PRINCIPAL EMOTIONS AND THEIR ELEMENTS:
Facts involved in Emotion—Further definition of Emotion—Metaphysical problems—Etymological meaning of Emotion—The three main sub-divisions, forms, or types of Attraction—Metaphysical problems—The meaning of superiority, equality, and inferiority—The three main types of Repulsion—Final definition of Emotion—The evolution of Emotion—The final form and the ultimate reason of psychophysical parallelism.

CHAPTER V.—THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL EMOTIONS:

CHAPTER VI.—CERTAIN POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS:
Objection based on physical death—Solution, by the Nature of Consciousness—Instances of death for Love or by Hate, and precise meaning of these two in such cases—Infrequency of death for love, and frequency of it by Hate—Causes—Cases of death for mixed Love and
CHAPTER VII.—EMOTIONS AND CHARACTER, OR THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE EMOTIONS WITH VIRTUES AND VICES:

Definition of Virtue and Vice—Illustration in support—Tentative classification of Virtues and Vices—Metaphysical questions.

CHAPTER VIII.—COMPLEX EMOTIONS:


CHAPTER IX.—THE CORRESPONDENCE OF EMOTIONS:

The General law—The special laws—Illustrations—Metaphysical considerations and psychological explanations—Why and How—
CHAPTER X.—EMOTION IN ART:

(a) Poetry and Literature:—Their essential nature—Definition of Poetry—R a s a—An inter-blending of cognitive, emotional and pleasure-tone elements—The element of unreality therein—Ornaments or Figures of Speech—The Object of Poetry.

(b) The Nature of Pleasure and Pain:—Pleasure, the feeling of the Expansion of the self—Pain, a Contraction of it—As physical facts—Meta-physical explanations—Genesis of triplets by mutual superimposition of qualities between Self and Not-Self—Morbid pleasures and pains—Relativity and limitations of all statements—Swing between selfishness and unselfishness and balance of justice or constant adjustment—The two classes of emotions corresponding to the two classes of Jivas.

(c) The Essential Object of Literature:—Dual mental pictures accompanying desire—The form of Poetry—The significance of Literature, and of the World-Process, in terms of Emotion—Various types of literature.

(d) Illustrations:—The nine principal interests, relishes, tastes, inclinations, or sentiments of poetry—An objection—The answer—The Fearful—The Cruel and Disgusting—The Pathetic—Danger of over-indulgence in imaginary Benevolence—Comparative absence of Tra-
CONTENTS.

Tragedy from Sanskrit Imaginative Literature—Classification of the rasas under the two main Emotions of Love and Hate.

(e) The Other Arts:—The sensuous element predominant in them—Admixture of Emotional elements—Dangers of ‘art for art’s sake’—Subservience to distant ends...

CHAPTER XI.—THE IMPORTANCE AND PLACE OF EMOTION IN HUMAN LIFE AND THE SOURCE OF ITS POWER:

All life, as all literature, an unfolding of Emotion, in one aspect—The Equality of all Jivas, despite extremes of variation—The working of imagination in Emotion—Emotion and Sense-Objects—Evil results of false sentiments—Transformation of Good into Evil Emotions and vice versâ.—The distant future development of new senses, through a combination of physical ennui and inward-turned high sentiment. ...

CHAPTER XII.—THE HIGH APPLICATION OF THE SCIENCE OF THE EMOTIONS:

(a) To whom the Science is addressed:—Who are the proper students of it—Those touched by vaîrāgya—The inevitable arising of that mood in its due time—The world-scheme—The ends of life—Manu’s all-comprehensive and all satisfying “Code of Life” and laws—Explanatory triplets—Full understanding of the scheme not possible till the Jiva sets foot on the Path of Renunciation—Deliberate, open-eyed choice and cultivation of Love possible and necessary for such only—The meaning of deli-
berateness and free-will—Metaphysical significance and justification of counsel—Why the counsel of this Science may be addressed to all, even those who are not yet definitely on the Path of Renunciation—The need for cultivating vaïrāgya—An objection and the answer—The results in and on the outer life, of following the counsel—The first half of the world-cycle—The second half.

(b) Human Life:—The growth of individuality.—In terms of Self: (i) Consciousness, (ii) Self-Consciousness; (iii) All-Self-Consciousness—In terms of Not-Self: (i) The physical body (and etheric double, sthūla and prāṇamaya); (ii) the subtle body (sūkṣhma, liṅga, manomaya, astral, mental, kāraṇa, vijnānamaya, causal, etc.); (iii) budḍhic or mahākāraṇa, etc.—The meaning of individuality—Certain fundamental triplets and trinities—Final ideal to be the highest possible, intermediate ones being implicit.

(c) How Human Life is helped by this Science:—Deliberate Love—Constant self-watchfulness—Avoiding provocation of evil and promoting evocation of good emotions in others—Avoidance of much laughter—And much talk—And objectless reveries and imaginations—Promotion of mutual trust and harmony—One-pointed Yoga and Final Unification, Union, Mokṣha.

Last Words.
"What hast thou to do with riches? what hast thou to do with kin? how shall wives bestand thee, son! that shalt surely die? Seek the Ātmān, hidden in the cave within the heart. Where are gone thy father, and the fathers of thy father?"

Such was the teaching, still more ancient, addressed by an ancient Indian father to an ancient Indian son—addressed by Vyāsa to his son Shuka—Shuka who grew to be greater even than his great father. And such used to be the beginning of philosophy, the search after Truth, the truth of life and death, in olden India.

1 Mahābhārata, Shāntiparva, ccxxiii. 72.
"He in whom hath arisen sense of difference between the Passing and the Eternal, he in whom desire for the fleeting hath died away, his shall surely be the great gain of wisdom." So Vishvāmiṭṭa assured Rāma when leading him to Vasiṣṭhtha for the teachings embodied in the *Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa*. From *vārāgya*, the ceasing of

---

1 *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭhtha*, I. xi-2. The work is also called the *Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa* or the Great Rāmāyaṇa.

2 This word, *vārāgya*, is of great importance in Sanskrit philosophy. Like the periodic crises in the life of the physical body, when it adjusts itself anew to its environments, this mood marks the critical turning-point in the life of the inner ījā, when it adjusts itself anew to the world-process and alters and renewes its outlook upon it. There is not yet any adequate English word for it. 'Pessimism,' 'cynicism,' 'the world is hollow,' 'life is not worth living,' 'there is nothing good,' etc., and 'aloofness,' 'detachment,' 'weariness,' 'indifference,' etc., are shades of its first and second, or rājasa and tāmasa, stages or forms—if we add the very important element of unremitting search for the real explanation of the world-process and for the real significance of, and element of truth in, the mood itself. More on it will be found in the last chapter here; also in *The Science of Peace*, ch. i. For illustrative description see *Yoga Vāsiṣṭhtha*, I. In one of its later forms it appears as 'the night of the soul' so often spoken of by Christian mystics. In its *perfection* and final or sāttvik form, when it distinguishes between the individualised and separative life and the Universal Self (*viveka-khyātiḥ* of Yoga) it is the highest knowledge also (*Yoga Sūtra* and *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya*, i. 15, 16)
desire—from \textit{viveka}, the discrimination which sees that all objects of desire are limited and fleeting, and, therefore, painful—from these alone, but from these without fail, proceeds the \textit{bodha}, the knowledge that grasps that which is not limited, not fleeting, and, therefore, beyond pain.

Thus ancient philosophy took its rise in the relation of the Jiva, the separated or individualised self, to those two constant companions of its life, the two sole guides of all its action—Pleasure and Pain, Joy and Sorrow, Happiness and Misery, Gladness and Sadness. It set a distinct aim before itself, the aim of relieving pain—that pain, that master pain, of doubt, uncertainty, and hopelessness, which, while it lasts, poisons the very roots of life, and throws all other pains, even the pains of positive material loss and physical torture, into the shade. And it proceeded straight from pain to the cause of pain, and thence to the remedy. \footnote{\textit{Sāṅkhya Kārikā}, 1, and \textit{Yoga-Bhāṣṭya}, ii, 15.}

That philosophy remains and will remain true for ever, but it has to be modelled into ever new forms to meet the needs of the ever changing races of humanity.

The more advanced races and classes of the present humanity have, in the march of evolution,
come to the stage where 'Intelligence' (according to theosophical literature, the fifth principle, the distinguishing characteristic of the Āryans, the fifth race, the pānchājānāḥ)1 is attaining its highest development. In order to reach its proper perfection,2 it has become in the beginning exaggerated beyond its due proportion. The immediate result is that even as itself—being in reality only a means to the service of that other aspect of the nature of the Jiva, viz., Desire-Emotion—has taken up the position of end and thrown emotion into the background, so, in all departments of the life of those modern advanced races and classes, the means are overpowering the ends, and loom far larger in the mind, and occupy a far larger share of time and attention, than that which they in reality seek to subserve. A ton of plate is used to eat an ounce of food; the record of a piece of business has more time given to it than the performance of that business; there is more supervision and inspection than work to be supervised and inspected; more writing than reading; more newspapers than

1 Amara-kośha, II. vii. 1.
2 J. S. Mill, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, are illustrations, in one sense, of what is meant by this. See in their autobiographies, their confessions of, and regrets at, their lack of emotional enjoyment, the atrophy of that faculty, and consequent sense of want, due to over-cultivation of only the intellectual aspect of their minds.
news. So much precise and elaborate calculation is made, that it very often ends in defeating its own purpose by not making sufficient allowance for contingencies which are beyond calculation; a thousand, a hundred thousand men are sacrificed, by competition, to ensure the success of one man; the outer is looked at far more than the inner; governments, systems of administration, diplomacies, and policies come to be believed sincerely to be far greater and more important than the people and their simple well-being, for which only they exist; cities come to be greater than fields; town-life than country-life; a fine dress than a beautiful physique; the author than the book; the writer than the reader; non-productive activity than productive labor; money and material luxuries than the soul's contented blessedness; showy arts than honest industries; 'glorious war' than 'inglorious peace'; an ever-growing, an ever more unwieldy statute-book than never-changing good men; an education that cultivates the outside, that gives external polish, that fits for struggling with others and profiting surreptitiously and plausibly at their expense, than a training which opens the inner man, and fits him for real peace with Self and peace with others, fits him to suffer wrong rather than do it. The culmination point of this high growth of one-sided exaggeration is reached when professional philosophers assert that the object of
philosophy is not Truth, but the pursuit of Truth; that the latter has far greater interest than the former. ¹

Such are the inevitable consequences, at a certain stage, of the onward process of evolution; and they need not be regretted, since they have their proper place in the story of man. Without passing through them, the Jīva would remain wanting in a very necessary experience.

But it must pass through them, and not remain immersed in those quagmires.

That intelligence, developing and expanding, should, even through exaggeration, reach perfection in wisdom, and not descend into the deep imperfection of cunning, it has to become self-intelligence, and not only self-intelligence, but All-Self-intelligence; it has to understand its own true nature, in one Jīva and in all Jīvas.

To know man, what he is and whence and whither and how and why, is the noblest—and whether noblest or not is the most urgently needed—qualification of man. Philosophy in this sense is

¹ See Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. I., Lec. i. It is as if we should say the object of the science of medicine is not health, but only the pursuit of health. And yet that even this has an element of truth in it, as indeed have all opinions whatsoever ever entertained by any mind, may be realised when we consider the fact of Jīvas returning to new systems and cycles after having attained mokṣha in previous ones.
the very highest of sciences, and has always been thus regarded in the East. And it has been pursued in the West too, but the reasons which, as just said, have there very often made philosophers find greater interest in the pursuit of Truth than in Truth, have confined attention largely to the psychology of the senses and the intellect—the means of cognition—one hand, and to the discussion of ethics—the principles of action—on the other.

That which is directly or indirectly the energising motive of both the motor-organs and the senses and intellect, viz., the Desire-nature, the Emotion-nature, of man, his रागद्वेशम्, रागाध्वेशम्, love-hate, has not received proper attention, and what it has received has not been fruitful of good and true results. Further, because of the initial defect in selecting the starting-point of investigation, the other two branches of philosophy, to which there have been given so much time and labor, have also remained untraced to their true roots.

Not till the springs of Pleasure and Pain are reached and plumbed, not till there is earnest sympathy of search between the questioner and the teacher, the student and the science, not till mere superficial and cynical moods of asking are cast away, not till the human heart is pierced as deeply as that of Shuka by वैराग्यासुष्टी
that which underlies the ancient counsel given to
him by his father Vyāsa—not until then can the
pure waters of true knowledge and deep consola-
tion well up within that heart and flow forth ever
after in a constant, sure, and never-failing stream.

For students thus touched with vārāgya, and
yet by necessity of circumstance belonging to and
dominated by the prevailingly intellectual nature
of the present races, this booklet is written; it
treats of the Desire-nature of man, his Emotions,
in the way, as far as may be, of the usual books on
the science of psychology, and attempts to lead
those students on from the Science of the Emotions
to that highest science which deals with the very
roots of life, with the ultimate principles of the
whole world-process, the Science of Peace.

May the little book serve its appointed purpose,
under the blessings of those who are the
Guardians and the prayers of those who are the
servants of Humanity.
CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE ANALYSIS AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EMOTIONS.

The view that such analysis and classification are impossible.

The latest result of the discussions in the West on the subject of the Emotions seems to be that each Emotion is something sui generis, that an organic connection between Emotion and Emotion is not traceable, that it is vain to try to reduce any one Emotion into terms of any other, and that a genuine, unarbitrary, and artificial classification of these mental phenomena is impossible.¹

¹ See Sully, The Human Mind, vol. II., p. 86 (1892); Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, Chap. x. (1897); Michael Maher, Psychology, p. 446 (1900); and William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. II., 448 (1901). For various schemes of classification, see Sully, The Human Mind, II., Appendix J., and Bain, The Emotions and the Will, Appendix B. James undoubtedly lays his finger on the real difficulty when he says (Ibid) that all the writing on the subject that he has come across amounts only to tiresome lists and descriptions of emotions as distinct individual psychic entities
It seems to some that this result is not final, that a true classification of the Emotions is possible, and that an organic connection and a genetic principle of evolution of the complex from the simple are traceable amongst them. Valuable hints on the subject are to be found in Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣṭya on the *Nyāya-Sūtra* of Gauṭama,¹ in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*,² in the works of the other Indian Schools of philosophy, and of medicine,³ and notably in the various works of Sāhiṭya, the science of poetry and rhetoric, which bulk largely in Sanskrit literature, beginning with Bhārata’s *Nātya-Shāstra*.

without any luminous deductive or generative principle. But when he propounds his own view of the physiological origin of emotions and says it amounts to such a principle, one fails to follow him. On that view we have lists and descriptions of ‘physiological entities’ instead of ‘psychological’—that is all. Wherein is the organic and genetic principle? On the older view, certain situations in life caused certain mental states, known as emotions, which in turn caused, or were accompanied by, certain bodily changes; and these mental states stood apart from each other, each being *sui generis*. Under James’ view, certain situations in life cause certain bodily changes which *are* (or are accompanied by, or cause) certain (mental) states called emotions (p. 149); and these bodily changes stand apart from each other, *are sui generis*, each of them. How are they related to each other genealogically?

¹ I. i. 2 and IV. i. 3, &c.
² xvi.
³ E.g., *Sushrutā*, *Sūtra sthāna*, I.
An attempt is made here, therefore, to lay before the student of philosophy a very brief sketch of a scheme of the Emotions based on the assumption that they can be analysed and, therefore, classified scientifically. This is done with a view to invite further discussion of this vitally important branch of psychology. If a true science of the Emotions could be discovered, the art of consciously, deliberately, and purposefully cultivating the higher and better ones and weeding out the lower and the evil would become a possibility—with what beneficent ultimate consequences to humanity is at present matter more for poetical and religious imagination and hope than perhaps for sober matter-of-fact expectation. Yet, there is no doubt that the theory and method of education would, even immediately, benefit greatly from such a science.

In view of these possibilities, it is very desirable that no conclusion declaring the impossibility of dealing more satisfactorily with the Emotions than has hitherto been done should be allowed to pass as final.

The present sketch lays no claim to any maturity of thought. It is intended to propound only the general outlines of a possible method of dealing with the subject, which have presented themselves more or less definitely to an enquirer. Defects will
be found especially in the use of the names of the less common Emotions, inaccuracies in the appraisement of the true values of them, which are inevitable when a foreign tongue is used. But if, notwithstanding such shortcomings, there should appear to be any substantial truth in them, abler hands will naturally take up these outlines, and supply the necessary amplifications, corrections, and details of illustration.

The method that has been followed is, as it could not but be under the circumstances, introspective and analytical. But this should not be understood to mean anything that goes against the fact—which lies behind all that is written here—that Self and Not-Self, Spirit and Matter, Puruṣa and Prakṛti, Pratyagātmā and Mūlapraṇā, are always inseparable, that changes of ‘Matter’ always accompany and correspond with changes of ‘Mind,’ and vice versa. What is meant is only this, that here the one series of changes is considered more prominently than the other.

It may be noted here that James’s and Lange’s theories of the physiological origin of Emotions represent the one exaggerated extreme of this truth of psycho-physical parallelism, as the older theories of the wholly emotional origin of certain physiological changes represent the other. Darwin’s famous work on *The Expression of the Emotions* explains some of the physiological reasons for the
various methods of expression—blushing, sneering, etc. Since his time, many researches on similar lines have been made, and it is fully proved that while a change of mind, as just said, is accompanied with a change in the physical body—appropriate facial transformations, or gestures with the limbs—so the production of the change of face or of the gesture tends to produce the corresponding emotion. Thus it has been found that if a subject, under hypnotic influence, but conscious, is made to double the fist and shake it at someone, anger is aroused; if tears are produced by the exhibition of ammonia, sorrow is awakened and genuine sobbing will follow. Hence control of the expression of anger will tend to check the emotion of anger, and physical self-mastery may be made, and is made in civilised society, an instrument for mastery of the emotions. Many of the physical practices of Yoga, e.g., the regulation of the breath, are based on this truth of psycho-physical parallelism, as the exaggerated distinction between Hatha-yoga and Rāja-yoga is due to the excessive emphasising of the physical side of life and the psychical respectively. The metaphysical explanation will be found elsewhere of how and why, while the whole man is one, he is at the same time divided into a mind and a body, a psychic side and a physical side; how and why, while he is acted on and reacts, is impressed and responds, as one, there is at the same time a
succession within him between his two sides, now the one preceding and now the other; and what the sense is in which a change in the one side may or may not be said to be the cause of a corresponding change in the other. That the individual is a one, mind-body, is the element of truth in the James-Lange theory; that he is also a many, mind and body, is its refutation. Cognition, desire and action; thought, emotion and behavior; have no significance and indeed no existence apart from and independently of each other; but they cannot be melted down wholly, any one into any other.

---

1 The Science of Peace, ch. xv.
2 Ibid, ch. xi.
CHAPTER II.

THE FACTORS OF EMOTION.

(a) Beginning then with the simple, and proceeding thence to the more complex, as is the approved method of all exposition, we find as the first and most elementary factor of life—the Self.

It is no mistake to call the Self the most elementary factor. It is not possible to analyse it into anything which is simpler, more intelligible, more directly present to a living being. The Self, towards itself, combines in one ever-present mood—conscious or sub-conscious, deliberate or otherwise, but ever-present all the same—the three modes in which it (when individualised) grasps the world, viz., those of cognition, desire and action. These three aspects are distinguishable in reference to the outer world. But the mood of the Self towards itself may indifferently be styled Self-consciousness (Self-knowledge, Self-cognition), or Self-feeling (Self-desire, the will to live), or Self-assertion (Self-manifestation). To say that “we think before
and after," that the life of the self is made up of memories and expectations, is only to describe what accompanies it, what is involved with rather than in the Self and Self-consciousness; to say this is not to analyse the Self into any simpler constituent elements; it is not to show that the Self is made up of any elements which do not already pre-suppose it. It is the same with other endeavors to analyse the Self.¹ A myriad doubts may cluster about its nature; there is not possible any doubt as to its existence.

But it is no use entering into further discussion on this point here. That discussion properly belongs to Metaphysic as distinguished from Psychology. It is enough for present purposes to say that the Self is the indispensable first basis of life.

नाहि काश्यतु मोदिघे अहम् वा नासहम् वेलि। "None-doubts, am I or am I not."

(b) Indispensable to Life in the same degree is the Not-Self, something other than the Self. When the world which is cognised and desired and acted on as something

¹ As a general rule, the word ‘self’ is spelt in this work with a capital S when it is used for the Universal Self, and with a small s when for the individual self or Jiva.

² Bhāmaṭī, a commentary by Vāchaspaṭi on the Shārīraka-Bhāṣya of Shankarāchārya, (page 2, in the Bibliotheca Indica Series edition issued by the Asiatic Society of Bengal). The discussion of the metaphysical questions involved may now be pursued in The Science of Peace, ch. iv.
THE FACTORS OF EMOTION.

different from the Self has been named the Not-Self, the last name has been given to it. It cannot be reduced any further, even as the Self cannot be. Life is a Relation of which the two indispensable and only factors are the Self and the Not-Self. In this Relation appear the states which are dealt with next.

(c) Equally universally known and recognised, and perhaps equally impossible to analyse into anything simpler, are Pleasure and Pain, the two Feelings proper, which, in alternation, are the constant accompaniments of the Self. Most psychologists assume a third state of the Self—Indifference. Vātsyāyana seems to refer to such a third state as moha—by etymology meaning, apparently, 'unconsciousness'. To say the least, though practically, 'indifference' is also a fact, yet, theoretically, analysis will always show in any specific case that 'indifference' means only a very mild degree either of Pleasure or of Pain. For the purposes of this essay it is not absolutely necessary to determine whether there is such a third state.

¹ Nyāya-Bhāṣya, IV. i. 3. He ranks moha side by side with rāga and dv成败, or love and hate, and not directly with pleasure and pain, but the psychological significance is obviously nearly the same. See also Yoga-Sūtra and Vyāsa-Bhāṣya thereon, i. 11.
or not.⁴ It is enough to be sure that the two states of Pleasure and Pain exist.

It was said just now that these two are "perhaps equally impossible to analyse into anything simpler." This was said in order to avoid opening up another discussion not immediately relevant at this stage. But it may be mentioned in passing that a slight but elucidative reduction of these into terms of the Self appears to be possible; and a statement thereof may be found to be unavoidable later on.² The full discussion, however, belongs to the Metaphysic of the Self.

(d) The next step is that with Pleasure goes Attraction—Liking; with Pain, Repulsion—Dislike.³ The mood of the Self towards its attitude, its condition in the presence of that which causes it Pleasure is Desire, Attraction, Liking, the wish to be nearer. The opposite mood,

---

¹ Schemes of psychological triplets will be found in The Science of Peace, ch. xv, and the Prāṇava-vāḍa (to be shortly published).
² See ch. ix (b) infra.
³ Yoga-Sūtra, ii. 7, 8, and Bhagavad-Gītā, iii. 34. For further references to Sanskrit texts, see the collection at the end of Part III, chapter vi., of An Elementary Text-Book of Hindū Religion and Ethics (published by The Central Hindu College, Benares). The 3rd Parts of this and of An Advanced Text-Book of Hindū Religion and Ethics and the 2nd Part of Annie Besant's A Study in Consciousness are specially recommended for a fuller development of many details of the subject.
towards that which causes Pain, is the mood of Aversion, Repulsion, Dislike, the wish to be more distant. Generally speaking, in the most comprehensive sense of the terms used, it is true that whatever pleases is liked, whatever pains is disliked; and the primary consequences of Pleasure or Pain are, on the one hand, the desire to take in, to absorb, to embrace, or, on the other hand, to throw out, to push away, to repel, the object causing the pleasure or the pain respectively. This desire to be united with an object is Love, rāgā; to be separated from it, Hate, ṇeṣha.

An attempt is made now and then to derive love from hate, or hate from love, to reduce the two to one or the one into the other. But the attempt does not succeed. The case is the same with all other inveterate pairs of opposites, light and darkness, pleasure and pain, sin and merit, birth and death, etc. The element of truth behind the effort, and which is the reason why it is persistently made, is that each one of such a pair is inevitably dependent upon the other and has no significance of its own without reference to the other; and such indefeasible interdependence implies a common underlying unity. The element of error in it is that it overlooks the fact that the many is the many, and cannot be reduced into one, into less than many, without the abolition of both. The ‘archetype,’ of course, of all such cases is the Absolute Itself, the Supreme Self, wherein the
Self and the Not-Self co-exist as inseparable opposites in the unbreakable relation of Negation. It is the same with such triplets as those of cognition, desire, action, etc., referred to before, at the end of the previous chapter. And, finally, on realising the partless continuum of the whole world-process, the case is seen to be the same with everything; everything is seen to imply and therefore to carry in it, everything else always and everywhere.¹ In such interdependence of pairs may be found the reason, why either is always passing into the other, in endless rotation, light into dark, pleasure into pain, love into lust or hate, the pure into the impure, birth into death, pursuit into renunciation, the physical into the superphysical, and back again endlessly.

¹ Yoga-Bhaṣṭya, ii. 22.
CHAPTER III.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF EMOTION.

The preceding chapter led up to the suggestion that Emotions are forms of Desire. In the interplay of the Self and the Not-Self arises individual consciousness, or life with its three aspects, viz., cognitions, desires and actions; and Emotions belong to the department of the second. This suggestion will be expanded somewhat in the present chapter.

It should be noticed that there is a subtle, but radical difference between the oriental philosopher's view of the nature of Emotion and that taken by the western philosopher, especially since the time of Kant. Generally speaking, the latter view divides mental functions into three kinds: (1) Intellect or Cognition, (2) Feeling or Emotion, and (3) Will or Volition and Desire; it includes desire with if not exactly in volition; it regards Emotions, such as anger, terror, love, etc., as distinct from desires, and as
kinds rather than as consequences of the feelings of Pleasure and Pain; and it holds the distinction between volition and action to be something very definite.

The oriental philosopher, on the other hand, appears to regard all these विनाय (ways of existing, moods, functions, psychoses), which are usually called Emotions in western philosophy, as Desires. His classification of the phenomena of consciousness is into (1) Cognition—ज्ञानम; (2) Desire—इच्छा; and (3) Action—क्रिया ज्ञानिति, इच्छिति, यत्ते। "Man knows, desires, and endeavors," i.e., acts.

It may seem awkward at first sight to say that 'action' is a mental function. In order to compare the two views it is necessary to accept the western use of the word 'mind' as covering the three fundamental aspects or modes of the self, as being, in fact, equivalent to 'individualised consciousness.' The exact significance and proper use to be severally assigned to the words 'mind' and

1 This is the Nyāya phraseology. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga prākāśha or prakhyā, sṭhiti, and kriyā or pravṛtti are the words used (e.g., throughout the Vyāsa-Bhāṣṭya in Yoga) for, jñāna, kriyā and ichchhā respectively. In Indian systems of philosophy, it simply goes without saying that all three are possible only by means of a body, a material organism, gross or subtle, physical or superphysical.
'consciousness' are as yet matters of discussion. But using the word 'mind' generally as it is used in western psychology, the eastern psychologist substitutes 'action' for 'volition' in the three-fold division, and 'desire' for 'emotion.' To him thought is a further and complex development of cognition, emotion of desire, and industry of action; while volition he would regard either as the 'active' sub-division of cognition or thought, or as the 'cognitive' sub-division of action or occupation. When we say that action, i.e., physical action, is a mental function, we mean that the inner nature of action is essentially a function of consciousness, that the living physical body is something which is a part of consciousness, indeed, it may be said, is itself an expression of consciousness. Just as no western psychologist hesitates to say that cognition is unmistakably mental, though it is possible only by means of the sensory organs to begin with, and has for object always material things in the ultimate analysis; just as to him desire is something mental, though possible only in a material body, and for material objects, also, in the ultimate analysis; so to the Indian philosopher action too is mental, though using a material body to bring about material changes in the final analysis.

Briefly, then, the distinction between volition and action is not made in the East as it is made in the West. P r a y a ṭ n a, endeavor, is one of the attributes of the mind with the Naiyāyika
feelings proper, or pleasure and pain.

It may be noted that the Indian three-fold classification of the phenomena of consciousness as stated above takes no account of the 'Feelings of Pleasure and Pain,' whereas the western classification includes them, though vaguely. The reason for this may partially appear from the

1 Schopenhauer uses the word 'Will' in the sense of 'Desire.' The Indian view seems to be now beginning to find vogue in the west. G. F. Stout, in recent times, mentions as one among other views, that emotions belong to the conative consciousness, as being tendencies to do something; Manual of Psychology, p. 63, p. 234, et seq. Hoffding's views seem to tend in the same direction; Outlines of Psychology, chs. iv and vi. The scheme of classification agreed upon by an international committee of psychologists at a conference held in Paris during the International Congress of 1900 speaks of Cognition; Affection (Feeling and Emotion); Conation and Movement (Volition, Effort, Will): See Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II. (dub. 1902) Article on the word Psychology.
discussion which will be entered into later as to the nature of Pleasure or Pain.¹

But the following statement—though scarcely likely to convey much meaning at this stage—may be made as being rather needed here, and also in the hope of giving a clue to the full explanation in connection with the later discussion.

That reason appears to be that ‘Pleasure’ and ‘Pain’ are degrees of the self, rather than forms or aspects of it. It may be said, by somewhat stretching the use of words, that they are connected with the ‘measure,’ the ‘bulk’ of the self, rather than with its ‘form’; and as such they pervade and overhang all the life of the self and its manifestation in the three forms or aspects of cognition, desire, and action.

Perhaps the following considerations may explain how the western view as to the nature of Emotions came to prevail.

Every one of the Emotions is either pleasurable or painful. The two aspects of Emotion in this general fact, viz., of Emotion as Emotion, and of Emotion as pleasurable or painful, are not usually or carefully discriminated in ordinary life, and attention has not been sufficiently directed to the distinction existing between them. Nor,

¹ Ch. ix. (b) infra. James Ward points out in the article on Psychology, (Encyclopedia Britannica) how the word Feeling is used loosely for many things, amongst them (a) Emotions and (b) Feelings proper, or Pleasure and Pain.
indeed, does there appear to have been made any systematic or successful attempt to class the Emotions exhaustively and truly under the two heads of Pleasurable and Painful. Even this would probably have given a clue to the true nature of Emotion. What is generally and broadly observed is that particular situations in life arouse particular Emotions, Pleasurable or Painful. The truth here is that the Emotions are Preliminary desires either to perpetuate a situation if pleasurable, or to escape out of it if painful; and the prospective fulfilment of the desire or the defeat thereof, in expectation and imagination, gives the foretaste of the corresponding Pleasure or Pain, and makes the pleasurable-ness or painfulness of the total mood. The Emotion thus begins in, and looks back to, a feeling of positive Pleasure or Pain, and looks forward to, and ends in, a possible Pleasure or Pain. These various elements are, however, blended together in ordinary consciousness so closely that, unless a distinction is deliberately looked for, it easily escapes notice, and each

1 E. B. Titchener, An Outline of Psychology, (1902), ch. ix. p. 231, says there are two kinds or classes "of Emotion: the pleasurable and the unpleasurable." But thereafter he pursues other lines of thought and as to classification, says (p. 232) : "All that can be done at present is to indicate one or two of the ways in which classification has been tried... ...but with no final result."
Emotion comes, as it has come, to be regarded as something unanalysable and *sui generis*.

But it should be noted closely and carefully that the Desire-Emotion specialised by the immediately surrounding circumstances of the particular situation is one thing, and the Pleasure or Pain specialised by its correspondence with such Desire-Emotion is another thing.

The later parts of the book may, perhaps, succeed in throwing more light upon this point, and make it plainer.

The above brief examination of the difference between the two views of the nature of Emotion, and how it came to arise, gives the clue to the proper classification of the varieties of Emotion; for on the Indian view it becomes possible and permissible to analyse and thereby classify Desire-Emotions.

The precise meanings of Desire and Cognition and Action; how the one consciousness of the individual self breaks up into these forms and why; what the precise relation is between Desire on the one hand and Pleasure and Pain on the other; how the two, (i) Desire, and (ii) Pleasure and Pain, can be characterised with reference to each other in such a manner as to avoid definition in a circle; which precedes and which succeeds in the first instance, or whether there is no such first instance, and it is impossible to trace an ultimate precedence.
and succession, as in the case of the seed and the plant—these are questions which are not hopeless, but should find treatment and solution in the Metaphysic of the Self and the Not-Self, of Space, and Time, and Motion.¹

For our present purpose let us assume as the starting-point for our study, after the foregoing cursory discussion, that Emotions are Desires, and that the two elementary Desires are: (i) the Desire to unite with an object that causes Pleasure; and (ii) the Desire to separate from an object which causes Pain; in other words, Attraction and Repulsion, Like and Dislike, Love and Hate, or any other pair of names that may seem best.

¹ Many of these have now been attempted in The Science of Peace, ch. xv., and endless sub-divisions into triplets, by mutual reflexion and re-reflexion are referred to therein. But pleasure, pain and peace are not derived systematically there, having been left over for treatment in a projected sequel to that work. In the meanwhile, it may be stated here, tentatively, that as cognition, desire and action arise in the Jīva out of the coming together of the Self and the Not-Self, so there also arise in it by correspondence with its objective side or material body, (i) an 'activity,' mobility, occupation, or character, (ii) a 'quality,' or mentality, or intellect, and (iii) a 'substance,' or changing degree and bulk, or humor, temperament, or tone. These will be found, on examination, to correspond, in various ways, with Saṭ, Chīt, and Ananda. Being, Consciousness, Bliss.
In the hope of suggesting a possibly fruitful line of thought, and therefore even at the risk of being supposed to propound a mere verbal quibble, it may be stated here that Love, the desire to unite with something else, implies the consciousness of the possibility of such union, and that its full significance is this: an instinctive, ingrained, inherent perception by each individual self, each Jivātmā, of its essential underlying unity, oneness Eka-ṭā, with all other Jivātmās, all other selves; unity in the being of the All-Self, the Universal, Abstract, Inner Self, the Pratyagātmā; and the consequently inevitable endeavor of these individual selves, these fragments of the one Self, to break through the walls separating each from each—the walls that have disrupted the original 'One Self' into the 'many selves'—and thus merge into each other and re-form the single whole. So too the full significance of Hate is the instinctive perception by each self—now identified with a larger or smaller mass of the Not-Self, of Mūlaprakṛti, matter—of the non-identity, the inherent separateness, the manyness, nānāṭvāa.

And, here, the first may be sub-divided into: (1) pravṛtṭī, pursuit, worldliness, selfish occupations; nivṛtṭī, renunciation, unworldliness, unselfish work; and mokṣha, justice, balance, equilibrium; (2) cognition, etc.; and (3) pleasure, pain, peace. In adjectives (3) would be: pleasant, cheerful, good-humored; painful, ill-tempered, morose, melancholic; and peaceful, equable, quiet, sober, inexcitable.
of each not-self, each atom of Mūlaprakṛṭi, from every other atom, every other not-self, and its endeavour to maintain such separate existence at all costs and by all means.
CHAPTER IV.

THE DEFINITION OF EMOTION AND THE PRINCIPAL EMOTIONS AND THEIR ELEMENTS.

We have said that Attraction and Repulsion, Like and Dislike, Love and Hate, are the primary, basic Desire-Emotions. A rapid recapitulation of the facts involved in these may be useful; and in the course of the recapitulation, an important and necessary addition will be made to the general idea of the nature of Emotion outlined in the preceding chapter.

'Attraction,' 'Like,' 'Love' implies:

i. That contact, association, with another object has at some time been found empirically to result in pleasure. Though the general question as to which precedes the other, desire or pleasure, is incapable of solution here, there seems to be sufficient ground for assuming, for our present purpose, that, confining ourselves to a single life of a human being, the first experience of the new-born
infant is a general, vague, undefined craving, want, desire for nourishment, for something that will keep up its life. The mother's milk supplies this want, and from that moment of positive, definite pleasure, the indefinite want is specialised into a distinct desire, a liking for the milk. Therefore it does not appear to be incorrect to say generally that 'Attraction' implies a previously experienced pleasure.

ii. It also implies that there is a memory of this past fact, and

iii. That there is expectation of a similar pleasure occurring in the future under similar circumstances. Lastly,

iv. (a) That there is in consequence a desire for repeated contact, for association, for union with that object. But that

(b) While contact and association are possible, an absolute union is impossible. Where 'union' (though here too it is after all only comparative) is possible, as between the feeder and the food, the desire remains a desire only. It does not advance into the condition of an emotion proper, which is the attitude of one Jīva towards another Jīva, between which two Jīvas an absolute union is impossible, though an ever-closer approach to it is possible, and is being always made in the world-process. An Emotion is, thus, a desire plus the
cognition involved in the attitude of one Jīva towards another.

As to what the real truth is of the apparently complete union between feeder and food; as to whether there is any truth in the distinction of animate and inanimate; as to how subjects, Jīvas, becoming embodied in upādhis, sheaths, masses of the Not-Self, become objects to each other; as to how and why each Jīva-atom carries in its very being and constitution both the powers of attraction and repulsion, whereby there results the impossibility of an absolute union or an absolute separation—these are questions for the Metaphysic of the Jīvātmā. ¹

But the facts enumerated above as being implied in all Emotion are based on that Metaphysic; and it has to be mastered if they are to be understood in their entirety. These same facts, studied in the light of that Metaphysic, fully and truly explain the process of the growth of Individuality, of āhām-kāra, step by step, through the various 'bodies,' 'sheaths,' śharīras, kośhas, of Vedicāṇṭa and theosophical literature.

To return: the expected pleasure pictured in imagination—imagination and expectation represent only slightly different aspects of the same mental process—interblending with the desire, and the

¹ See The Science of Peace, ch. xiii.
two together constituting a special mental mood, have, as before stated, been taken generally as one Emotion-feeling, rather than one Emotion-desire; attention having been more taken up with and fixed by the pleasure-element than the desire-element.

Feelings proper are, as already stated, only Pleasure and Pain, which are special degrees of self-cognition, self-feeling, self-realisation, self-consciousness.

The very word Emotion, on the other hand, indicates that in the beginning, at the time the word was formed, the desire-element and the idea of the motion and action consequent on desire were more prominently and truly present before the minds of the men who first framed and used the word. Emotion is only a form of motion; motion towards an object, or away from it, in the mind, is Emotion. The current Samskṛt word for Emotion, bhāva, seems to have a similar significance. It implies a 'becoming,' a somewhat prolonged intermediate condition of passing or changing from one state to another.

Let us see now how the first of these two simple primary forms of Emotion (defined as a desire plus an intellectual cognition, as distinguished from a mere sense-cognition or sensation), this movement towards an object, Attraction, Like, Love, differentiates into and evolves the more complex forms, as between human being and human being.
The three main subdivisions of Attraction.

i. Attraction—\textit{plus} the consciousness of the equality with one's self of the attractive object, is Affection, or Love proper.

ii. Attraction—\textit{plus} the consciousness of the superiority to one's self of the attractive object, is Reverence.

iii. Attraction—\textit{plus} the consciousness of the inferiority to one's self of the attractive object, is Benevolence.

How the distinctions of equality, superiority, and inferiority arise between self and self, Jiva and Jiva; how the Peace of the Supreme is broken up into the dual of Pleasure and Pain; how in its motionlessness there appear Attraction and Repulsion; what the true meaning of Power, Force, Ability to cause or undergo a change, Ability to attract or to repel, is; how the One and the Many arise side by side in the Distinctionless; for a solution of these intimately connected and intensely absorbing questions—without a satisfactory solution of which indeed final satisfaction is not possible—for such solution Metaphysic proper must again be referred to.\footnote{\textit{The Science of Peace}, ch. x, xi.} For we are dealing here with relations between the existing and not with origins.

But it seems desirable, and possible also, at this
The meaning of superiority, equality and inferiority.

place to make an effort to explain what the meaning is of these cognitional elements, the consciousness of equality, superiority, and inferiority, which play such an important part in the structure and development of the Emotions, and which are indeed the sole cause of their differentiation from the homogeneity of Love or Hate into the heterogeneousness of numberless kinds, shades, and grades. A physical analogy will serve our purpose. Given attraction between two magnets properly placed, that which moves the other towards itself without itself displaying motion would be called the more powerful magnet; while the other would as clearly be called the less powerful. But if the two should, both of them, move towards each other simultaneously and meet half-way, they would be called equal in power. The case is the same between Jiva and Jiva. Given attraction between two Jivas, that which moves towards the other first is so far the inferior; that which moves the other towards itself first, is in that space and time the superior. If the two should move towards each other simultaneously, then they are equal.

The same idea may be expressed in other words, thus: Love is the desire for union with the object loved, and, therefore, ever tends to bring subject and object to one level in order that they may unite and become one. The fact that one Jiva
possesses a quality which meets a want in another Jiva lies at the root of their mutual attraction; it furnishes the common ground, the possibility of unity, of coming together, between them. Where these wants and their corresponding supplies are both about equally divided between two Jivas, so that each has wants that the other supplies, we may speak of them as equal; for each is inferior to the other in his wants, superior to the other in his corresponding supplies, and these deficiencies and superfluities existing on both sides, their sums balance each other. Exchange will go on till deficiencies and superfluities alike have disappeared. Where the wants of one Jiva are his distinguishing characteristic in his relation to another Jiva, whose distinguishing characteristic is his power to supply those wants, we may speak of them as inferior and superior. Here also the action of Love gradually leads to equalisation, as the superior fills up the deficiencies of the inferior, thus lifting him to his own level and making union possible.

Another and somewhat more metaphysical question may also be justly asked and dealt with here. How is it ever possible for a superior to be attracted towards an inferior, if what has been said above is unreservedly correct? An inferior, of course, receives benefits and pleasures from a superior and so feels attraction towards him; but what benefit and pleasure can a superior derive from an inferior that will initiate such attraction in him?
The answer to this question embraces two main considerations which, however, are connected with each other. (a) A pleasure is an empirical fact and not deducible in the ordinary sense of the word; one man finds hot pepper pleasant, another sugar; there is no law governing these facts except that persons are variously constituted; the organism of one is more in assonance with one kind of objects, that of another with another. As to why one Jiva should have one kind of organism and another another, we can only fall back upon the general metaphysical law that all jivas, individually as well as collectively, must pass through all possible experiences, individually in endless time, collectively in simultaneity; for so only can the Perfect Equilibrium of the Absolute be maintained. And, if pleasure and pain are such empirical facts, then it may well be that some so-constituted persons find it a positive pleasure to see the smile of happiness on an inferior’s face after he has been helped, and a positive pain in the opposite case. Of course, it may be said that if this is so, the mother that wants and longs for her baby to smile at her and stroke her face with its tiny fingers is inferior to the baby. And, in a sense, this is so, and rightly, for democracy in the deepest and truest sense of the word is inherent in the very Nature of the Absolute, and no Jiva is in reality and essence superior to or inferior than any other. But for the practical purposes of the
relative and successive, we have differences of superior and inferior also as indefeasible facts, and as these exist with reference to the multiplicity of the Not-Self, therefore material (and not the comparatively mental or psychical or spiritual) wants and supplies are ordinarily made the basis of the distinctions. He who can give more of material things and of power over them, directly or indirectly, is ordinarily called the superior. (b) Jivas, as will be further explained in chapter viii, are always and invariably belonging to either the one or the other of two and only two classes, the daiva or divine and the asura or demoniac, as they are technically called in the Bhagavad-Gītā. The class in which the One Self, the Pratyagātmā, is predominant, by their very constitution, helplessly, find giving and helping to be pleasant. It may be noted in passing that the question will perhaps become clearer when the Metaphysic of subtler and grosser bodies is grasped. It may then appear that, in the exercise of benevolence, though the grosser outer sheath is diminished, the inner and subtler, with which the Self in the Jīva is for the time identified, really expands, so that the self grows not only metaphorically but actually. As the banker’s actual cash balance diminishes because of loans advanced, his credit, his assets, grow. In a certain sense it is true that absolutely disinterested benevolence there is never. In most cases, at

1 xvi. 6; and the whole chapter generally.
the present stage of evolution, the desire for return, for reward of good actions, here or hereafter, is obvious and unconcealed. But even when the donor himself can find no such desire in the deepest depths down to which he can probe his own consciousness, either to pay off a past debt by his present beneficent action (which is as much an interested motive as the other), or to receive an adequate repayment in the future, still, even then, because of the fact of his being a separate individual, there is necessarily hidden in him such a desire sub-consciously. Otherwise, the beneficent action would be motiveless, causeless, and, in the realm of the Relative, there can never be an event without a cause. As the current Samskrét proverb says, कृपानुबंधो लोकायम् “all this world, i.e., all Jivas, are bound together in the bonds of mutual debts, endlessly” — a fact which, as said before, follows directly from the very Nature of the Absolute and the ultimate identity of all Jivas, and without which the endless story of the world-process were impossible. In practice, the Jivas that are comparatively the most disinterestedly and truly benevolent will be the readiest to acknowledge that they should not entertain the pride, and inflict on the recipient of their charity

1 In such registration, by the inner sub- or super-consciousness, of all debts and assets, consist the power and process of the law of Karma.
the humiliation, of forbidding a grateful return, parents nurturing their babes—what actions more disinterested?—yet thereby discharge their debts to their own parents, and may also rightfully expect, and do expect, service from their grown-up sons in their old age. The Highest Gods, the Hierarchs, the Masters, and mothers and fathers, expect a certain amount of reciprocation—in the immediate present also. The emanations, in subtler matter, that are the accompaniments of the finer emotions are the food of the Gods, and of the mental bodies of others generally.¹

These considerations may help to remove any mysteriousness or mysticism that may seem to hang about a mere statement that the self expands with compassion; and to show that on the side of Love, the predominance of the Common Self appears not only in the desire to help, known as Benevolence (active) and Magnanimity (more passive), but also in the desire to repay and serve in some way or other which is the essence of Gratitude (active) and Humility (more passive), which accompany all Reverence and Worship, when regarded as Emotions.

Repulsion, Dislike, Hate, may be analysed in exactly the same manner as Attraction, and yields the three principal sub-divisions of:

i. Anger—In the case of the equality of the object of it.

¹ Bhagavad-Gītā, iii. 11.
ii. Fear—In the case of the superiority of the object of it.

iii. Pride or Scorn—In the case of the inferiority of the object of it.

The definitions, given before, of superiority, equality and inferiority, in connection with the emotion of Love, apply also, mutatis mutandis, to the emotion of Hate. Briefly, as he who has more, is the stronger, and is willing to give voluntarily, is the superior, and he who has less, is the weaker, and is willing to receive if the gift is made voluntarily, is the inferior, on the side of Love; so, he who is the stronger and desirous of taking away by force is superior, and he who is the weaker and liable to be deprived and made to lose against his will is the inferior, on the side of Hate. So, too, the exchange, in the condition of equality, is involuntary here.

All mental moods whatever which are by general consensus called Emotions—as also many which are not so called but which are in truth well deserving of being so-called—will, on close analysis, be found (a) either to fall under one or other of these two triplets which cover the six principal Emotions of humanity; or, (b) to be compounds consisting of elements taken from both. The mental moods which are not generally recognised as Emotions fail to be so recognised only because they are not so intense as the others, and are accompanied with a less degree of general excitement—expansion or contraction—of
the system (speaking physiologically) and of the self (speaking psychologically). In them the desire-element which stamps a mental mood as Emotion and induces urgently to action is weak, sometimes so weak as to be imperceptible; while the cognitional, the intellectual element is strong and prominent. In the ordinary books on Psychology they are either not treated of at all, or are vaguely and loosely referred to the department of the intellect exclusively. Examples of them will appear later on.

Summing up, now, the progressive definitions given above, from time to time, we may say: Emotion is the desire of one Jīva towards another Jīva in one of two main forms, viz., either to associate with it, knowing it to be able to give to, or exchange with, or receive from itself, objects of sense or their derivatives (in the broadest and most comprehensive sense), under conditions of perfect voluntariness; or, to dissociate from it, knowing it to be able to take away, or exchange with, or lose to itself similar objects of sense under conditions of involuntariness. A convenient abbreviation of this would, perhaps, be that: An Emotion is a desire in one Jīva to associate with or dissociate from another Jīva, plus an intellectual cognition of the latter's superiority, equality, or inferiority, with reference to possible voluntary or forcible exchange of pleasures or pains between them.
If, in any given case, the definition appears to fail in any respect, it will probably be found, on analysis, that the difficulty is due only to a deeper intermixture in that case than usual of elements belonging to both sides, of Love as well as of Hate, and that when these are duly discriminated and sorted out the difficulty vanishes. This inextricable mixture of "opposites" in the world-process, and consequent impossibility of absolute definition, the impossibility of any other than comparative characterisation, is a fact which has always to be borne in mind and is to be met with in interpreting any and every experience and any and every object belonging to the realm of the Relative. Why this should be so is for Metaphysic to answer.

The above analysis and definition of Emotion need not be confined to the emotions of the human race, but may safely be applied to those of other races of beings also, be they higher or lower than the human in the scale of evolution. Even apart from the metaphysical considerations which go to show that consciousness is a partless and unbreakable unity in essence, and uniform in manifestation though varying endlessly in degrees of unfoldment (parallel with the endless variations in the quantity, quality, and activity, the density or subtlety, peculiarity, simple or complex organisation, etc., of the vehicles of its manifestation, its sheaths or bodies) throughout the world-process, the facts, established
by modern investigations into the evolution of intelligence in the various kingdoms found on this earth, by themselves suffice to establish common features of consciousness in minerals, vegetables,¹ animals and men, and to show that the differences are differences mainly of degrees of complexity and definiteness. Consciousness unfolds evenly in all three departments, cognition, desire and

¹ See J. C. Bose's *Response in the Living and the Non-Living* and *Plant Response*. It is remarkable how while one series of investigations tends to show that what was heretofore regarded as inanimate is as much animate as man, another series of experiments tends towards the apparently exactly opposite conclusion that the activities that were so long believed to be exclusively due to animate or conscious life are really inanimate and mechanical in their nature; (See, e.g., J. Loeb's *The Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology*, and his explanation of animate functions by geotropism, heliotropism, stereotropism, galvanotropism, etc.). The reconciliation is to be found, and the final why at the end of each series of experiments satisfactorily answered, only in the view, emphasised by the *Vedānta* and the *Sāṅkhya* that even *buddhi* and *manas*, reason and intelligence, are *jaḍa*, unconscious and material, and that the only Conscious Fact is the One Self whose Consciousness *maintains* all the world-process. To understand the full significance of this metaphysical doctrine, we should study, e.g., the accounts of 'photographs,' etc., of the invisible emanations from human beings during special psychological conditions, taken by Dr. H. Baraduc of Paris, and of 'voice-figures,' 'music-forms,' 'sound-colors,' etc., of which even professionally scientific journals are full now, to say nothing of theosophical literature.
action, though, of course, one is generally pre-
dominant and the other two subordinate, so that
there is also an appearance of succession and con-
secutiveness in the development of the three; and as the first grows more and more defined into
intellect and thought, so the other two also grow
similarly complicated and developed into the
most subtle emotions and the most wide-reaching
industries. The history of the evolution of any
one of these is also the history of the evolution of
the other two.¹

¹ For various schemes of triplets, e.g., (a) Desire, Emotion,
Passion, or (b) Desire, Craving, Will, etc., arising out of the
mutual reaction and reflexion of cognition, desire and action,
the reader may refer to the Prañava-Vāda. For valuable
details as to the developments and transformations of emo-
tions, e.g., of the sex-passion into parental love, see A Study
in Consciousness, by Annie Besant, Part II., ch. iv., s. I.
CHAPTER V.

THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL EMOTIONS.

Let us now try to follow out the complex developments of these comparatively simple Emotions with special reference to the desire-aspect of them.

i. The attraction felt to an equal is the desire for union with the attractive object by means of equal reciprocation. By reciprocal, because an absolute union is possible only by the dissolution of the forms enshrining and making separate the Jivas, of the forms through and in which only Love (as well as Hate) between Jiva and Jiva becomes possible. By equal reciprocation, because the two termini of the nexus, the two parties to the relation, being equal, neither has any net surplus to give away to the other, neither suffers from any net deficiency which could be supplied from the stock of the other. Only an exchange is possible. And the more varied the things exchanged, the more constant
and rapid the intercourse, the more complete and all-sided the gratification of the requirements of each by the other, the greater, the more perfect the Love. But always only the more perfect—always only a greater and greater approximation to perfection; never the perfect, for that implies absolute identification wherewith Love ceases. And hence the mysterious (because un-analysed), never-gratified, ever-vague, ever more inward-receding longings of Love, the sex-love especially of early youth.

The degree of reciprocation, and the objects in regard to which it takes place, are the sources of the sub-division of this head of Emotion into many minor heads.

Desire for union, for harmony, by reciprocation in merely social matters, between persons superficially acquainted, and mostly confined to the avoidance on either side of acts which would make the other feel inferior and small, and the performance of such as would promote and strengthen the feeling of equality—such reciprocation corresponds to that mental mood which is indicated by the word Politeness. Making way for and salutation of each other are instances of the physical manifestation of this mood.

A higher decree of reciprocation in matters deeper than those involved in ordinary social intercourse, underlies the Emotion of Friendship.
A Sanskrit verse sums up the features of Friendship, rather prosaically no doubt, but in a way which very aptly illustrates and confirms the truth of the analysis which lies at the root of the present classification:


dhūrasyo bhūyate caiva guhya vākā śrūṇagitā ch।
dravyatā prātipūrṇaḥ śūrdvīrṇaḥ mālālakṣaṇam
dhūrasyo bhūyate caiva guhya vākā śrūṇagitā ch।
dravyatā prātipūrṇaḥ śūrdvīrṇaḥ mālālakṣaṇam
dhūrasyo bhūyate caiva guhya vākā śrūṇagitā ch।
dravyatā prātipūrṇaḥ śūrdvīrṇaḥ mālālakṣaṇam

"Six-fold is the characteristic of the friend: he gives and receives presents, confides and is entrusted with secrets, entertains and is entertained at feasts."

The prominent physical manifestation is the hand-shake and the arm-in-arm.

- The desire for union by means of the highest degree of reciprocation possible between human beings, possible in perfection only between two human beings of the opposite sexes at the present stage of evolution, of reciprocation covering all the departments of human life, is Love proper. The physical manifestation is the embrace, the constant association, and the living together of family-life.

- Attraction towards a superior where the superiority is slight is Respect. Respect with regard to some one quality or more, where the object of that Respect is inferior in other qualities, becomes Esteem for the whole man. The physical accompaniment is the prānaḥ, the bow.
Where the superiority is greater the Emotion becomes Reverence, Veneration, finding expression in 'kneeling for a blessing,' 'touching the feet,' 'bending.'

Where it is complete, as that of one who is regarded as the Creator, it becomes Worship, Adoration, appearing in 'prostration before the Lord.'

In the above three cases, the desire for union—which desire ultimately takes effect as imitation leading to equalisation, absolute union being impossible, as said before, without breaking up the material forms or upādhis—is the desire for equalisation by receiving from the superior, as is manifest in the upturned hand of prayer in the case of worship, and is present, though not so expressly, in the other forms also. Attention may be drawn here again to what has been indicated before, that Emotion, like any and every other aspect or feature or element of individualised life, can never exist in the entire absence of ultimate reference to some material object, in the comprehensive sense, some not-self, be it matter of the physical earth or of the seventh heaven, the Satyaloka, which is capable of being given or taken by the Jīva who is the object of the emotion. Even such conventions of honor or insult as 'giving precedence' or 'the higher seat,' 'taking the wall,' 'passing to the right,' 'saluting first,' 'folding palms,' 'uncovering,' or the opposite, though not
possessing now any significance of direct material benefit or otherwise, had such significance in their origin and imply it now.

The stages through which a worshipper passes in his worship show the equalising power of Love in a remarkable way. At first he is chiefly conscious of the immense superiority of the object of his worship, and his longing for union finds expression in the wish to submit himself to guidance to efface his difference: "Thy will be done, O Lord, not mine." The substitution of the will of another for his own produces in him a likeness to the object of worship, assimilating his own nature to that of the higher one, until he reaches the point where he is no longer conscious of the existence of two wills, one of which is subordinated to the other, and where the expression of his Emotion is: "Thy will and mine, O Lord, are one." This is the cry of perfect Love, in which worship is replaced by extasy, by a sense of union achieved.

A question may arise here. It is said that worship is the expression of humility, the declaration of one's need, the soliciting of help, the desire to receive.¹ Is not this inconsistent with the fact of

¹ This is so generally recognised as a fact in Sanskrit literature that there is no discussion of it at all. It is everywhere taken for granted. The majority of hymns end with an enumeration of the benefits to be derived from the worship of the deity concerned with that hymn. The Purāṇas
The meaning of self-surrender.

self-surrender which generally accompanies worship and means giving rather than receiving. The general answer seems to be this: The impulse of self-surrender which is found in the worshipper is an incidental though usual accompaniment of, and not identical with, the feeling of worship, and, moreover, it is not due so much to any feeling on his part that he has something to give which can supply a want in the object of worship, as rather to the feeling that he should completely throw away everything which might stand in the way of the free flowing in of the superfluity of the superior, so that by the reception of that superfluity he may be raised to the level where union becomes possible by equality, by pseudo-identity of nature.

If we wish to enter more fully into the matter, we may note that worship is, in practice, actually made with only one of two ends: (i) the one seeks to secure and prays for some personal benefit, some gain to the self of the worshipper as separate from other selves; (ii) the other seeks the good of that self only as united and in essence one with all other selves. In the former case, whatever self-surrender teem with declarations of the power of worship of such and such Iods to bring such and such fruit. A current verse says: Let a man worship the Sun, if he wants health; Fire, if he wants wealth; Shiva, if he wants wisdom; Viṣṇu, if he wants deliverance. The bhakṭi, or 'devotion which is without motive' is distinguishable from worship.
happens to be present with worship, however apparently complete and unreserved it may be, is in reality conditioned and reserved by the primary and ever-internally-present aim of the particular benefit desired. This is what is known as sa-kāma-ṭāpa, worship, or asceticism, or sacrifice, in honor of some one deity, with some one definite selfish object, with a desire for some personal gain of some particular object or power. It means: “I serve you, I humble myself before you, in all possible ways, I undergo all kinds of hardships and sufferings (self-imposed, but as if) in the performance of your commands, I yield up the whole of myself to you, and you may do with me what you like—but I do all this in order that you may take pity on me and give me back all my poor services and presents and offerings with much enhancement, give me of your own possessions and powers, as far as may be, for me to use and exercise at will for my personal pleasure and profit.” In the other case, where the worshipper’s self is surrendered for the helping of other selves, to the Ideal of self-sacrifice, and only to Him and to those who are His representatives in high offices of self-sacrifice, the Hierarchs, Rṣhis, Prophets, Saints,—however externally reserved and conditioned with reason the surrender may be, yet it only is internally complete, for that conditioning reason itself has in it the seed of universality and all-embracingness, and is not a limited and limiting desire for the
benefit of one separate person only. The worship in this case means: “In serving you I wish to serve others, the world generally so far as may be, and whatever of powers and possessions I desire to receive from you, I desire only for the better helping of others, and the surrender of myself and my belongings that I make to you is governed by the view that you will thereby be the better able to utilise and equip me for the service of these others.” Such surrender is the true and sincere devotion or bhakti which is instanced in the case of Rṣhis whose tapaḥ is niṣṭhā-kāma, without selfish and with altruistic motive; whereas the other devotion is only apparent and insincere, as shown in the cases, mentioned in the Purāṇas, of the ājīvyaśas and the asuras who performed sacrifice only till they had obtained the boons of power that they had craved all along, and then threw devotion and penance to the winds.

Even after the above statement there may remain behind in the mind an objection to the use of the word ‘equality’ in connection with worship. This would probably be due to the fact that ‘endeavor to become equal,’ has come to mean ‘endeavor to rival,’ amongst ‘separative’ Jīvas. But that is not the meaning intended here, or among ‘union-seeking’ Jīvas. There is no rivalry here, in worship of the second kind above described, but only partnership. The son grows up to share in and lighten his father’s work and not to oppose
him. "Perfect love casteth out fear" as well as pride. The infant clammers on to the top of its mother's head and shoulders. She does not resent it as presumption. She knows that it is the pure and perfect love that feels no trace of difference of mine or thine. On the contrary, if the child showed fear and kept studiously shrinking apart, she would feel sad and hurt. The baby feels the perfection of confidence that the mother is its own private property without any reservation, all mine instead of mine and thine. "Ye must become as little children if you are to enter the kingdom of heaven."

Briefly, to put the matter from another point of view, the worship that thinks: "I want absolutely nothing in return" will, on analysis, be found to be meaningless pride; and the worship that thinks: "I may not want equality, even by way of the humblest partnership" will, similarly, on examination, be found to be an unbecoming fear, the fear of offending an element of pride, which is thereby unworthyly ascribed to the object of worship.

From all the above it may appear that the emotion underlying worship pure and simple is the desire for equalisation by receiving, and that Devotion is something different from this; it will be treated of again later.

iii. Attraction towards an inferior is Kindness, having as physical manifestation the smile of welcome, encouraging approach by assuring a kindly response, and
meaning, here, the sense of 'superiority,' of 'moreness,' that is willing to give, is accompanied by the desire to give.

(The various meanings of 'smile' and 'laughter' will be discussed later. The smile referred to here is of course not the same as the smile of self-complacence or irony.)

Attraction in a greater degree towards an inferior is Tenderness—wherein the physical manifestations are more prominent, more intense, passing into caress.

Lastly, it is Pity proper, and Compassion, whereof tears are the first physical expression, tears that mean the overflow in gift of the surplus of the greater, even earlier than the outstretched and downward turning palm of giving.

In these three sub-divisions of Benevolence the realisation of the desire for union, *i.e.*, for equalisation, is sought by the superior by means of giving to the inferior from his own excess, and so bringing him up to his own level. And the acceptance by the worshipped of the worshipper's first humble sacrifice, by the mother of service from her son, by the benefactor of a mark of gratitude from him to whom he has done good, is not a refutation of the fact that Benevolence is 'giving.' It only means the gracious accord of equality to him who was erstwhile so helpless and so helped.

Notice here that the tendency on the side of
Convergence and divergence of forms of love and hate.

Attraction is to culminate in the equality-union of Love, though relations might and very often do begin with inferiority on the one side and superiority on the other. The reverse is the case on the other side of feeling, where Repulsion is the motor-power. The ways of virtue starting from two points, compassion and humility, meet in Love. The way of vice starting from anger, the first form of Hate, diverges endlessly into scorn and fear. Love is the coming together of two equals, neither of whom in the end gains anything from the other; it is thus, in its perfection, the very climax and the end of virtue. So Hate is the going apart of two equals, neither of whom at the beginning has taken anything—but will begin to try to take all—from the other; and it is thus the beginning of vice.

As Love is the desire for union with the object loved by equalisation, by reciprocation, so is Hate the desire for separation from the object hated by differentiation, by inequality. And as Love between human being and human being is not

---

1 In these considerations may be found, in part, the reason why love passes into lust (when the Jiva has not yet got over the tendencies of pra vṛttī), and lust into love (when the nivṛttī tendencies become strong); such is the endless wheeling of life, the ear of corn out of the manure and manure out of the corn again, each having its indefeasible place in the world-process.
compatible with complete identification of either party with the other, so neither is Hate compatible with total suppression or annihilation of either.

At first sight it might seem that complete separation is best secured only by such annihilation, and it is true that in its pure nakedness the desire constituting Hate would be the desire for complete annihilation of the object hated; but this form of the desire is inevitably changed by the necessity of the conditions under which alone the mutual play of the Self and the Not-Self is possible. The case of Love is the same. The desire of Love is the desire for complete identification; but the desire can never be fulfilled, except by the disappearance of Love with the disappearance of its object. Each, if carried to excess, to its metaphysical completion, loses its original character and abolishes itself, becoming indistinguishable from its opposite. Love uttermost becomes identity, reduces all the Many to One; Hate extreme annihilates all Else, all Other, all Not-I, and remains it-Self alone.

Such absence of Love and of Hate, absence of movement, absence of the one and the many, absence of the abstract and the concrete, absence of Pratyāgātmā and Mūlaprakṛti, belongs to the Absolute, the Parabrahman, the Paramātmā. But the discussion of that question belongs to Metaphysic, as also of the intimately connected question—which
takes its rise directly from the problem stated in the preceding paragraph—whether a commencement has an end also or not. It would be unending if complete identification into one of those which were two were possible. Otherwise, however close the approximation, however long even the appearance of identification in certain exalted states, there will be an end and a redisruption at the beginning of another kalpa.¹

The result of these considerations is that it appears that Hate proper cries: "I wish mine enemy had a hundred lives, so I might slay him over and over again"; that Hate is as insatiable as Love; for with annihilation of its object it itself dies.

The subdivisions of the primary emotion of Hate and its subdivisions. Repulsion, Hate, Dislike, are exactly analogous to the subdivisions of the opposite emotion.

i. The Repulsion causing separation by inequalisation between two parties that are actually equal is, in the preliminary degree, Rudeness, Brusqueness, even Reserve and Chillness in a certain sense. The physical manifestation is 'keeping off,' 'mutual distance,' 'turning the cold shoulder.'

---

¹ See *The Science of Peace*, ch. xvi.
At those stages of human evolution, in those times and places, in those races, in which the separative self and intelligence are strongly developed, this mood of Reserve, of 'mind your own business,' and 'keep your distance,' this absence of 'gush,' and suppression of 'maudlinness' or 'effusiveness' or 'fussiness'—as the opposite mood is described by a sometimes exaggerated contempt—is most marked. Its real nature is so little understood that it is often regarded with some pride, as a manly virtue in itself, apart from any special reasons or circumstances.

In the next higher degree the desire for separation becomes Anger proper, Enmity, Hostility. The physical manifestation is 'preparation to strike down the other,' 'exchange of abuse, or blows,' amongst simple unrefined natures where the physique prevails over the mind; and amongst the so-called cultured and refined and complex-minded, it becomes the exchange of 'cutting' sarcasm, and 'crushing' retort, and 'piercing' taunt, etc.

The last stage is Wrath, and Rage, and Hate proper, and open war and frantic endeavor to suppress each other entirely, physically and mentally, by whatever means and weapons come to hand first, when even Bhiśhma and Arjuna, the ideal warriors of the Mahābhārata story, forget the laws of chivalry, and senators in the
legislative halls of modern nations use their fists and fling ink-pots and blue-books at each other.

ii. Repulsion from a superior where the superiority is slight and not definitely recognisable, the desire for inequalisation by making him inferior, coupled with the consciousness of inability to do so, and also with the consciousness that that superior is capable of making the inferior more inferior, is Apprehension. The physical manifestation is 'shrinking.'

The next degree, where the superiority of the object of dislike is greater, is Fear and Terror proper; the physical manifestation is 'avoidance' and 'running away.'

The third and culminating stage is that of Horror, where the dislike as well as the superiority of its object are at their greatest, and the physical manifestation corresponding to the consciousness of complete inferiority and powerlessness is, 'paralysis of the limbs,' 'powerlessness even to stir and run away.'

iii. Repulsion plus the consciousness of the inferiority of the object of Repulsion, the desire for further separation from it by means of further inequalisation, and the consciousness of ability to bring about such further inequalisation, is, when the inferiority of the object of Repulsion is slight, mere Superciliousness, the 'subjective' aspect of which, as it may be called, is Self-importance. The
physical manifestation is ‘looking down upon,’
‘holding the head high,’ ‘toss of the head.’

In the next degree it is Scorn, Contempt, the
physical manifestation of which is the ‘sneer,’
‘the curled lip.’

The third stage is Disdain, manifested in the
‘sparing away’ of the object, the ‘relentless
‘crushing’ of it, ‘the treading of it into the dust,’
‘planting the heel on the neck,’ ‘reducing to
slavery,’ ‘breaking the spirit.’

It may be noted here that in Sanskrit literature
reference is being made constantly to
the six ‘waves,’ śhaḍ-ūrmaṇya,
the six ‘internal enemies,’ antaraṇaya
which have to be conquered
before the attainment of the Self and of Liberation
is possible. But these six ruling passions are
named kāma, krodha, lobha, moha,
maḍa and maṭsaṇa, literally love or lust, anger,
greed, confusion, pride, and jealousy. It seems
difficult at first sight to identify these with the six
principal sub-divisions of Emotion adopted here.
But by bearing in mind that in Sanskrit literature,
in the contexts in which they usually occur, the idea
is to transcend them all, both virtues and vices, for
both operate as bonds (when virtue is not trans-
formed into duty), and that therefore even the good
emotions are named by names which rather hide
their goodness; and also by slightly stretching the
significance of the doubtful ones so as to include
allied emotions; we may succeed in reducing these to our six, thus: Kāma is obviously and admittedly Love; lobha, greed, stands for Reverence and Worship, by emphasising the prayer-element therein; moha, confusion, stands for Compassion which overrules one's self-interest and confuses him as to personal consequences; krodha is clearly Anger; so is mada Pride; and matarasa, jealousy, represents Fear.
CHAPTER VI.

CERTAIN POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS.

It seems desirable at this stage to consider certain possible objections in detail.

The facts of outright physical murder on the one hand, and of uttermost self-sacrifice of the physical life on the other, seem to conflict with the theory of the nature of Love and of Hate propounded here, in so far as it says that absolute union or absolute separation is impossible. But the reconciliation is to be found in the consideration that even in these cases—when they are true instances of Love and Hate—there is in the consciousness the perpetuation of the relation of Love or of Hate, as the case may be, that is to say, a perpetuation of both the factors or Jivas in the relation of love or of hate, and so an absence of utter union or separation.

This explanation will not appear very satisfactory to those who have not yet seen reason to believe that the individual self, the Jiva, has any life apart from the present physical body. Yet the fact of the consciousness of a perpetual, unending rela-
tion is verifiable by them too. When a person deliberately and voluntarily undergoes suffering for the well-being of another, even to the extent of giving up his life; when he does so silently, in concealment, and unrecognised; when he is, over and above all this, an atheist, an agnostic, a non-believer in a soul and a future life by the conviction of his intelligence; even under all these circumstances, if his mind were looked into with sufficient scrutiny, there would be found in it, a desire for recognition, suppressed by some stronger motive; a consciousness, a sub-consciousness it may be, that his act of self-sacrifice might have a permanent, a lasting, nay, a perpetual value; and a long series of the beneficial results of the act would also be present in his consciousness, thereby extending that consciousness actually over all that period, notwithstanding the side-belief that the consciousness would be cut short in a limited time. The truth here is that the side-belief is a mere word-belief—there is no real modification of consciousness corresponding to it; consciousness can never imagine its own cessation.

मासाब्दयुगकल्पेशु गतागम्येष्वनेकारः ।
नौदेति नास्त्येकां संविदेषा स्वयंप्रभा ॥

"Through the numberless months, years, yugas and kalpas, past and to come in the exhaustless

1 Paśchaṭashī, i. 7.
future, what rises not, nor sets, is this One Self-luminous Consciousness alone.”

"Never has the cessation of consciousness been witnessed; or if it has been, then the witness thereof himself remains as the embodiment of that same consciousness."

It has just been said that cases of murder and of self-sacrifice of life—when they are true instances of Love and Hate—are reconcilable with the theory put forward here. Other cases do not need such reconciliation and they are no less frequent.

Let us consider what would be true instances of the relinquishment of one’s own life and the taking of another for pure Love and pure Hate, respectively. And first the precise significance of Love and Hate should be fixed in this reference. Which one or more of the three principal phases of each can be meant here?

 Instances of death for Love or by Hate, and precise meaning of these two in such cases.

1 Devi-Bhagavāta, III. xxxii. 15, 16. The Vyāsa-Bhāṣṭya on Yoga-Sūtra, ii. 9, and the Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣṭya on Nyāya-Sūtra, III. i. 19, infer previous experience of death, and therefore previous lives, from the fear of death in this life.
On the side of Love, such absolute self-surrender, involving complete self-extinction, would, at first sight, appear to be possible in the case of all the three phases. A greater might conceivably give himself away wholly to a smaller to enlarge the latter's life. So a smaller might also give himself to the greater and be absorbed into his larger life? But is this possible? Apparently not, from what has been said before as to the nature of self-surrender and Devotion. The superior cannot take from the lesser, and so increase the latter's inferiority. Such an absorption is not possible in the case of equals either. It involves a reasoning in a circle. Each cannot become absorbed in the other, only one may in another. The result is that only a greater can give himself away to a lesser; and the meaning of Love in this special connection is therefore Benevolence.

What is the case on the side of Hate? Equals as equals, and while continuing equals, cannot harm each other. And the lesser can clearly not suppress the greater. Thus in the case of Hate too, only the greater can suppress and take the life of the lesser; and so in this reference Hate means Pride.

Unfortunately the word Pride does not express all that is meant to be expressed. And there does not appear to be another English word—scarcely even a Sanskrit word, though māḏa comes very near to it—to express the exact opposite of
Benevolence, to express Hate plus superiority in strength plus active exercise of both. Tyranny approaches most nearly. Hate, Tyranny, and Pride will therefore be used rather unprecisely in the succeeding paragraphs as each seems fittest. It should also be noted that the words 'greater' and 'lesser' have been used above in a precise and limited signification, restricted to the ability to give or take life.

Passing on after this preliminary limitation of the signification of Love and Hate in view of death self-sacrifice and slaughter proceeding from them, we find that the cases where the death, and the death alone, of the physical body of the benefactor is absolutely necessary for the purpose of the benefaction, and is consciously, deliberately, and fully premeditated, are, fortunately for humanity, few. The Budhha, in a previous incarnation, giving up his Brähmaṇa-body in invincible and joyous tenderness to feed the life of the famishing tigress and her cubs; wives sucking the poisoned wounds of husbands and dying; shipwrecked sailors tossed on rafts for week after week, and casting lots to decide whose body should first be sacrificed to feed his starving comrades; healthy persons giving blood in large quantities for transfusion into the veins of the sick—are very infrequent instances in tradition

The Dhāna-bhūtu Upaniṣhat indicates that kṛṣṇa or Compassion and himsā or slaughter, the wish to destroy, are at the opposite ends of a certain line in the heart.
CER	PPOSSIBLE OBJECTIONS. 69

and history. In most other cases the self-sacrifice of
life is incidental and not premeditated, not even
strongly expected as probable, as in rescues from
fire or water or weapons. In such cases the giving
up of life is not necessary, very often the exact
opposite is necessary, to the achievement of the
object of the action.

In the case of Hate—Pride plus Tyranny—
unfortunately for humankind, the action whereof
the suppression of another's life is the direct and
premeditated object is very frequent at this point
of small progress in human evolution.

The causes and beginnings of Hate are, in
strict theory, not more numerous than
those of Love amongst embodied Jivas.

But the instinct of Love is unity;
hence Benevolence begins by giving up one after
another the many things that make up embodied
life, in order to secure, in the receding end, the
unity of two selves. An utter self-sacrifice of life
is therefore seldom required. The instinct of Hate
on the other hand is separateness; and where it is
strong and rampant it would begin by at once taking
away—in imagination only if it cannot in actuality
—the separate life and self of the other, as the
very root, in order wholly, easily, and effectually to
suppress all the rest that constitutes the existence
of that other. In lawless and savage races the
slaughter of human beings, on the slightest
occasions, is, in consequence, immense. But in
ordered and well-governed societies—where the very fact of social organisation shows that the elements of Love and harmony and union are more or less prevalent over the elements of Hate and discord and disorder—the Hate is less strong, and would not, or is not allowed to, begin with murder, but generally commences with inflicting minor injuries and losses.

In the result, the fact remains that there is much more murder caused by true Hate than self-sacrifice of life by Love.

Cases of murder for robbery and for sex-jealousy—wherein the 'separate self' seeks its own comfort and preservation and propagation either in and through its own physical body, or in and through its progeny—are cases of rather indirect Hate. There is the desire to gain something which is likely to cause pleasure and enhance life. But as this is a desire in and for the 'separate self,' and not in and for the 'united Self,' there is a conflict over it between the two separate selves concerned, instead of union; and this conflict becomes the conflict of manifest Hate. If there were no such conflict, the underlying Hate would not come to the surface. Cannibals, travellers' accounts say, treat their future victims with great care and tenderness, and fatten them up; and there is no sign of Hate at all in their relations. But let the victim resist his immolation, and Wrath and Hate are at once aroused.
CERTAIN POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS.

This belongs to travellers' stories, which cannot be verified by everybody's personal experience. Let us take what is within the reach of every one.

Poulterers, and beef, mutton, and pork-breeders feed and tend their animals very carefully,—even affectionately, shall we say?—and enhance their life for the time being by fattening them up, and so do exactly what Love would do rather than Hate in similar circumstances. But what would be the case if one of these animals resisted yielding up its flesh when it was required of him by its master? The rage and roar of wild animals tearing their prey are only due to the resistance of the prey, to its endeavour to keep its flesh for itself. This conflict of desires brings out the hidden Hate. So far as the mere flesh is concerned, the tiger loves not its mate more dearly than it loves the antelope. The tiger, the leopard, has been known to fondle and play with the body of its prey after killing it. It rends not its mate as it rends the antelope, because it finds in that mate possibilities of repeated pleasures, which can be secured by the fostering of that mate and would be lost by the rending of it. It has no such inducement to preserve rather than destroy in the case of the deer. The infant that, afterwards, for tapasyā and self-denial, was compelled by Brahmā to hold the office of the sixth Manu, Chākṣuṣha, laughed, remembering his former
births, while being fondled in his mother's lap with many words of love. The frightened mother asked the recently-born baby why it laughed. The babe replied: "Thou lovest me, it is true; but so does this wild cat that is waiting for an opportunity to eat me; so also does this ogress of a subtler plane, invisible to thee, but visible to me, also waiting for the same! They love me too, though in a somewhat different way!"

In other words, the emphasising of the 'united Self' with reference to a common object of desire is Love; the emphasising of the 'separate selves' with reference to a common object of desire is Hate.

In other cases the Hate is more direct. In the case of insults and affronts, of reflections against each other's superiority, of non-admission of such, of the desire to 'cut down tall poppies,' the desire to suppress each other, etc., has no other distant and indirect motive and object.

प्रकृति: खलु सा महीयता सहते नान्यसमुदाति गया।
"It is the very nature of the proud that they cannot endure the rise of others." These, it may perhaps be said, are instances of true Hate causing murder in a special sense.

1 Markandeya-Purāṇa, chapter lxiii.
2 Kirāṭārjuniya, ii. 21. Another and perhaps better reading is समुद्राति, 'aggressiveness' or 'pride,' instead of rise.'
The deaths in wars are, it may be noted, connected with both Benevolence and Tyranny. In so far as the fighters fight for what they believe to be a righteous cause, and risk their lives for the sake of the general good of their country, they are dominated by the one emotion; in so far as they fight for mere robbery of land, or money, or similar physical advantages of commerce, etc.—however specious the names given to the causes of the war—they are dominated by the other.

All these cases will, it seems, be covered by the theory of a perpetuation of the relation in consciousness—and so in subsequent lives, according to the Indian doctrine on the subject.

Beginning with Anger, each party to a relation of Repulsion endeavours to separate the other as much as possible from himself. This he seeks to secure by taking away from that other all that makes up his being, and so making him inferior to and distant from himself. The other reciprocates, and so 'exchange of blows' goes on, till the relation of Anger is changed into the relation of Pride on the one hand and Fear on the other. The former then exclaims: "I have broken this creature's spirit." The other bears away in his heart the bitterness and ashes of despair, the ever-burning fire of secret rage, and rankling sense of mortification and malice. This is the
commonest development of relations of Repulsion. Sometimes, only too frequently, the relation apparently ends in the death of one party caused by the violence of the other. But so long as the Hate continues in the heart of the survivor, the other party is also present in his mind and to his consciousness, and the relation has not really ended; witness the boasting over destroyed enemies, arches and monuments of triumph, and periodical celebrations, etc., etc. Even when the Hate dies, and is succeeded (through natural re-action coming sooner or later, as it must, in the same life or in another) by Remorse and other subsequent moods, then too the relation between the two continues, the two are still together in consciousness; but the nature of the relation has, of course, changed. In the same way, so long as the memory of the perished benefactor continues in the heart of the benefitted, both the parties to the relation of Love are present in consciousness; here also memorial monuments serve as illustration. These psychological facts have actual superphysical consequences in post-mortem life according to the Purāṇas. ¹

¹ It would be interesting, in this connection, to follow out the *modus operandi* of the Law of Karma. The commentary, known as the Paramārtha-prapā, on the Bhagavad-Gītā, says that all beings are bound together by the (superphysical but material) rays of the Hiraṇya-garbha, whose centre of life is the heart of the Sun, and that each action of each
CERTAIN POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS.

And so all the component parts, all the Jivas, of a world are and continue to be bound to each other in relations of Love or Hate by the bonds of memory and consciousness, till the bonds are loosened by knowledge, in the way that will appear later on.

Two other possible objections should be noticed here. Is it true that we feel no emotions towards inanimate objects? We fear a cyclone, or loathe a filthy cess-pool, or are annoyed by the excessive sun or rain or fog or snow, the child is angry with the stone which has hurt it and even strikes it, we love the homestead, admire a mountain or forest scene, and caress tenderly a gem or statuette or other work of art. Are these not inanimate objects and do they not yet call forth emotion in the sense accepted here? The answer is that the words indicating emotions are used in such cases only by metaphor; the objects of the emotions are

being with reference to another is notified to and registered at the centre along the appurtenant rays, and brings its own reaction along these same. The mutual adjustments between the inner and outer bodies, as between acting and re-acting causes and effects, in consequence of sins and merits, seem to be part of the same material or superphysical modus operandi. The spiritual or metaphysical explanation is the thread-bond of the Common Self appearing as individualities within individualities. Vide The Science of Peace, ch. xiii. and The Advanced Text-Book of Saṅgaṇa Dharma, Part I. ch. iv, and III. ii.
invested in imagination with an individuality similar to that of human or other living beings; they are regarded as independent and inassimilable or unabsorbable sources of pleasure or pain. If they were absorbable, they would be objects of like and dislike in the same sense as good or bad food; in no case of emotion-proper.

The second objection is: What about the mental states which have been variously named 'Emotions of relativity,' such as Novelty, Variety, Monotony, Freedom, Restraint, Wonder; or 'Emotions of intellect,' such as Relief, 'similarity in diversity,' 'lucidity or cogency or neatness of argument or judgment'; or 'Aesthetic emotions,' Beauty, Harmony, Utility, Fitness, Sublimity, the Ludicrous; or the 'Moral or Religious Sentiments'; or the 'Emotions of self' such as self-regard, self-esteem, self-gratulation; or 'Emotions of power'; or 'of action,' such as Pursuit, etc.? The answer to this is that many of these will be found on analysis to be reducible into emotions proper as defined here, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter on Complex Emotions; and that the rest, which are not so reducible, are on a level with and practically varieties of not desires but pleasurable and painful sensations or cognitions and actions directly promotive or abative of vitality. 1

---

1 See the remarks on Pleasure and Pain, p. 27, supra, and on the Emotions of the Sublime and again of the Beauti-
The various kinds of pseudo-Emotions mentioned here are referred to by Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, and by Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, and others, under more or less different names. They are briefly dealt with by William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, II., ch. xxv.; he calls them 'the subtler emotions' and distinguishes in them a 'primary element' and a 'secondary' one; the 'secondary' element is nothing else than the 'coarser' emotions, as he calls them, the Emotions proper, from our standpoint, from which the 'primary' element is not emotional at all. It is true that, by reflexion and re-reflexion or mutual combination and complication, the three primary factors of the conscious life, cognition, desire, and action, become evolved into thought, emotion, and occupation, etc., and these may again be sub-divided into triplets reproducing the feature of one mainly and of the other two subordinately. But the following out of these complications is beyond our present purpose; the broad principles of how this complexity evolves will be found stated in *The Science of Peace*, ch. xv., and also indicated in the tables appended to ch. viii. of this work.
CHAPTER VII.

EMOTIONS AND CHARACTER, OR VIRTUES AND VICES.

From what has gone before it immediately follows that the virtues and vices of mankind are only the Emotions become permanent and wide-reaching: they are only permanent or habitual moods of mind (in the aspect of desire), guiding modes of action towards others generally. In the case of virtues they are the Emotions on the side of Love; in the case of vices, those on the side of Hate. For example, the emotion of Love, originally felt towards a small circle, for special personal reasons, ties of blood, etc., becomes the virtue of love (lovingness, friendliness, an affectionate nature, benevolence) when felt towards all with whom the man comes into contact, recognised (deliberately or instinctively) as a duty owed to each and based on the root-idea of the Unity of the Self. The emotion of parental love, felt to the
son, becomes the virtue of compassion, of tenderness, of protectiveness, when exercised towards anyone who is inferior or helpless. Hence Manu bids a man regard all aged women as his mothers, all young folk as his children, widening the personal Emotion into its corresponding virtue. Hence, also, a Buddhist description of the Arhat, speaks of his love as infinite, all-embracing, regarding all as a mother regards her first-born son. Hence, again, a Christian scripture says that ‘love is the fulfilling of the law,’ since all that duty can lay down as virtue love pours out spontaneously in fullest measure. So, on the other side, passing fits of anger, or scorn, becoming habitual, make up the vice of peevishness, or malevolence. Thus, then, we see that if a man acts to every one as to his own under the sway of love, he will be a virtuous man; if he behaves to others generally as he does towards the special objects of his dislike, he will be a vicious one. We may rightly say then that virtues are Emotions on the side of Love, vices those on the side of Hate. Indeed, this is so much the case that, even without the fact being clearly recognised, the same word is often found denoting a particular Emotion as well as the virtue or vice corresponding to it; for instance, compassion and pride. It requires only to name the corresponding Emotions and the virtues and vices side by side respectively to show at once the truth of the statement made above.
The permanent aspects of the principal Emotions named before, appearing in man as overruling and predominant moods of feeling, affecting, coloring, and guiding his modes of action, may be grouped as below:

On the side of Love:
The Attraction between equals in the three ascending stages before mentioned (pp. 47-49) gives rise to:

**Tentative classification of principal Virtues and Vices.**

On the side of Love:
- Politeness—Good manners—Courte
ty—Blandness—Considerateness.
- Friendliness—Helpfulness—Sociability.
- Lovingness—An affectionate nature—Domesticity.

Attraction to a superior similarly produces:
- Modesty—Unobtrusiveness—Mildness.
- Reverence—Seriousness—Earnestness—Gravity.
- Sedateness—Staidness—Non-flippantness.
- Meekness—Humility—Obedience—Gratitude.

Attraction to an inferior:
- Gentleness—Softness—Sweetness—Kind-heartedness.
- Compassionateness—Pitifulness—Benevolence.

On the side of Hate, they are, similarly:

Towards equals:
- Rudeness—Brusqueness—Churlishness.
- Moroseness—Sullenness—Irascibility—Peevishness.
EMOTIONS AND CHARACTER.

Cholericiness—Bearishness—Ill-temper.

Towards superiors:
  Timidity—Suspiciousness—Shyness.
  Timorousness.
  Cowardice—Vindictiveness—Revengefulness.

Towards inferiors:
  Superciliousness—Nil admirari—Slightingness—
  Self-complacence.
  Self-importance—Aggressiveness—Obtrusiveness.
  Scornfulness — Disdainfulness—Hauteur—Pride—Malevolence.

The above general list is sufficient illustration of the proposition stated at the beginning of this chapter, and also of the complexity and subtlety of shade which prevails among human Emotions at the present stage of evolution, making indistinguishable the line at which Emotions pass into permanent moods, and become mental facts which are not allowed the name of Emotions in ordinary language, nor even of virtues or vices, sometimes.

This subject leads on immediately to the consideration of a number of mental phases which require careful analysis in order that they may be brought into line with the procession of thoughts followed hitherto. The next chapter will be devoted to them. We may note here, as a means of useful exercise for the student, that the Emotion-virtues and vices above-mentioned, and others, may be sorted out (among other many possible ways) according as they are more 'subjective,'
or more 'objective' or midway between the two. Thus, as hinted in passing, on a previous occasion, Self-Importance may be regarded as more 'subjective,' Superciliousness as more 'objective,' and Self-Satisfiedness as midway. Of course the radical principle of all such triple sub-divisions is that which is the basis of cognition, action and desire.

The complete significance, in all their mental associations, of the facts that are denoted by the words virtue and vice; why the one should be followed and the other eschewed; and many related questions; these belong to the Metaphysic of Ethics, the necessary sequel to the Metaphysic of the Emotions, as the Metaphysic of the Self is its necessary precursor.¹

The outlines thereof may have to be touched on afterwards in connection with the question (which belongs to a later stage) of the practical cultivation of virtues and the eradication of vices by means of the regulation of the Emotions.

¹ See *infra*, chapter xii. (c) as to how the inmost significance of Truth and Untruth, as the basis of ethical schemes of virtues and vices, is nothing else than Love and Hate, Unity and Many-ness. Also Part III of *The Advanced Text-Book of Sanātana Dharma.*
CHAPTER VIII.

COMPLEX EMOTIONS.

Many Emotions, virtues, and vices, which are pre-eminently called by those names now-a-days, and are more prominently noticeable in human intercourse than some of the others before mentioned, have, so far, in this work, not even been named amongst those others. The reason for this is that on analysis they appear to be compound rather than simple, made up of more than one of those described before, sometimes of Emotions on the same side, i.e., of Love only, or of Hate only, and sometimes of elements taken from both sides. The last kind, indeed, figure the most prominently in present human life, for the reason that they—because of their very nature—involve the greatest and completest exercise and excitement of the whole of human nature, of both sides of it, the good and the bad. The battle between these is sharpest at the turning point in the evolution of human beings, just before the one is
definitely worsted and begins to give way steadily to the other. For this reason these emotions fix the attention and impress the memory in an overpowering degree.

Majesty, dignity, self-control, self-possession

Examples.

awesomeness, awe, sublimity, grandeur, magnificence, magnanimity, admiration, wonder, pathos, laughter, heroism, devotion, valor, courage, fortitude, endurance, prudence, discretion, cautiousness, circumspection, confidence, trust, faith, diffidence, shyness, distrust, jealousy, envy, ridicule, humor, malice, spitefulness, meanness, niggardliness, cavilling, fault-finding, slanderness, insolence, crookedness, cruelty, tyranny, impertinence, greed, lust, disgust, disgustingness, loathing, abhorrence, etc., etc., these are instances of complex emotions.

It would appear indeed at first sight that all or almost all the irreducible Emotions, which had remained behind as hopeless and impossible to classify after the enumeration of those set forth in order previously, had been thrown together pell mell in this list. It is not so. Scrutiny will disclose that the same basic principle of analysis and classification applies to these, and it would be an interesting and instructive lesson for a student to sort out these and the many others not named, and assign to each its proper place in a genealogical scheme of the Emotions.

A brief and rapid analysis of the more important
of these will accordingly be attempted here, sufficient to indicate how out of the same simple and homogeneous elements exceeding heterogeneity grows forth.

Let us begin with Majesty, with which the above list commences.

With reference to the fact that current language scarcely tolerates the denomination of Majesty as an Emotion, it may be re-stated here—it has already been said before in different language—that each Emotion has two aspects, a subjective and an objective; they might almost be called, a passive and an active. The former is the aspect of the Emotion as felt by the person under its influence, inwardly feeling it and possessed by it; the latter is that presented to other persons. The Emotions in which the former aspect predominates are the Emotions recognised by ordinary language. Those in which the latter predominates are called merely qualities. These qualities again, if their beneficent or maleficent results to others are prominent, are called virtues and vices respectively. Thus the distinction is only one of relative permanence, as already stated in the chapter on virtues and vices. It is matter of common observation that passing feelings leave almost no trace behind. Great Emotions, long continued, stamp themselves on the features, passing from the predominantly subjective to the predominantly objective phase.

In this sense, there is an Emotion of Majesty
underlying and making possible the quality of Majesty—that is, there are present in what is known as Majesty both the subjective and the objective aspects. Such expressions as 'majestic gesture,' 'majestic gait,' indicate this fact. And that Emotion is an equal compound of Compassion and Pride—Compassion for the weak, the poor, the good and the deserving; and Pride and repressive strength for the proud and strong and evil and lawless. Such is the virtue that befits the Jivas whose part in life is the part of kings and rulers. And the instinct of man has devised as physical emblem of this, the sceptre or sword of punishment in the one hand of the king, and the globe or bowl or niḍhi-paḍma, the treasure-lotus of gifts, in the other.

Dignity is only a lesser degree of Majesty. Self-Control, Self-Possession, Self-Respect—these are the beginnings and the foundations of Majesty and Dignity. They stand at the turning point between the two opposite sets of Emotions. They mean, in their true inner and fullest significance, the desire to unite rather than to separate, the desire to avoid, if possible, the relations of Hate and discord, and to preserve and promote those of harmony and Love. This is their inner, subjective aspect. The outer and objective aspect is 'unmovedness,' 'inaccessibility to emotion,' 'unemotionalness,' 'unemotiveness.' These words,
taking account of only the outer condition of the physique accompanying the inner mental mood, do not describe the actual state of things quite correctly. In fact they are even misleading. They convey the impression that there is no Emotion at all beneath Self-Control. The reverse is the fact, especially in the case of Jivas just beginning to acquire the experience, the faculty, the possibility of the emotion or mood of Self-Control and Self-Possession. In them the struggle between the opposing desires, the one tending to break out in a violent expression of one or other Emotion on the side of vice, and the other to prevent such an outbreak and cause rather an expression of an Emotion on the side of virtue—this struggle is very strong. It is only gradually that the one nature gains such complete mastery over the other that the struggle, which does continue to take place for long, becomes more and more feeble and unfelt.

The result in the outer man is a deadlock all through, a stillness, an unmovedness. Held back by the strong reins of reason—of Love, which is the highest reason, for it founds on and is the very Truth of truths, the Unity of Jivas—the wild unbroken horses of the man’s lower nature stand in apparent motionlessness. But we should not look at that outer motionlessness, but rather at the great strain within, if we would understand the true Emotion-nature of Self-Control.
The above analysis of Self-Control is supported by the ordinary usage of the world. When a person is praised for his Self-Control, what is praised in him is his ability to refrain from the expression of one of those Emotions which have been classed above on the side of vice. But sometimes Self-Control is used to denote the power of restraining an Emotion on the other side also. This use is due, in the first place, to the confining of the attention to the outer result of the Self-Control, in which outer result there is the absence of the appearance of all Emotion, and not only of evil Emotion. In the second place, when the word is used in this second sense, with a laudatory implication, that is 'due to the special constitution of the races of men amongst whom such use occurs. In them the use is due to the mental mood which has been referred to above, in the analysis of Reserve and Chillness, in the case of the majority. And in the case of the minority, who would express their better Emotions unreservedly, as of Pity by tears, if placed in different circumstances, Self-Control, in this sense, occurs either deliberately and intentionally because they see that the demonstration of their Emotion would arouse an evil Emotion—of Scorn or Ridicule or the like—in others; or it occurs unconsciously by force of surroundings and conventions and circumstances, though the real reason may be and is the same.
Heroism is only active Majesty: Majesty as appearing in the moment of action, when the element of Compassion for and helping of the weak, and repression of the oppressor, become manifest in actuality from having been potential. The former element is, if possible, even more prominent than the latter. The very essence of Heroism is giving—the giving of one's property, one's life, one's most cherished possessions, for the succour of a weaker and a younger. Compare the Samskṛt expressions, ġān a-vī r a, ġa y ā-vī r a, the hero of Charity, the hero of Compassion. Public instinct too does not give the epithet of hero to any one, however great his deeds, in whose deeds the fact or possibility of self-sacrifice has not been present, who has not undergone actual suffering or the risk of suffering. In the Mahābhārata, Bhīṣma, recounting the roll of heroes to Duryodhana, denies that title to Drona's son, Ashvaṭṭhāmā, in every way equal to Arjuna himself as warrior, because "Ashvaṭṭhāmā loves his life, and fights not regardless of it."

Courage, Valor, Bravery, Fortitude, Endurance—these are grades and kinds of Heroism, kinds distinguished from each other by the differing circumstances in which the superiority which makes Compassion for the weak and Repression of the strong possible, is displayed; and grades distinguished from each other by the varying extent of that superiority.
That Heroism and Courage, etc., should have come to be associated almost exclusively with wars and battles and martial prowess is due to the 'accident' that, in the present stage of human evolution, the essential characteristics of these Emotion-virtues are called forth and appear mainly on the occasions of such struggles. But with different social and national circumstances the Heroism and Courage of quiet, unostentatious, even unknown, self-sacrifice in ordinary life, apart from slaughter and massacre, will be recognised more and more prominently, as they have always been recognised, even if not prominently, in all true literature.

Diffidence is the opposite of Shyness. As the latter is incipient Fear, is Repulsion plus the consciousness of the possible, but not certain, superiority of the object of the Repulsion, so is Diffidence incipient affection, Attraction plus the consciousness of the possible, but not certain, superiority of the object thereof. The outward manifestation of Diffidence is hesitation as to the manner of approach, on terms of equality or of inferiority, boldly or humbly and respectfully. In the case of Shyness the outward manifestation is hesitation as to approaching at all. In terms of manner, Shyness may be described as hesitation as to the manner of passing by or avoiding another, on terms of equality or inferiority, going past with steady gait.
and turned head, or slinking and shuffling away at a distance.

Because of the incipience of both the emotions it often happens that the words respectively denoting them are used indiscriminately. But compare the usage in such cases as these: 'A horse shies at an object that frightens him,' and 'Youth and maiden approach each other diffidently.'

Where the two are really indistinguishable the proper explanation would probably be that the Emotion is a compound of uncertain desire and uncertain consciousness. There is no clear memory of a past contact and of resultant pleasure or pain, and consequently no clear expectation; hence no certain desire either for approach or avoidance, but an oscillation backwards and forwards. There is an uncertainty, for lack of sufficient data in past experience, whether the other will respond with affection or irritation; and this uncertainty, at midpoint, wherein Diffidence and Shyness meet, expresses itself as hesitation to move at all; but when Hope predominates, it becomes Diffidence, and when Fear prevails, Shyness.

The converse of Diffidence is Confidence, as that of Shyness is Distrust, settled Disbelief. This is plain even in the ordinary usage of words. Confidence in another means Attraction plus the consciousness of the certain Benevolence, or Friend-
liness, or Humility—any one of the three—towards oneself, of the person liked, with reference to some object of desire. This is an illustration of a combination of a simple Emotion in one person with a complex consciousness of an Emotion-virtue in another to form a new Emotion.

A higher degree of Confidence is Trust. Illustrations of perfect Trust are the relations between Dasharatha and Rama. The king, bewailing his helplessness, says: "Happy should I be, indeed, if Rama should, knowing my inner feeling, disobey my outer order of banishment, but, alas! so transparent is his mind, so full of trust in me, that he will not suspect duplicity in me, never imagine that I mean one thing and say another to him." Also the relations between Rama and Bharata. Rama says to Lakshmana, when the latter suspects that Bharata has come to the forest with an army only in order to slay them and thus confirm his hold on the kingdom: "I will say to Bharata, give the kingdom unto Lakshmana, and Bharata will say, yes, and nothing else." So between Dasharatha and Bharata: "Rama may, perhaps, stray from the path of dharma, but Bharata never." 1

Distrust is similarly Repulsion plus consciousness of the certain Scorn or Anger or Fear towards oneself of the other who is the object of that Repulsion, with reference to some object of desire.

In another view, Confidence is the feeling, the

1 Vālmīki, Rāmāyaṇa, II. xii, xcvi.
consciousness, the certainty of one's own equality to the task, to the occasion, plus the desire to approach it and take it up. Lay the stress here on equality and not on task or occasion. Confidence is the feeling—and the feeling may be one either of Attraction or Repulsion—plus the consciousness of ability to carry out into action the particular specialised form of that desire, whether one of Attraction or Repulsion. The feeling mostly takes shape as a general excitement or elation, that being the appearance of superiority or ability desirous of, or on the point of, asserting and proving itself. The mere intellectual cognition of one's own power would be only knowledge, and not the emotion or feeling (as it is commonly called) of Confidence, which always hides a desire internally, however calm and unmoved the exterior may be. To find, in this kind of Confidence, Confidence in one-self, the (otherwise somewhat hidden) strictly emotional quality, which always involves, by our definition, a reference to other Śivas, we have to remember that the mood, directly or indirectly, includes the wish to prove to others one's capacity for a task, and in order that some of these at least may appreciate him as equal to or better than others.

The analysis of Distrust under this other view is exactly similar.

Faith, Belief, and Reliance in or on others,
Doubt, Suspicion, and Misgiving of or about others, are respectively allied to and degrees of Confidence and Distrust, and are even sometimes only synonyms of these Emotions. Doubt and Suspicion might be distinguished from Distrust by substituting 'uncertain' for 'certain' where that word occurs in the definition of the latter. In other words, as Diffidence is to Confidence, so these are to Distrust.

It may be noted that as the word Confidence has a usage, viz., Confidence in one-self, wherein the emotional characteristic is not very patent, so the words Faith and Belief, Doubt and Disbelief are used also often with an almost purely cognitional significance. If we would discover their emotional aspect in such cases, we should look at the bearing of them on the life, the practice, which necessarily involves relations with others, of the person entertaining them. Faith in God is the realisation 'I am He,' for, basically, religious faith is the certainty of the existence of the Self, and hence of the triumph of the Permanent, the Conscious, the Blissful, over all that is other than these, however strong for the time the 'other' may be. Such faith is sometimes said to be 'belief without proof,' but this is only because the Self is its own proof, incapable of being strengthened or weakened; other 'beliefs without proof' are but reflections and copies, and therefore generally weak
and defective, of this primal faith. Again, faith in Self-existence is the sure internal witness and supporter of faith in immortality. Faith in other worlds is the refusal of the Self to submit to the narrow bonds of one set of material limitations. So, faith in a man is the recognition that the same Self is in him as in oneself, and that, in consequence, he will act as one-self would act. Similarly, corresponding Disbeliefs imply the presence in one's consciousness in an overpowering degree, of the pseudo-existence of the Not-Self, of its uncertainties, its pains, its limitations and its accompanying ills generally. The emotional aspect of these faiths and disbeliefs appears in the powerful influence they exercise on the temperament (of which, in a certain sense, they are counterparts, vide foot-note at page 28, supra,) and on the conduct in life, and towards others, of the holder of them. Emotionally, Faith belongs to the side of Love and Unity, Doubt to the opposite. Belief is the ready acceptance of a person as what he appears to be. A settled habit of Trust assumes a good motive whatever the external appearance, and acts thereon fearlessly, sometimes recklessly. So Suspicion regards the outer appearance as being a cloak for some mischievous purpose, and, often falsely, sees an evil motive lurking behind a harmless exterior. Against a settled habit of Suspicion no goodness is safe; the most innocent action may be supplied with a motive which transforms it into guilt.
Devotion has already been alluded to as distinct from Worship. At first sight—inasmuch as it generally and prominently makes a tie between an inferior and a superior—it may indeed appear to be a simple, and not a complex, Emotion of the nature of Worship. But it is in reality somewhat complex. Devotion is a self-surrender, a self-sacrifice, a giving of all one has to another. Such giving necessarily implies superiority in the giver. The inferior receives. But surely if, as already said, the feeling of Devotion is the feeling of an inferior towards a superior, and at the same time Devotion implies giving, and giving implies the superiority of the giver—is there not here an insuperable contradiction in terms?

Let us look closer. It is only generally, and not invariably, according to even current language, that Devotion is the feeling of an inferior to a superior. A husband is devoted to his wife, a mother to her infant, a benevolent physician to his patients in a hospital. Is the word 'devoted' here misused and misapplied? Or are the mother, the husband, the physician, inferior to the objects of their Devotion? Neither is evidently the case. But a servant is also devoted to his master; a soldier in the ranks to his officer; a disciple to his teacher; a worshipper, a creature, to his Deity and Creator. Here the inferiority is obviously on the side of the devoted person, and the word devoted is equally correctly used.
Is the word then used in two different senses in the two connections? It would appear so. The significance of the word is service and help in both places. What then is the difference? It is this. In the first case the service and help are truly service and help directly to the object itself of the Devotion; and the Devotion here is in reality only Tenderness. That the Tenderness should receive the name of Devotion in this reference is due to the fact that attention has been excessively fixed on the large element of self-sacrifice in the Tenderness, and on the aspect of persistence which the Tenderness has put on, and which self-sacrifice and persistence it has in common with the mood which is more appropriately indicated by the word under discussion.

In the second case the persistent service that is implied is mostly co-service with the object of devotional attachment to another object altogether. A Deity, a Teacher, a ruler or officer, as such, does not require any sacrifice for himself from his votary, or disciple, or subordinate. He requires it for others whom he himself is 'serving,' i.e., helping—a world, a race, a government, and their constituent parts. To these, (whole and part respectively) both the object (Deity, etc.), and the subject (votary, etc.,) of Devotion are superior, though in vastly different degrees. So far as the Deity, or teacher, and other superiors accept a service to themselves from the inferior, they do so either by giving permission to
the inferior to make repayment, in his small way, of kindness done to him formerly, and thereby to that extent lift him from inferiority to equality, as before said; or they graciously and voluntarily contract a new debt, an obligation to that inferior, to be necessarily repaid in the future, and thereby voluntarily put themselves in the position of the debtor, an inferior to that extent and in that reference; they would probably do so for the educing in the devotee of higher qualities, possible only in connection with a sense of power and confidence. To sum up, Devotion in the sense of Devotion to an ideal, a teacher, a Deity, is Reverence, wherein a partnership in serving others is sought; and, however generally inferior the devotee may be, the very fact of partnership gives a limited equality. Defined in terms of desire, Devotion is the desire for equalisation with the Ideal, who is the object of that Devotion, not by direct receipt of gift through prayer, as is the case in pure Worship, but by means of obedience to the behests of and guidance received from that Ideal.

The significance of Devotion has been considered before also, in connection with the analysis of Worship.¹ The difference between the two is naturally rather difficult to state precisely, because the two are always more or less intermixed in practice, as said before; and because, in their

¹ P. 52, supra.
higher, or unselfish, aspect, they, and Love, have the same ultimate end and purpose, namely, mergence, union, identification to the fullest extent possible. The common use of language indicates this overlapping of the significance of the three: A mother ‘loves,’ or ‘worships,’ or is ‘devoted to’ her child. Similar unavoidable synonymisation of more or less distinguishable words is observable in the works on Bhakti, in Samskrt. Thus: “We will now explain bhakti (Love or Devotion). Its nature is extreme Love or Devotion (prema) to some one. Vyäsa says it is addiction (anuraga) to worship (püja). Garga says it is predilection for hearing (persistent listening to conversation or teaching about Ātmā, the Self). Shândilya says it is the continuous realisation of the Universal Self in the object of devotion and in one’s own self. Nārađa says it is the surrendering of all actions to God, and the feeling of the greatest misery in the forsaking of or by Him. Love (bhakti) is its own end. The sons of Brahmā, Nārađa and Sanatkumāra say that Love is its own reward. Inexpressible is the essential nature of Love (prema), etc.”

But we will easily see what is meant in these passages, and be able to make in the mind the distinction that is not very easy.

1 Nārađa-Sūtra: 1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 30, 51, etc. So too Shândilya-Sūtra, 1 (bhakti), 2 (anurakti), 6 (rāga), 44 (sammāna, priti, etc., as varieties of it).
to express in words, if we remember that the Self only is its own end, that Love is our feeling of Its Unity, that realisation of this Unity, to whatever extent possible, is its own reward, is moksha or deliverance from the sorrows of separateness, is nissheras, the highest good, summum bonum. To express the distinction in words, we may reiterate that in Worship, merely as such, self-surrender is not an element, but that its essentials are an acknowledgment of inferiority and a prayer for help. In Devotion proper, on the other hand, self-surrender is an essential element, offer of service of any kind that may be needed, generally for the helping of others, and there is also present a touch, lighter or stronger, of the sense of equality-identity already achieved, a feeling of belonging to the same household, of partnership in the same concern, esprit de corps. That offerings and sacrifices are made generally in Worship also is only to prove actively the acknowledgment of inferiority; the real significance of such is this: "Behold, I am truly humble before thee, and cling to, and depend on, and ask of, and expect from, none else than Thee, and in proof of this I offer up to Thee all that I have and hold nearest and dearest—only to show that they are not nearer and dearer to me than Thou." Because this significance underlies acts of worship, does it come about, when the worshipping Jiva is of the very selfish or 'demoniac' type, mentioned in the
COMPLEX EMOTIONS.

_Bhagavad-Gītā_, that his evil selfishness transforms what should be the pure offerings of devotion into foul uncleanness and slaughter and orgy, and turns God-worship into Devil-worship, the Right-Hand Path into the Left-Hand Path, White Magic into Black. True Devotion is characteristic of the Jivas on the _nivṛtāṭī-玛rga_, the Path of Renunciation; pseudo-Devotion is found on the other Path: Worship on both.

एवं सर्वोषु शून्यद्वारा भक्तिश्रवणमिष्टानि
कर्तन्या वषंदतेऽशेषेत्वा सर्वमृतमये हरिम्

“Knowing Hari (the Universal Self, from the metaphysical or transcendental standpoint, and the larger individuality of the Logos or Ruler of our cosmic system, from the empirical standpoint) to be all beings (of the whole world-process, or of our system), the wise should extend bhakti, love, devotion, to all beings undeviatingly.”

To have to use the words inferior and superior and equal in such connections looks awkward, no doubt, because of the long-established emotional associations of these words. But it is hoped that in the present psychological analysis of Emotions, only the strictly and rigorously scientific significance of the words will be looked at, and all other ordinary associations discarded for the time being. Without such temporary balancing of the mind a

1 _Viṣṇu Purāṇa_, I, xix, 9.
useful discussion of the subject will remain impossible. Thus, the statement that only the greater can give to the lesser\(^1\) may appear objectionable to minds full of the purest devotion, that are ever ready to give all for the service of the object of their devotion, and yet are also ever full of the sense of their own littleness and inferiority, where the object of devotion is a Master or a God. But what has been said before in analysis of Devotion may help to bring out the true significance of this. To that may be added here: the words 'greater' and 'smaller,' 'superior' and 'inferior,' 'higher' and 'lower,' 'older' and 'younger,' etc., which should always be interpreted in a comparative sense within restricted limits, as 'in this particular respect only,' 'so far only.' What is very inferior altogether, may equally undoubtedly be distinctly greater in some one little respect. Because smaller on the whole, is no reason why it should not be clearly superior in one particular matter. Because man is superior to the elephant, it does not follow that he is superior to it in physical strength also. There is no breach of reverence involved in the recognition of a truth. Consider the cases of genuine self-sacrifice of life by one for the sake of another. In the moment of such sacrifice, the maker of it invariably rises above the object for the protection or saving or helping of whom the sacrifice is made. The words used

\(^1\) P. 96, supra.
themselves indicate this. In the Purāṇas we have instances of how, by acts of sacrifice, the younger becomes truly the elder of his elders. And this is but in accordance with the metaphysical law which requires that none shall be really and essentially greater or smaller than any other, but that (the whole of time and space and motion being considered) all shall be equal, for indeed they are One; and we see the reflection of this inner metaphysical fact and law in and on outer practical human life in the incontrovertible fact that the greatest are absolutely dependent in some vital respects on the so-called meanest (e.g., the municipalities of the greatest capitals of the earth on their scavenging staff), and vice versa, of course. All are inter-related and none can do without others.

Loyalty and Fidelity are grades of Devotion. The element of desire, the desire of co-operation, co-service, is less active, less

---

1 Puru, the son, gives his youth to Yayāti, the father, and wins greater fame and honor. Sūdeva, the soldier-servant of Ambariṣha, who was a typical devotee of the Lord, rises to higher worlds than his master because he has sacrificed his body in battle-service. In modern literature, Fouquet, in a burst of pitying tenderness, rightly calls the King whose servant he is, “My son,” when he has saved him from the imminent danger of lifelong immurement in a dungeon, at great risk and loss to himself (Dumas’ Le Vicomte de Bragelonne); The ex-convict and robber, Jean Valjean, “rises above” the good Bishop, in the opening scenes of Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables.
urgent, here; it waits for an occasion instead of seeking one, or even seeking to create one, as Devotion in its excess of zeal sometimes does.

Awesomeness is that aspect of Majesty which deals with the repression of evil, taken by itself; as Benignity is the converse. Awe is the emotion in the beholder corresponding to the virtue or quality of Awesomeness in the object of that emotion. The root of the emotion of Awe seem to be on the side of Repulsion. It is akin to the emotion of Fear. A person struck with Awe is a person who realises for the time being the possibility of the existence in himself of deficiencies which would call forth the repressive powers of the object of Awe and, therefore, often feels uncomfortable and endeavours instinctively to move away therefrom. He that has no dross in him feels not Awe in the presence of the Highest, but only Worship, Devotion, Love. He that is the Highest purifies not dross by chastisement, but transmutes it by His own overpowering Love into the purity of Love and Devotion, in all who happen to stand in His Presence; He has transcended Majesty and rests in Benignity.¹ En-

Benignity. Encouragement corresponds to Benignity, as Awe to Awesomeness.

¹ Compare the descriptions, in Paurānika and Buddhist and other similar religious literatures, of the 'contagious' and 'infectious' effects, even upon animals, of the perfected virtues of Rshis, Yogis and Saints. For explanation in terms of matter, we have to consider the 'subtler' bodies, suksma sharīra, etc.
Magnanimity is the emotion-virtue which is next higher in order after Self-Control. Pain caused by another, wrong done by another, no longer arouse struggle; they are simply passed over, absorbed, overlooked. Large-heartedness, Forgivingness, Generosity, are practically other names for the same thing. But they have not yet reached the height of perfect Compassion, constant Benevolence. Patience, Equability of temper, is a milder and more general form of Forgivingness; it is the habitual Forgiving of constant small annoyances, as Forgivingness is Patience under greater wrongs.

Unforgivingness, Rancorousness, Vindictiveness, are the counterparts of these on the side of Repulsion. Impatience, Fretfulness, Peevishness, Fault-finding, Querulousness, Asperity, etc., are also all more or less direct variations. Fretfulness, Fault-finding, Peevishness, deserve a word to themselves. The attitude of mind in the case of these seems to be that of a more or less implicit hostility to and repulsion from another, or others generally, with an uncertain consciousness of the superiority or equality of the other or others; as when a person suggests a certain course to another, which he, for want of sufficient confidence and knowledge, is unable definitely to improve upon and therefore follows, though unwillingly, for lack of trust in the counsellor, but which, if anything should go wrong,
he criticises later on with many exclamations of ‘I thought so,’ ‘I said so,’ ‘Did I not say so,’ ‘I knew it,’ ‘It should not have been done,’ etc. It is a common failing and should be deliberately combated by means of Fellow-feeling and the good rule that we should not violently abuse what we cannot mend.

Strictness, Justice, Implacability, Rigorousness, Justice, would be the mean between these two. Honour, Upritgtness, Prudence, Discretion, Cautiousness, Circumspection, are all related emotion-virtues. They all belong to the region of Self-Control. In the first the attention is more taken up with ‘giving others their due’; in the last with ‘not losing and giving away to others what is not their due’; in all, there is present the desire to prevent further inequalisation by undue lessening either of oneself or of another.

Jealousy is a peculiar and most powerful emotion. It seems to be Repulsion jealousy. plus the consciousness of a possible or even probable special kind of superiority in the object thereof, which superiority will enable that person to exclusively gain and appropriate for himself something which is loved, coveted, desired by both. It implies Love of a certain object, and Hate of another person who prevents the acquisition of that object. The intensity of the emotion is in direct ratio to the amount of exclusiveness of the possession that is
desired to be held by oneself or is feared to be held by another. Where wholly exclusive possession is not desired for oneself but is feared to be desired and securable by another, the jealousy takes on the form of doubts as to the return of one's love by the object thereof, a feeling of insecurity as regards the retention of the treasured affection of the beloved person. To the extent that it is secure in its own abiding-place, Love is not susceptible of Jealousy, but welcomes the affection bestowed by others on its object, as an enriching of the common field of love; and even if others should seek to oust it, it will smile serenely in the confidence (and only in exact proportion to the confidence) of the futility of their efforts. In the intenser forms of Jealousy, connected with sex-love, wherein exclusive possession is essential to the completeness and integrity of the relation, at least among human beings, the emotion is inevitable, unless perfect mutual confidence exist, and Love and Hate simultaneously arise in their fiercest forms. Hence Jealousy is an emotion which may be said to disturb the mind of the human being, sway it, tear it in two, more powerfully than any other emotion. It excites the whole of his dual nature simultaneously in a manner that almost no other emotion does.

The Love implied in Jealousy is of course a selfish Love. In Love, as such, there is no selfishness or unselfishness. It seeks union, which
means the equality of both the factors to be united. So long then as the desire for union exists in both the factors of the relation, Love proper is neither selfish nor unselfish—as between those two. When, however, the desire for union is only on one side, not on the other, then the desire for union becomes a desire for acquisition, a selfish desire. In Jealousy the Love, the desire for union, has implicitly become a desire for acquisition, for if, indeed, there were clear Love on both sides, there would be no chance for intervention by a third party, and Jealousy would not exist in the mind of him that loves and is loved. Also, in whom there is no Exclusiveness, no Reserve, whose gaze of Love is turned not out towards material separateness, but in towards spiritual unity, in him there is no Jealousy.

This leads on to the connected emotion of Lust. The kind of Love that is mostly responsible for the feeling of Jealousy is that which is best denominated Lust. To refined natures it would probably at first sight look impermissible and improper to call Lust a kind of Love at all. Yet there is something in common between them. Later and evil associations, and natural and inevitable consequences, have made the present connotation of Lust a truly evil one. That it was not so always is apparent in the use of the expression ‘lusty Youth,’ where only physical vigour and capacity for physical
Love are meant without any depreciatory significance.

As Love generally is desire for union by exchange and equalisation, so Lust is desire for union by exchange and equalisation in the physical self or body pre-eminently.

As marriage-unions based on Lust only lead invariably to exhaustion and satiety of the physical nature in a more or less short time, and, the higher mental and other superphysical selves or bodies not having been cultivated, the higher forms of Love lasting through vast eons of time remain impossible, unhappiness is the logical consequence of such marriage unions, and far more of unions which are not sanctified by even the formalities of marriage—formalities which have at least a shadow of religion and spirituality about them.

It then appears that the evil consequences of Lust, its resultant satiety, exhaustion, weariness, dreariness, and unhappiness, make it evil; otherwise, it were not evil; otherwise, its consanguinity to Love proper were undisputed. It is the same with other moods of mind to which the word Love is even less hesitatingly applied by mankind. We read that Roman and other epicures 'loved' the cooked tongues and brains of nightingales and other delicate birds. The present constitution of the majority of the human race is such that it gladly sanctions the use of the word Love in this connection, and entirely fails to see the horror of
the wholesale murder involved. In the strict and abstract sense of the word, however, even this use is perfectly correct¹; it is only the ‘consequences’ involved that throw this gloom over the word in this reference. As Bhīṣma said:

नाहि मांसं तुणाद्र काठादपलाद्राय नायते ।
हत्या जेतु ततो मांसं तस्मादोषप्तु मन्येण॥¹¹

“Flesh groweth not on grasses, nor on trees, nor on stones; it is obtained only by killing a living creature; hence only the sin of eating it.”

It may be noted here that the more Love is confined to the physical self, the more it is Lust; and the more Lust approximates to a mere ‘appetite,’ a pure sense-craving, the less it has of the character of Emotion proper.

The so-called mystery of physical Love may not inappropriately be considered here. The question, of course, belongs, as usual, to Metaphysic, the Metaphysic of the Jiva in the procreative aspect. But a brief statement may throw light on the question more immediately dealt with here.

Amongst the primary so-called lowest organisms, procreation, self-multiplication, is asexual. A cell absorbs nourishment and grows; it expands itself at the expense of; something else, another self (in the general sense). Its own oneness

¹ See supra ch. vi, p. 71.

grows. But the mass of matter that makes up its 'oneness,' its 'individuality,' carries within itself the principle of manyness inherently. It therefore necessarily, inevitably, falls apart into two, sooner or later. But in falling apart, the new, the second, mass, retains the nature of 'livingness' it has acquired during the period of oneness; and so it becomes the centre of the new life of an individual similarly constituted; another Jīva, of the same class, at once comes in and occupies the ready-made, specially-prepared, home. Trace the process up from u ṭ b h i j a, born by fission, separation, or sprouting; through s v e ḍ a j a, sweat-born, by exudation; and a n ḍ a j a, egg-born; into p i n ḍ a j a, viviparous sexual humanity, step by step. The kind, the essential nature, of the process is exactly the same in essence, but the manner has changed completely. The 'expansion' of one embodied Jīva, which was in the first instance caused by direct actual and real nourishment, comparatively speaking, is now caused by an excitement of the multiple senses and organs of that Jīva by an appropriation of another embodied Jīva, which appropriation is only the simulation and the substitute of the process of the absorption of nourishment.

In the simulation and substitution is the apparent mystery. Each Jīva-u p ā ḍ h i attracts the other in order to absorb it into itself and so enlarge its own life; and at the same time each repulses the other-
sufficiently to avoid being wholly absorbed into it. This is mutual. Attraction prevailing largely over Repulsion—the latter becoming reduced to a mere consciousness of separate individual existence in some of the highest forms of Love or *mukti*—there is mutual approach and embrace, a simulation of absorption and nourishment, but not complete and real absorption and nourishment. And here appetite and desire pass into the form of Emotion.

The separation into sexes, at a certain stage, the middle one, in Evolution, is Nature's master-device for bringing easily within the reach of each Jiva a compendium of all experiences—though it is, as compared with the *originals* of the experiences, *viz.*, the experiences resulting from the contact of the senses with the aspects of nature, Prakṛti at large, only a copy, however overpowering for the time being. And the separation of sexes seems to be brought about by the easy means—though requiring ages and eons to mature—of a separation of functions (partial and by predominance and not radical and exclusive) of procreating and setting apart, and of nourishing and guarding, the paternal and the maternal, both brooded over by the Love which here is the retention of 'oneness' even after the 'falling apart,' and is the foundation of the Family, the Tribe, the Nation, and the Race. This division into sex is itself a copy of that primal and essential division into Self and Not-Self; and
as that division is the necessary condition of all experience, so is sex-division nature's simplest, easiest, and most successful way of giving to every one of her Jīvas experience of the noblest and the vilest, the intensest and the dullest Sensations and Emotions. Truly are man and woman the whole of the world unto each other while this sex-separation lasts.¹

¹ Sex-feeling occupies such an important place in human life at the present stage of evolution that a little dwelling upon it here may not be out of place. It seems that all the main problems connected with it are capable of solution, if the metaphysical facts referred to in the text are borne in mind and applied carefully to concrete facts.

Because we have the Self and the Not-Self, we have man and woman. The characteristics of the Self belong to the man: unification, systematisation, height of standpoint, breadth of view, knowledge, reason. Those of the Not-Self to the woman: multiplication and division, limitation and confinement within bounds, separating off of man from man and soul from soul and family from family, intensity, motive power, desire, emotion. The inner self is the man and the outer body is the woman (Cf. Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. viii.) It must always be remembered that all this is only comparative; for, in every individual organism, both factors are and must be always present, though also always, one must be prominent and the other in abeyance. It is only because, at the present day, the characteristics of the Self predominate in one kind of organic constitution and those of the Not-Self in another, that the distinctive class-names are used of man and woman. It is repeatedly said in the scriptural books of India that the Jīva has no sex; only the enveloping sheaths, which it puts on from time to time, have it; it is also indicated that
Where, again, this physical Love, this Lust, is entirely one-sided, there results the Emotion which underlies the action of Rape; it is largely made up of the emotions of Pride and Oppression. These, in the evil of the all Jivas must pass through both kinds of sheaths, turn by turn, by action and reaction from one kind of experience to another. The fact that these distinctions, like all others, are only comparative, that here, as everywhere else, there is no sharp and insuperable ultimate definition, is illustrated by the balancing and mutual neutralising which is observable in human life as in all nature. For, generally speaking, the characteristics assigned respectively to man and woman above are noticable only in their relations with others outside the family. Within the family they are nearly reversed: while the wife and mother is all self-sacrifice and devotion, is the thread of love that holds the family together and the forethought that provides for its needs from day to day; the husband and father is rather selfish and comfort-seeking. A case of ‘conservation of energy.’ So, the spirit of love and human gregariousness which takes shape as ‘familism’ in the East becomes ‘individualism plus nationalism’ in the West of to-day.

It may be noted here, with reference to the distinctive sex-characteristics referred to above, that Samskṛt works on medicine derive from the father all the ‘systems’ of the body, e.g., the osseous, the nervous, the arterio-venous, the hairy, etc., and from the mother, the ‘separate’ factors of the body, the flesh, the blood, the fats, heart, spleen, liver, intestines, etc., (vide Sushruta, Shāfrasthāna, iii.)

As to the gradual unfolding and reclosing of sex and sex-feeling, we learn from The Secret Doctrine and, more vaguely, from the Purāṇas, e.g., the Mārkandeya, xliii., and the Viṣṇu, I. xv,) that humanity begins as a-sexual, becomes
two classes, good and evil, of Jivas, become pleasurable by being accompanied with a sense of power and superiority, as will appear later.

bi-sexual, then different-sexed, then again bi-sexual and finally a-sexual again before pra lá y a. And we find this recapitulated, in accordance with the laws of ontogeny, etc., or, in simpler language, the law of universal analogy, 'as above so below', 'as the small so the large', in the life of the individual to-day, though, of course, only in a general manner, more psychical or psychological than physical, through the stages of the child, the adolescent, the adult, the aging, and the aged. It may be noted here, again, that all these words, asexual, different-sexed, etc., are only comparative, as modern anatomy also tends to show, for there never is a complete loss by any organism, showing one sex; of the germs and elements, however atrophied or undeveloped, of the other sex also; and this for the plain metaphysical reason that I and Not-I can never be wholly separated. The sex excitements and perversions that often occur before and after adolescence and prime in the individual, as also a race (for history shows that widespread intermarriage and sex-corruption have been the almost invariable precursors, respectively, of the birth and the disintegration of national organisms), seem also to correspond to elements in this same general 'scheme' of evolution. What would probably be normal and healthy methods of propagation in that vast plan, in the proper times and places and with the necessary fullness of appurtenances, in the 1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th Races, become unhealthy, dangerous and fruitless abuses and aberrations when they appear, out of and away from that proper setting, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th.

In order to explain the why of this scheme of evolution, we have to refer to The Science of Peace. In that successive manifestation of the Logion, I-This-Not, which makes up the
The commonness of Adultery, too, is due to similar reasons. Adultery excites not only the emotion of Lust, but also of Malice, sometimes of Revenge, or of Pride and world-process, the earliest asexual condition of the race would correspond to that condition of the first factor, I or Aham, wherein the second factor, This or Eta, the Not-Self, is only faintly present. With the increased accentuation of the second factor, we have the bi-sexual condition. The equal definition of the two gives rise to the complete division of the sexes. With the developing of the third factor, Not or Na, the Negation, we have again a blurring of sex differences and a return to the hermaphrodite condition on a different level. And lastly, with the greater emphasising of the Negation, the asexual condition supervenes again as a preliminary to pralaya.

This general idea seems to have set the type to human history, as it has been and will be current for some millions of years (according to the Puranas and The Secret Doctrine), from the advent of the Third Race and the influx of high and low Jivas from other planets, ‘micro-organisms’ as modern science would charitably call them, till the appearance of the Sixth Race. The type has undergone the distortions and reversals which are inseparable from reflexion into and association with matter; and we therefore observe that the course of human history has been: (a) the ‘marriage’, by violent conquest, of a younger and more vigorous nation with the daughters, the wealth, the worldly possessions, the vitality and the means of subsistence, of an older nation which has become effete, ‘unsexed’, ‘emasculated’; (b) the birth of a younger generation, i.e., a new nation of emigrants and conquerors, fostered by the older at first; (c) a new marriage, by conquest; and another death, of the older, and so on.

The unending and ever-unsatisfied cravings and ‘long-
Conquest, and again of Fear, which—by a particular perversion that will be treated later on in more detail under the subject of the Philosophy of Poetry and Literature—becomes, in a certain

ings of love', which are generally regarded as part of the mystery of sex-love, are due to the plain fact that two living and separate organisms, such as are needed to a relation of sex-love, cannot become absolutely identified with each other without that relation itself being destroyed and its very purpose defeated in consequence. Yet there are ever nearer approaches to such complete mutual absorption, even in the physical, and much more so in the superphysical states (by comparison with the physical)—at least one of the current conceptions of mūkṣṭi being that of such a complete absorption.

With reference to the sex-mistakes above alluded to, to effectively guard against the frittering away of the forces which help on normal human evolution and minimise the distortions of the ideal type in contact with matter, to make the progress of human biography and history smoother, generally, there seems to be really but one all-round satisfactory course open to men to follow, viz., the dharma of varṇa and āśrama laid down by the First Manu of the Human Race, out of the stores of wisdom gathered by him from the vast experience of whole past world-cycles. The struggles, the problems, the difficulties, individual, psycho-physical, domestic, social, economical, political, that are consuming and embittering life to-day, would cease to trouble if the world could be induced to go back again to the main outlines of that practical utopia which there is much reason to believe was once actually working in India. If it be impossible to follow even the principal lines of that all-comprehending polity, then indeed there seems no hope, and humanity must go down deeper and ever deeper into the
aspect, a pleasurable, from being originally a painful, sentiment. Sometimes the motives are exactly the opposite; the miseries of an unhappy marriage may drive the spouses apart from each other and into the companionship of others who can better satisfy their natural human craving for the affection of some fellow-being; in such cases the adultery would be more technical and not so much the lustful one referred to before. What probably more frequently happens is that people become surfeited with the quieter joys of the family-life and, beginning to find them stale, plunge into the wild ways that bring more 'sensation'; and vice versa also, in the everlasting swing of the soul between the 'pairs of opposites' which make up the world-process.

The real and full significance of the statement in the Bhagavad-Gītā, 1 मंकारो नरकायव, "Adul-
valley of bitterness. But it is not so. There is hope. The utopia has worked before. And it will work again. Indeed it is only because the Race became tired and surfeited with the 'tameness' of health and peace that it has entered on a course of the 'excitements' of license and disease and pain; and when it has had enough of these, it will gladly go back again to health and peace. 'The difficulties of modern life,' turning mainly on the selfishness and the excitements involved in different-sexed life, were needed by the Race to supply, by contrast, the forgotten commentary on Manu and restore to His very simple and superficial-seeming rules the depth and fulness of significance that there really is in them.

1 i. 42.
tery leadeth unto hell," is to be found in this very fact that it has its root in the evil Emotions, and so shall have branches and fruits in them too. If the springs of the stream are poisoned, all its subsequent length will show the taint. Let the Emotion, the whole mood of the parents, be pure, peaceful, happy, and loving, in the moment they produce and 'set apart' from their own upādhi's a new upādhi, and then this nucleus, partaking as it must of the pure nature of its parent upādhi, shall become fit abode for a pure Jīva. Otherwise it will be evil and attract an evil Jīva only into itself. Herein is to be found the true use and significance of a formal and public celebration and consecration of marriage, whereby all false and evil emotions of Shame and Fear and Jealousy of other claimants are removed, and only pure and peaceful and recognised and undisturbed affection is given the best opportunity of growing between the married pair, to the benefit of the progeny.

The converse of Jealousy—viz., Attraction plus the consciousness of a possible superiority in another which will help one to secure the object of one's wish—has apparently no distinctive name in the English language. Confidence, Trust, Faith, Reliance are the nearest terms. Perhaps the idea is better expressed by Hopefulness; the emotion in the parent corresponding to the Promisingness of his
child; the emotion which is indicated in the Samskrṭ saying:

सर्वेऽज्ञामन्विच्छेत् पुत्रादिच्छेत् पराजयम् ॥

“Let a man wish to excel all others, but let him wish that his son should excel him.”

Envy is Jealousy wherein the superiority of the object thereof is more pronounced, the Envy. Repulsion as great, and the active endeavor to make the envied person inferior to oneself is weaker, because less hopeful. Jealousy and Envy cease as soon as the disputed object is definitely secured by one of the rivals: the emotion that is left behind in the mind of the loser is then neither Envy nor Jealousy, but Hate—the Hate of Malice. But sometimes the word Envy is used in a comparatively good sense, that of Emulousness, in the spirit of the Samskrṭ advice, हेतावोष्ण्यन्नके। “Be envious of the causes, not of the results,” i.e., be envious and emulous of the merits which secure prosperity, and strive to develop them in your self; be not envious and jealous of the resultant prosperity in any given case.

Malice is Hate plus Fear. Its converse is Tyranny, Cruelty, Oppression. Slynness is a milder form of it. It does not strike openly, but seeks to injure by an underhand blow, by insinuation, or by some crooked method, so that

1 Charaka-Samhita, Sūtrasṭhāna, viii.
the assailant may not appear as such, and so may escape the return blow which he fears and wishes to avoid by keeping in the background. It sometimes appears in one who is on the whole stronger, towards one who is on the whole weaker. It then takes the form of a desire to inflict pain and feel power over another in a way which does not admit of any immediate show of resentment on the other side; it watches for the opportunity to stab when retort would place the victim in an even worse position than silent endurance. Here, the fear is fear of others, the fear of losing reputation with them and being treated by them accordingly. In the inferior towards the superior, it is often the effort to revenge Tyranny. Many that call others malicious and mean are worse themselves, for they are oppressors and misappropriators, have themselves by their own wrong-doing created Malice and Meanness in their victims, and are angry that they should be resisted by those victims in the ways that appear malicious and mean. Spitefulness is allied to, perhaps the same as, Malice.

Meanness is Strictness where Benevolence or Magnanimity is expected and proper.

Meanness is an allied emotion. Usage confines the latter word to money-matters.

Extravagance, Carelessness, Recklessness, False Magnificence, are the converse moods. They are Benevolence, or mere Self-Display, where strictness is desirable.
Insolence, Impertinence, Stiff-neckedness, Stiff-backedness, Brag, Bullying, Presumptuousness, etc., are the opposite of Humility, the converse of Malice, the kin of Tyranny. They are the assumption in oneself of equality or superiority, where the fact is inferiority, to the object of the mood. The desire here is the desire of Repulsion, though it is not very prominent in the beginning. An ‘insult’ is the pointed expression of one’s consciousness of the inferiority of the object of the insult.

Crookedness and Craftiness are the more active forms of Spitefulness and Malice; but the element of dislike is more hidden.

Admiration too appears to be a complex emotion. Of course, in order to say that an emotion which is described by a special name is simple or complex, we must be guided by current usage in deciding what emotion is really denoted by that word. This reflection comes up at once in connection with a word like Admiration, which is used—like so many others, on account of the paucity of languages, resulting from the absence, on the part of the races using those languages, of the feeling of any need for more minute and elaborate expression—to indicate many distinguishable though related phases of the same mood. For our present purpose we have to take the sense in which the word is used most
often. Taking that sense, *i.e.*, scrutinising the majority of the particular instances in which the word is used, it appears that it is employed mostly where there is a consciousness of the superiority of the object of it, but the feeling of Attraction accompanying it is neutralised or diminished by collateral circumstances.

We admire the skill of a juggler. We recognise the superiority of skill and are pleased with and like the results, but not very much. They appear trivial to us, or perhaps even wasteful of time and energy. So also we admire the skill of a general in the successful conduct of a war. But, if we are neutral to the parties warring, while recognising the superiority of skill in manipulating armies, we are perhaps full of sadness and regret at the fearful results in slaughter and rapine. If we are not neutral but interested, then there is no Admiration; the successful fighter becomes an object of apotheosis or satanisation; his name becomes a name to worship or a name to fear, according as we have gained or suffered by his skill. Again, we admire the beauty of a person; we admit the superiority in that respect, but there is something, some drawback, which prevents the Attraction from ripening into Reverence or Love, and the feeling remains one of Admiration only.

Thus Admiration is Attraction *plus* consciousness of superiority in the object in some respects, *plus* consciousness of its inferiority in some other res-
pects. It comes very near to Esteem. In Esteem the element of Attraction is stronger perhaps, and the objects of it, the attributes liked, are different; they are qualities of a work-a-day usefulness, indirectly pleasurable. In the case of Admiration they are more directly pleasurable. Such seems to be the distinction between them; but it refers, of course, to only one special sense and use of each term.

Wonder is distinct from Admiration; yet it has something in common with it too. It is consciousness of the superiority of the object, plus attraction, the desire to approach, plus uncertainty of one’s own ability to do so; the whole being overshadowed by the unexpectedness of the object, it being something out of the ordinary course of experience. It is this extraordinariness, indeed, which is the immediate cause of the uncertainty as to ability to approach. The physical manifestation is a general expansion of the features—open eyes, open mouth, ‘ wide-eyed wonder ’—consequent on the feeling of pleasure, accompanied by the arrest of motion—‘ standing stock-still,’ ‘struck dumb’—which corresponds naturally to the uncertainty above-mentioned.

The emotion stands close to Admiration on the one hand, and Awe and Diffidence on the other: yet there is a subtle distinction between them.

The Mystical, the Mysterious, the Curious—the emotions of these are allied to the emotion of the
Wonderful. There do not seem to be exact names expressing those emotions, as Wonder describes the emotion produced by the wonderful. The special, constitutional characters of the objects of the emotions, and their greater or less extraordinary and importance, make the difference between them.

Curiosity is, in one sense, only the desire for 'the curious,' for knowledge of the little-known, the out-of-the-way; it is a wish to see the unseen, to feel the unfelt, a seeking to understand uninterpretable contacts, as in children and savages, and, in a wider sense, the men of science, in whom there is a standing want to acquire knowledge of the details of the world around, full of inexplicable puzzles. But, in this sense, Curiosity is not yet an emotion, in the sense of that term as defined here. It is rather a direct appetite, being to the inner or mental man what hunger and thirst are to the outer or physical man. For as the parents nourish the physical body of the child, giving rise to the Pi̲ṭ̪̣-ṛṇā, the debt to the 'Fathers'; so the Elders of the race feed and foster the mental body of the Jīva, creating thereby the R̄ṣhi-ṛṇa; the Gods of the elements providing the means for the accomplishment of both the processes, and themselves becoming, in consequence, the creditors of the third or Deva-ṛṇa. The purpose of Curiosity, in this sense, is practically the same as that of all primary desire, the
desire to live more and more fully, to feel or realise oneself more and more strongly, to exercise greater and greater power and control over all around and make them subject to or part of oneself. Only the intellectual or cognitional element is more prominent in Curiosity than in primal desire. Thus we know generally, as said at the outset of chapter iii, that cognition is followed by desire and that by action; action is followed by fuller knowledge and thought which leads to more complex desire and emotion and greater power of action; and all that again bears fruit in more complicated work and industry; and so on, in endless rotation. The desire for fuller and fuller knowledge as a means to larger and larger life is Curiosity in this first sense.

In the other sense in which the word is often used, that of a minor vice, it conforms more to the definition here adopted of Emotion, a desire for information regarding the personal affairs in particular of other human beings, which information will either (a) give some sort of hold or power over them, or will (b) give a sort of petty satisfaction, by means of gossip and scandal, the same in kind (though differing in degree and quality) as is derived from the witnessing of acted plays or the reading of stories whereby we live very various lives and pass through very different kinds of experiences, vicariously, as it were. In this second sense, too, we find that Curiosity is
an emotion which unfortunately afflicts many human beings disproportionately and inappropriately, and very often to the great inconvenience of others. But, again, like all things else, it has its good as well as its bad side. The existence of such a feeling in fellow-beings is an inducement to all who have weak points to endeavor to strengthen them, to endeavour to live so that they shall no longer fear being brought into the light of day, no longer fear being made the subject of their neighbour's conversation.

In sense \(b\) abovementioned, Curiosity appears as a desire for a desire; for the wish to see acted plays or read stories is largely a wish to feel emotions, the emotions felt by the characters. This will be dealt with at greater length, later on \(^1\); but it may be noted here that, in strict analysis, a desire for a desire is an impossibility; and the expression, which has gained currency because it provides a convenient way of stating some rather common moods of mind, really means a desire for a certain condition of oneself, in which condition it will be possible to enjoy certain pleasurable objects; and thus, ultimately, it only means a desire for those pleasurable objects, complicated with a strong memory of them, and with a consciousness of present inability to enjoy them. When a sick man, who has lost all appetite, desires appetite, \(i.e.,\) desires desire for food, what

\(^1\) See *infra*, chapter x \((c)\) and \((d)\).
does he really want? He really wants all the pleasant foods and drinks that he enjoyed in his previous healthy condition, but is now prevented from enjoying by ill-health. And instead of stating the fact at such length, he shortly says he wants his appetite back again.¹

Surprise. Astonishment, the feeling of 'the Curious' as when a person exclaims, 'This is something very curious, unusual, remarkable,' etc., are degrees, modifications and varieties of the emotion of Wonder. The words are sometimes used to express corresponding moods on the side of Repulsion also by analogy and for convenience.

The emotion of the Sublime is also akin to Wonder. Where the unexpectedness and extraordinariness are at their lowest and the superiority at its highest, the emotion of

¹ There is also a subtler sense in which a Jiva may desire desires. For that sense we may refer to chapter xv, pp. 293, et seq. of The Science of Peace. Each inner subtler body, while from the standpoint of the outer and grosser it is only psychical or psychological and (pseudo-) immaterial, is, in turn, from the standpoint of a still more inner and subtler body, material, and so an object; and thus the psychical and apparently immaterial cognitions, desires, actions, etc., of it are, in turn, material objects to the cognitions, desires, actions, etc., of the further inner, an inner which is ever receding inwards more and more, antara antah, as the Triṣṭaṭ-Viśhubhi-Mahā-Narāyaṇa Upaniṣhat says. See also infra, chap. xii (c).
the Sublime is present. Awe is closely related also. The difference is, as is apparent from the foregone analysis of that emotion, that whereas in that there is a faint degree of Fear, here there is only Attraction.

'The Wonderful,' 'the Sublime,' and 'the Awful' cluster more frequently, or at least as often, round 'inanimate' natural scenes—mountains, summits of snow, gorges, canions, lakes, forests, tropical or montane vegetations, waterfalls, rivers, oceans—than, or as, round human beings—wielders of mystic powers, teachers, doers of great deeds, benefactors of mankind, great writers or great speakers. These scenes and objects of nature are said to arouse those emotions only by a metaphor, only as invested with human attributes in imagination, which, of course, may be so strong as to simulate reality. Grandeur and Magnificence are allied to, sometimes synonymous with, Sublimity.

Disgust is Fear in some respects plus Scorn in others.

Loathing, Abhorrence, are allied Emotions and express phases of Hate. As to what is the exact phase expressed by each—this is a matter apparently not very easy to determine, as the use of the words does not seem to be very precise or specific. They express Repulsion from an inferior, the cause of the Repulsion being its ugliness plus uncleanness,
and imply a desire for physical distance due to a fear of pollution. This latter element is predominant in Loathing, which may even cause the physical manifestation of vomiting, the effort of the body to throw out that which infects or injures it. In Abhorrence the mental element predominates; it is more aggressive than Loathing, and may be said to push away the abhorred object, whereas Loathing shrinks away from it.

These have an underlying basis of emotion, because they are not passive but active qualities, and manifest themselves in action, even though it be not always very prominent.

Greed is obviously excess of desire with reference to any particular object. It is thus not a complex emotion.

Tantalisation is a mixture of 'the desire to give, to impart,' and 'the desire to hold back.' The reason may be mere Love or Vanity, and Fear of consequences or even Dislike, respectively.

The consideration of the emotion of the Beautiful has been left over to so late a stage, because a peculiar mysteriousness is attached to it by humanity at large, though in reality there appears to be no mystery about it, and though it even appears to be a simple rather than a complex emotion.

The emotion of the Beautiful seems to be Love pure and simple; and this is why mysteriousness
attaches to it, for it does to Love also. Whatever gives us pleasure, whatever is fit to be united with and added to us, whatever enhances our self, our life, is, so far, Beautiful to us. The instinct of common usage and language indicates and embodies this truth. The Beautiful is the pleasant, the agreeable, the attractive, the charming, the fascinating, the lovely, the lovable. In Samskrit—
sundaram (suḍriyatē—that which is respected, loved; or suunattī—that which attracts); ruchiram (rochate—that which shines, or pleases); charu (charatimanasī—that which dwells and moves in the mind); sushamam (su and samam—even, unobstructing); sadhu (sadhnoṭi—fulfils desires); shobhanam (shining); kāntam (is loved, desired); manoramam or manoraram (pleases or steals and attracts the mind); ruchyam or ramyam (is pleasing); manojñam (knows or fills the mind); manju (is reputed, well-known, or has a sweet and pleasant sound); manjulam (the same as the last).1

There is no other standard mark of Beauty; for it varies, so far as its outer embodiment goes, with varying tastes in different men, and different races, and different times; but it never varies so far as its

1 Amara-Kośha, iii, 52; and the commentary on it, the Ramāshramī, by Bhānu Dīkṣīṭa.
inner characteristic of pleasantness is concerned. That is most beautiful to any one individual which is best calculated to supplement, to duplicate, to doubly enhance his self, his life. The instinctive, and not the definite, perception of the possibilities of such enhancement makes the mystery of the emotion. It may be that in later and more advanced races, with clearer vision and wider knowledge of all the phases of human life in each individual, the mystery will disappear and only the emotion remain. But the metaphysical view of the pseudo-infinitry of the limited rather forbids the entertainment of such a possibility. In this connection may be noted the theory of cell-physiology, viz., that the vital process going on in each cell has an optimum, a point of fullest life, with a minimum on the one side and a maximum on the other, the crossing of either of which results in the death of the cell; that is to say, if the degree of the vital process (vibration, assimilation of new and rejection of old material, or alimentation, or transformation of some kind or other, whatever its nature may ultimately be decided to be) falls below the minimum or rises above the maximum, then the cell dies, equally in both cases. Even so, a living individual dies, both of over-starvation or of over-repletion; a sound fails to be heard, i.e., fails to become a sound to the human ear, if its vibrations are too few or too many. Taking one instance of the effect of the
Beautiful, as between two human beings—where it is more frequently observable, though the generalisations apply to the so-called inanimate objects of nature also, in their effects upon human beings—we may note that the secret of what is called love-madness appears to be but this, that the nerves have been stimulated nearly beyond the maximum above-mentioned. Such over-stimulation, with natural and normal vent in corresponding action suppressed, often results in abnormal disease, hysteria, etc. In a milder degree it appears as the over-sensitiveness and restlessness of youth. In a higher degree, as the resistless yet aimless, overpowering yet unintelligible, passion that is accountable for many a wanderjahr, eccentricity or errantry. Where elements of sati and goodness are present, this attraction of the Beautiful in its super-physical forms,

The love of the moth for the Star,
Of the night for the morrow,
The devotion to something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow, ¹

is the cause of manifestations of genius, or of 'religious conversions,' which also occur largely in the critical period of youth. ² In its metaphysical form—of the One which confers infinite expansion of

¹ Shelley.
life upon its votary by becoming identical with him—the overpowering attraction of this, the Supreme·ly Beautiful, plunges the Jiva that is ready for it into endless vairāgya and lifts it out therefrom into viveka and the Life Eternal. The classical Purānic story, of the marvellous enthusiasm and love, indeed love-madness, aroused in men and women by the superhuma beauty of Kṛṣṇa's physical form and the divine music of his flute, is an illustration of the effect that is produced by sensations, which are the staple of the life of a higher and more complex organism, on organisms less developed, but not so dull and low in the scale of evolution as to be unable to respond at all. In this sense, the A vāṭārā may be said perhaps to have, amongst many other high purposes, one of setting up an ideal of physical form and nerve-organisation also, to be gradually grown into and realised by the race by means of the strain and striving of love and desire. At present, our human possibilities of enjoyment are confined to the five senses of knowledge and the five organs of action, in their direct exercise or as the basis of all the endless permutations and combinations of the thoughts, emotions and actions which arise out of and refer back to such exercise.¹ Each nerve may well have its own

¹ As to 'Sensations' being such basis, see among others, Blavatsky, The Secret Doctrine, I. 31; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, translated by Wallace, p. 21; Mill, Examination of Hamilton; Vāṭsyāyana, Nyāya Bhaṭṭya, I. i. 3.
appropriate pleasures and pains. 1 Compare the expressions: 'he lived in every fibre of his being in that moment,' 'every nerve tingled,' etc. These experiences, now comparatively rare and vague, will probably become more common and better defined in the future races, which will also possibly develop fully the five real organs of action corresponding to our five senses of knowledge. 2 At present, with two senses of knowledge fairly well-developed, the ear and the eye, we have only one organ of action similarly well-developed, viz., the vocal apparatus, for reproducing sounds, and one organ of action less developed, viz., the hands, for reproducing 'sights,' figures and forms, and also 'tacts' or touches. In the later races, we shall possibly have more or less developed organs for reproducing these two and also tastes and smells, and then the range of the emotion of the Beautiful will be correspondingly larger. While humanity

1 The descriptions in the Brahma Purāṇa, for instance, of the various ṭīrṭhas or holy places, and of the consequences of practising penance in them, carry indications of being (very) veiled descriptions of the several nerves or nerve-centres of the body, and of the results ensuing from the yogic stimulation or manipulation of each.

2 For a vague indication of this, see the story of Rṣhabha-deva in the Viṣṇu-Bhāgavata Purāṇa, V. v. The active functions assigned to the organs (excepting the vocal apparatus) in the current books, seem to be somewhat of the nature of 'blinds,' for they are shared in by other organs also and are not entirely specialised, though prominent, in these organs.
is different-sexed, so long, naturally, for the reasons mentioned before, the opposite sexes stimulate all the senses and organs and enhance the whole life and being of each other in greater degree than any other object, and, consequently, the emotion of Love and of the Beautiful is aroused most powerfully as between them.

One point may be noted here. Theories as to the Beautiful, in current text-books of psychology, have generally something to say as to lines and curves of beauty. Some even go so far as to exclusively identify beauty with a certain line or curve. The underlying truth of all these is that as the fulfilment of desire, the enhancement of life, the expansion of the self, in the limited individual, is in and through the senses of cognition and the organs of action, the stimulation that most enhances the being of any particular Jīva, in view of its special constitution, in the department of cognition or of action, and doubly so if of both, is the standard of beauty to it; the totality of such special constitutions, i.e., of all possible constitutions, is the totality of the Svā-bhāva, the Nature, of the Absolute; and a line or curve of beauty implies a line of movement, a course of action, which is most pleasant and congenial to the Jīva that regards it as such a line or curve of beauty. A constitution that particularly appreciates such a line or curve implies, in the first place, a special

1 Pp. 111—113, supra.
sensitiveness and delicacy of the sense of vision; and this, secondly, in respect of figures as distinguished from colors; and yet again, thirdly, in greater degree the actional sub-aspect of visual cognition, as implied in the movement of the eye along the line or curve. Other special standards of beauty may be similarly analysed with reference to the corresponding special constitutions of the Jīvas holding those standards.

One definition of Beauty, put forward by some Sanskrit poets, may be noted.

देव रूपं रमणीयताया: क्षणे क्षणे यन्त्रवताम् विधते ||¹

'Beauty or pleasantness or enjoyability, ramaṇīyata— the essential quality of this is that it appears as ever new, from moment to moment.'

Something has been said before about Novelty at the end of chapter vi.; more will be said later on in connection with the deadening effect of familiarity or repetition.² The element of truth underlying this view is that change is essential to the individual life, change of experience against a background of unchanging self. This, metaphysically, is the very meaning of individual life. Hence arise the many laws in all departments of cognition, desire action, etc., the Law of the Relativity of all knowledge, of intensity of feeling or sensation by contrast, of determination by negation, and all the conditions

¹ Māgha, iv. 17; see also Naśādhaka, xix—34.
² See paragraph on Irreverence, p. 141, infra.
of staleness, surfeiting, ennui, restlessness, etc. But, in this sense, beauty as novelty, or also as the special lines or curves referred to in the preceding paragraph, is not so much emotional as purely sensuous.

From what has preceded, it will be obvious that primarily this test of Beauty, i.e., its enhancement of another's life, applies to the physical embodiment; and secondarily, and more or less metaphorically, at a later stage of evolution, when the inner natures or bodies have grown, to the emotional and intellectual constitutions.

Vanity, according to the ordinary use of the word, is something reprehensible. Yet examination shows it to be on the side of Attraction and so of virtue. Popular usage recognises one form at least as 'innocent or childlike vanity.' Like Curiosity it seems to be a double desire, the desire of the desire for union, the desire of Love, the desire to love and be loved, to like and be liked, to praise and be praised, to please and be pleased. The physical consequence is self-adornment; otherwise, too, the laying out of oneself to please, in endless ways. That it has come to acquire an evil association is due to two causes. Even in the above good sense, Vanity would be an object of contempt to Jivas in whose constitution Unlovingness, Hardness, Reserve, and 'separateness' generally, were strong. Again, the word is used in a different sense altogether, as the nominal derivative of the adjective 'vain'; then it means
Self-Complacence, Self-Satisfaction, and becomes only a modification of Pride, which is a very different Emotion altogether.

Perhaps the reason why the two so different senses have come to be combined in one and the same word is that attention has been exaggeratedly confined to this aspect of the true Emotion, viz., the consciousness of the ability to please (and so far, of a certain power, a superiority), which is always present in Vanity together with the desire to please, though the consciousness may be of an ability varying from the lowest to the highest grades. This consciousness of ability is present in Self-Complacence also; but there it is not an ability to please others at all, there being no desire to please; and this makes all the difference.

Shame. Vanity plus consciousness of something which takes away from the feeling of ability is Shame.

Self-Complacence and Self-Satisfaction are Self-Importance and Superciliousness, in which the consciousness of the inferiority of another has become vague and general, and attention is mostly confined to the consciousness of one's own superiority generally. One somewhat peculiar phase of Self-Complacence seems to deserve special attention because of its insidious subtleness. It generally attacks Jivas at the junction-point between the two paths, of pursuit and renunciation, and may be described as the resultant
of a violent combination of contempt and cynicism on the one hand and budding benevolence on the other. In combination with other emotional elements in the constitutions of different individuals it manifests itself in different expressions. One such is the face of deliberately-assumed and conscious melancholy, embodying a sad self-awareness of the wearer's invincibly helpless superiority to his surroundings, which superiority persists despite all the wearer's best efforts to suppress it! The explanation is this: At such junction-point, the ā ha m kā rā, the self-consciousness or egoism, of the Jīva comes to a point, a focus, preliminary to disappearing into the universal space of All-Self-Consciousness. The vakrāgya, detachment, intended for 'the limited,' the anītya, as a whole, appears as positive contempt and cynicism with reference to particulars; and, not infrequently, it appears only when the individual expressing it is well-fed, well-clothed, and otherwise set in luxurious surroundings, for so only it finds the needed background to throw it into relief; at this weak infant stage it would perish if set in the actual asceticism that it aspires to. And the śama, peacefulness, which is the instinctive result of touch with the Niṭya, the Eternal, appears as budding benevolence also towards individuals. Hence an appearance of (often impertinent) hauteur plus condescension. The nasal tone of remonstrance, conveying apologetic abuse, often accompanies
this mood—‘I should turn my back upon you, were it not that pity prevents’—a combination of the ‘snorting sneer’ of pride and the ‘soft tone’ of pity.

Irreverence, Profanity, Flippancy, are incipient
Fear plus the desire to belittle, so as to
remove the element that causes the fear, in conversation with others; and also thereby to gain for oneself the consciousness of increase, in contrast with the belittlement of the other. They are distinguishable from that good-humoured and easy talk which is due simply to the fact that the speaker is more familiar with the subject than others, and therefore moves therein or thereabout with greater ease. A loyal subject may speak of the sovereign whom he has never seen and reveres from a distance as ‘His Majesty,’ and never in any more familiar fashion. A minister who is less removed from him, speaks of him as ‘the king,’ or even by name. In both, the emotion is on the right side. But neither may speak of a genuine king as ‘the figure-head of the state.’ There, the emotion would be on the wrong side, and so a case of flippancy, assuming, of course, that the king did not really deserve such a title. In the first case we have the familiarity of affection; in the second, of contempt. The so-called deadening of any emotion, with reference to any object, by repetition of contact with that object, wherever it really occurs, is due to the fact that other
subsidiary emotions, such as that of surprise, etc., which are peculiar to every new experience, do not arise in the repetition of it and therefore the total general stimulation or excitement is less. The matter might be put thus in other words:

It is not so much that "the emotions blunt themselves by repetition"\(^2\), as that exactly the same circumstances do not arouse the same amount of emotion a second time; but that if there is a cumulation of new pleasures or pains, additional soft caresses or petty annoyances, then we have a corresponding cumulative effect in the resultant emotion, that "desires grow with what they feed upon, as fire with fuel" and "love growth out of association," etc.

Laughter, as has been generally recognised by psychologists, is the physical manifestation of a sudden and excessive recognition of one’s own superiority.\(^3\) Where this

\(^1\) See, on this point, Goethe’s view, quoted in that generally very useful work, by Hoffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 282; “...the soul becomes greater without knowing it and is no longer capable of that first sensation. Man thinks he has lost, but he has gained; what he loses in pleasure, he gains in inner growth...”; but this seems still to require further explanation, as in the text above.

\(^2\) James, *Principles of Psychology*, II. 475.

consciousness is accompanied by Repulsion, the laugh becomes 'the laugh of ridicule'; where the ridicule is light-hearted, not serious, only chaff and banter, where it is moreover openly and unmistakably pretended and make-believe, 'the laugh of jest and joke,' of 'fun and good humor and good company' results.

But we very seldom find the loud laugh combined with genuine, deep-seated, real, earnest Benevolence. The smile is the nearest approach to laughter there.

**Smiles and tears require careful examination.**

*Jivas smile for joy and smile sadly; they weep in gladness and they weep in pain.*

*What is the meaning of this?*

The 'smile of joy' has already been incidentally and very briefly explained in connection with Kindness. The essential, psychological meaning of 'the expansion of the features in a smile' is a consciousness of 'moreness,' of 'superiority.'

The receiver of a gift smiles after the receipt. The giver smiles before the gift. In the first case the recipient becomes 'more' than he was before. The giver feels that he is more than the object of his charity and kindness. This last smile, the tender smile of Benevolence, is very nearly allied to and always ready to pass into the tears of pity.

The 'smile of sadness' also expresses the sense of superiority of him who smiles to the cause of his sadness, but without Repulsion, rather with pati-
ence, with resignation, with hope of future Love. The 'cynical smile,' 'the smile of bitterness,' is, of course, a near relative of the 'laugh of scorn.'

'The tears of joy,' like the 'tears of pity,' may mean either only an overflow of the superfluous possessions of the self—but without a definite object as in the other case, and only as a general expression of goodwill to all and readiness to give to any that need; or they may really be, as they often are, tears of pity for one's own past self, weak and worthy of pity before the cause of joy made it large and strong.

'The tears of pain' are in reality only 'tears of pity' where the object of pity is oneself.

Self-pity. The self here divides itself into two, the one pitying, the other suffering and pitied. Tears of pain are thus tears of Self-Pity. Tears generally do not come until the pain becomes mixed with a cognitional, considering, thinking, self-conscious element. This may be observed in children as well as in grown-up persons. A child generally accompanies his crying with exclamations of 'I am hurt,' or 'I have fallen down,' or 'So and so has struck me.' In adults too, there are seldom tears during the actual intensity of a pain. Tennyson's beautiful lyric illustrates the fact.

Home they brought her warrior dead;
She nor wept nor uttered cry....
Rose a nurse of ninety years,
Placed his child upon her knee,
Like summer showers came her tears:
"Sweet, my child, I'll live for thee."

This also gives us a clue to the reason why tears and Self-Pity, while allowed in the weak and the young, are considered reprehensible and unmanly in the grown-up and the strong. The ability to weep, as such, implies a lowering, an abatement, a diminution, a cessation of real acute pain; and to make a parade of pain then appears improper, in the first place; and, in the second place, such Self-Pity implies a demand for help by display of one's needs, and this in certain temperaments arouses Scorn, and calls forth the epithets of 'whining' and 'moaning,' etc.

Self-Scorn, Remorse, are similar to Self-Pity in respect of the dual character. So, too, Self-Praise.

The subject leads on directly to Pathos and 'the Pathetic.' The 'luxury of grief' has puzzled psychologists all the world over. The Samskṛtī authors on Sāhitya, too, give no adequate explanation. Sometimes they even content themselves with saying that the enjoyment of the Emotion requires a special and cultivated sense—which is scarcely true, as the Emotion is appreciated by young and old, cultured and uncultured alike. Herbert Spencer says he finds him-

* The Princess, vi.
self baffled; yet he makes a good attempt and brings out some of the real factors of the explanation. It is enough here to say that the essential constituent of the Emotion of the Pathetic is Pity, in some phase or other. As to how it becomes a source of enjoyment, etc., will be treated of in detail, later on, in connection with the Philosophy of Poetry.

Persistent pleasure and pain, transformed into joy and sorrow, persistent gladness and sadness, exaltation and rejoicing, misery and grief, may, in deference to the common view, but scarcely in strictness, for they are only degrees of pleasure and pain, be said to take on the character of Emotion. They seem to be double desires, like Curiosity and Vanity. Persistent sadness seems to be a dissatisfaction, a constant desire that certain things were otherwise than as they are, so that then pleasure and Love would result naturally in place of the present pain and effort and greater or less Repulsion. Gladness is the reverse, a satisfaction, a desire to prolong present conditions.

The active aspects of sadness and gladness are Worry and Cheerfulness. As Worry is an emotion which is the source of a great deal of trouble to humanity, it might be useful to understand it a little more fully. The following factors of Worry

---

1 Principles of Psychology, II. § 578. See also, James, Principles of Psychology, II., pp. 411 and 685.
are immediately recognisable—(a) A going wrong of something, an obstruction to desire, a source of pain; (b) endeavor to set matters right and want of success therein, a failure; (c) a non-recognition of the impossibility of setting things right and so avoiding the pain; on the contrary, a persistent consciousness that it is possible; (d) consequent repeated endeavor and repeated failure; and lastly, (e) continued anger and annoyance with the cause of the failure, and the mental repetition, over and over again persistently, of the cause of the trouble and the failure to get rid of it. It is this last which gives its peculiar characteristic to Worry; the irritation is worst, naturally, when the cause of the failure to set things right is the unamenability of some human being on whose co-operation the setting right of things depends. If this element of Anger is taken away, then the element of the peculiar painfulness of Worry disappears. All that remains is rightful and justifiable repetition of endeavor to set things right.

It is time to bring this chapter to a close. The list of Emotions might be prolonged indefinitely. The bulk of every language of an intellectually advanced race, excluding technical names and words relating to cognitions and actions, will be found to consist of words dealing with and expressing some phase or other of an Emotion.¹ It is

¹See, for example, Roget's *Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases*. 
impossible to deal with all of them in one place. Illustration of the general principles expounded earlier was the purpose of this chapter. It is hoped that this has been achieved by the examples given. The student should find sufficient reason herein to believe that all Emotions are capable of being reduced into terms of Love and Hate, permuted and combined with grades and kinds of superiority, equality, and inferiority. And he should try to find justification or refutation of his belief in practical exercises with new phases of Emotion.

A few tables are appended, tentatively casting the emotions and moods of more frequent occurrence into groups. The nature of the primal trinity of the Self, the Not-Self, and the relation of Negation between them, which governs and guides the grouping, may be studied in detail in The Science of Peace. But to avoid misunderstanding, it may be noted here that the subordinate triplet, of chīt or jñāna, saṭ or kriyā, and ānanda or ichchhā, i.e., cognition, action and desire, may be regarded as arising in the Self by the reflexion in it, respectively, of the Self (itself), the Not-Self and the Negation—so that these words, in the tables, indicate this reflexion rather than their literal connotations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I. (LIFE).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness or Chit (Mentality).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition or Jñāna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought or Vichāra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science or Systematised knowledge, or Shāstra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE II. (EMOTION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Not-Self</th>
<th>Relation of Negation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Love or Sympathy; the feeling of the Truth of the Unity, in the Self, of all selves; whence all order and organisation.</td>
<td>Hate or Antipathy; the feeling of the Untruth of the separateness of selves in consequence of the many falsehood, or illusory fact of the separateness of bodies; whence disintegration, anarchy and disorder.</td>
<td>Indifference or Apathy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Complex Emotions** (roughly classified by predominant characteristic):

- Esteem, Admiration, Wonder, Diffidence, Trust, etc.,
- Cheeriness, Heartiness, Content, Forbearance, Curiosity, etc.,
- Magnanimity, Mercy, Ruth, Forgivenes, Confidence, Surprise, etc.,
- Dejection, Despair, Dismay, Shame, Misgiving, Shyness, Distrust, Jealousy, Envy, Disgust, Loathing, Abhorrence, Malice, etc.,
- Bitterness, Vexation, Disappointment, Annoyance, Care, Fret, Worry, Anxiety, Discontent, Chagrin, Fury, Acrimony, etc.,
- Humiliation, Mortification, Reserve, Ridicule, Insolence, Impertinence, Lust, Disgust, etc.,
- Respect, Goodwill, Tenderness, Veneration, Worship, etc.,
- Friendship, Passion, Terror, Horror, Superciliousness, Contempt, Disdain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Not-Self</th>
<th>Relation of Negation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtue</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Duty and Devotion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>Egoism</td>
<td><strong>Omnism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Superiors.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Towards Equals.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Towards Inferiors.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Equals.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Towards Superiors.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Towards Inferiors.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Irritability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Inferiors.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pride.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Superiors.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-importance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Equals.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrogance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towards Inferiors.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Insolence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mixed Qualities (roughly classified according to prominent feature).**

- Obedience, Self-respect, Holiness, Servility, Unkindness, Harshness, Exactingness, Extortionateness, Prudery, Hypocrisy, Sanctimony, Ferocity, Rashness, Truculence, Turbulence, Impetuosity, Vehemence, Harsh Judgment, Malignity, etc.
- Fidelity, Self-control, Self-confidence, Courage, Vanity, Tolerance, Contentment, Uprightness, Gentleness, Honesty, Accuracy (of estimation of others), Prudence, etc.
- Courage, Magnanimity, Dignity, Urbanity, Condescension, Serenity, Sense of honor, Charity, Charitableness (in interpretation of others), Foresight, etc.
- Majesty, Heroism, Magnanimity, Deceptiveness, Treacherousness, Rebelliousness, Meanness, Bearishness, Moroseness, Sullenness, Fury, Reserve, Distortion (in interpretation of others).
- Holiness, Deceptiveness, Treacherousness, Rebelliousness, Meanness, Bearishness, Moroseness, Sullenness, Fury, Reserve, Distortion (in interpretation of others).
- Servility, Unkindness, Harshness, Exactingness, Extortionateness, Prudery, Hypocrisy, Sanctimony, Ferocity, Rashness, Truculence, Turbulence, Impetuosity, Vehemence, Harsh Judgment, Malignity, etc.
- Foresight, etc.
TABLE IV. (Behavior).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Towards Superiors.</td>
<td>Towards Superiors.</td>
<td>Condescension according to prevailing characteristic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praise.</td>
<td>Praise.</td>
<td>Blackmailing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obeisance.</td>
<td>Obeisance.</td>
<td>Tyranny,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratitude.</td>
<td>Gratitude.</td>
<td>Intimidation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Equals.</td>
<td>Towards Equals.</td>
<td>Bigotry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation.</td>
<td>Appreciation.</td>
<td>Scoffing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval.</td>
<td>Approval.</td>
<td>Harshness,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return.</td>
<td>Return.</td>
<td>Sneering,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Inferiors.</td>
<td>Towards Inferiors.</td>
<td>The laugh of ridicule,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrender.</td>
<td>Surrender.</td>
<td>The laugh of ridicule,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing.</td>
<td>Sharing.</td>
<td>The laugh of ridicule,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renunciation.</td>
<td>Renunciation.</td>
<td>The laugh of ridicule,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards Superiors.</td>
<td>Towards Superiors.</td>
<td>Self,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evasion.</td>
<td>Evasion.</td>
<td>lation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemnation.</td>
<td>Condemnation.</td>
<td>Remorse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation.</td>
<td>Depreciation.</td>
<td>Tears of self-pity, etc.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insult.</td>
<td>Insult.</td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury.</td>
<td>Injury.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery.</td>
<td>Robbery.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle.</td>
<td>Battle.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Behavior (classified according to prevailing characteristic).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submissiveness, Homage, Thanksgiving, Rejoicing, Adoration, Glorification, Worship, Piety, Faith, Aspiration, Penitence, Repentance, etc.</td>
<td>Coniliation, Atonement, Fun, Frolic, Remuneration, Pining, Repining, etc.</td>
<td>Benediction, Rewarding, Smiling, The laugh of good humor, Exaltation, Remorse, Inspiration, Tears of pity, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IX.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF EMOTIONS.

Before passing on to the Philosophy of Poetry and the other Arts wherein Emotions are dealt with in an aspect somewhat different from that treated of hitherto, a word may be said as to the correspondence of these mental phenomena with each other, and how the presence of one calls another into existence.

The general law governing their reciprocation and mutual manifestation may be summed up shortly: Emotions tend to create their own likeness, even as fire does. But in the actual workings of life, the results of the law undergo modifications by the special circumstances of the cases. These modifications may be generalised under two rules. (a) Amongst ordinary Jivas, inclined strongly neither to the side of Love nor to the side of Hate, Emotions produce their own likeness or counterpart. (b) Amongst Jivas belonging definitely to the one class rather
than the other, the Emotions of others, whether 
those Emotions belong to the side of Love or of 
Hate, create the corresponding Emotions of that 
class only to which the Jīvas belong.

Thus, amongst ordinary people, midway, so to 
say, between pravṛtti and nivṛtti, 
illustrations.

Love will produce Love, and Anger 
Anger, assuming equality. Pride and 
Scorn and Oppressiveness will inspire Fear and 
Malice and Vindictiveness in the really inferior; 
equal or greater Pride and Scorn and Oppressiveness in the really superior and stronger; or merely 
Anger and Annoyance in the really equal. Again 
Fear and Distrust will inspire Pride and Scorn in 
the superior; and equal or greater Fear and 
Distrust in the really inferior; or mere Anger and 
Annoyance in the really equal. So Benevolence will 
inspire Humility or Love or Benevolence. And 
again, Humility will evoke Benevolence or Love or 
Humility.

But in a Jīva belonging, say, to the class of Jīvas 
in whom the 'united Self' is strong, belonging, 
that is, to the side of virtue and Love and unselfish 
nivṛtti—whether this be the case by deliberate 
cultivation, such as will be treated of in the final 
chapter, or otherwise, by birth, karma, etc.—the 
sight of Fear will not arouse Scorn but Benevo-

tence, equally with the sight of Humility, or 
Friendliness, or greater Humility, according as the 
person towards whom Fear is expressed, feels
himself to be stronger, equal, or weaker; that of Anger, Sullenness, and Moroseness will not inspire real Annoyance and Reserve and withdrawal, but, on the contrary, Love and Affection and effort to break down the other's crust-wall of evil mood, equally with the sight of Love and Affection, or it will inspire Benevolence, or Humility, as the case may be, with reference to the equality, superiority, or inferiority, of the person inspired; that of Pride will not evoke Fear, but true Humility, and the feeling that the other is really better than himself, even as will the sight of Benevolence, or it may produce Friendliness, or Benevolence and Pity, as the case may be. And, conversely, in a Jīva belonging definitely—by voluntary, premeditated development in that direction, or otherwise—to the dark side, the side of Hate and vice and selfish pride, the sight of Humility or Fear, will equally provoke Disdain and Scorn and Contempt, or Anger, or suspicious Fear; that of Love or Anger, Sullenness and Anger, or Scorn, or Fear; and that of Benevolence or Pride, Fear and Distrust, or Anger, or Pride.

The correspondence may be worked out and observed through all grades and kinds of Emotion. The details are numberless as individual beings, and the Purāṇas and Iṭihāsas, and all good histories and observant stories of men, and accurately written accounts of the behavior of even animals to each other, abound with illustrations.
As to why one Emotion should arouse another Emotion at all, as to why reaction should follow action—this belongs to the province of Metaphysic, and final solutions must be looked for there. But it may perhaps help to make the matter less mysterious-looking, if the laws gathered above are put in other words.

Why does a display of Fear arouse Scorn, etc.? To show Fear of another person is to imply, to indicate, to say, that that person is not worthy of Trust, that there is a relation of Dislike and Hate between him and the timid person. This again is to imply, and to give cause to the other person to believe, that he should expect resistance, and harm, and attempt at making him less at the hands of the person who so displays Fear, for the Dislike present in Fear involves consciousness of pain and loss experienced in the past, and imagination of more to be experienced in the future, and consequent possibility of an endeavor to retaliate. The natural consequence is, that he, taking up the relation at this last stage, assumes the corresponding vicious attitude, and calls up Scorn, or Anger and Annoyance, etc., to his help, these being the ordinary Jiva's resources for supplying its deficiencies and losses. The other, the fearing, takes the

1 See *The Science of Peace*, ch. xv, p. 268, as to how and why every one, thing or thought, material or mental, by imitation of *The One*, is pseudo-infinite, and endeavors to realize this pseudo-infinity by endless multiplication and radiation.
situation up anew at this stage. And so, by action and reaction, the evil goes on perpetuating itself and becoming ever stronger, instead of abating.

So Malice is created by Oppression and Insolence, and by reaction creates greater Contempt and Oppression, till the whole situation ends in disaster—witness the mutual relations of Bhīma and Duryodhana in the *Mahābhārata*; witness, in our own day, the mutual relations of so many conquering and conquered races. Such oppressed persons nurse their grievances, and the Emotion, gathering strength with imprisonment and restraint, often explodes suddenly and, to those who do not follow up its gradual growth, in a manner entirely unaccountable and unintelligibly disproportionate to the occasion. These explosions may range from harmless and ludicrous outbursts up to crimes; from cases where a man really weak, but wishing to appear strong, puts too much loudness and bravado into his first speech to the disliked person and then fails and collapses altogether, to cases where the disliked person is assassinated for imagined wrongs. Wherever there appears capriciousness, or disproportion, or suddenness of action, there imagination has been at work silently strengthening the Emotion which has burst forth into the action.

The explanation in the other cases relating to ordinary Jivas is exactly similar.

In the case of extraordinary Jivas this new fact
comes into play, viz., that they each look only at the actual superiority, or inferiority, or equality underlying the Emotion of another, and mostly ignore that particular aspect of desire which, together with the superiority, etc., makes it the Emotion that it is; and so looking, they impose on it the Emotion corresponding to their own nature and dictated by their reason (consciously or sub-consciously) as the one proper to assume and act upon for practical purposes. At the same time it should be borne in mind, almost as a third law, that extraordinary Jīvas, of either class, within the limits of their own class, tend to behave towards each other like ordinary Jīvas, for the obvious reason that they are not extraordinary to each other, as illustrated by the facts of 'honor among thieves' and 'war in heaven.' In this fact may be found the explanation of the half-truth that there is in the saying that 'no man is a hero to his valet.' We see in ordinary life that it is easier for people, who are somewhat distant, to behave to each other nicely, than for those who are constantly thrown together and so tax each other much more frequently. Only a Jīva that is very much more 'advanced' or 'extraordinary', by comparison, than his immediate surroundings, can show in private and domestic life the perfection of character and behavior that he shows in public life. Witness the complaints of Kṛṣhṇa to Nāraḍa regarding his domestic difficulties. The Gods and the Rṣhis,
amongst themselves, behave like ordinary mortals—the inevitable logical consequence of the fact that they wear ‘bodies,’ and bodies are superior to some, inferior to some, and equal to some other bodies in every sense, i.e., as regards stage of development of the inner sukshma or subtle bodies also.

Note:—The metaphysical why of these laws has been referred to in a preceding foot-note at p. 152. The how of them, in terms of matter, i.e., superphysical or subtle matter, in the words of Vedântic and theosophical literature may, as has been explained by Mrs. Annie Besant in some of her lectures, (see also her Thought-Power) be put somewhat like this, generally. Every emotion produces in the sukshma or subtler body of the person excited, a characteristic vibration. This vibration tends to set up similar vibrations in the aura and sukshma body of every other person in the vicinity and, thereafter, and thereby, the corresponding emotion in his mind in accordance with the general law that changes of body are followed by corresponding changes of mind as much as changes of mind by changes of body. (See p. 13, supra.) But if the latter person has a peculiar individuality of his own, then, instead of allowing himself to be ‘governed’ by the conditions set up by the other, he will meet them with others, and stronger ones, created by himself, and so change the former’s mood, instead of being changed by it; that is to say, for example, if the vibrations of anger from another’s aura touch his, he will call up the mood of friendliness, initiate corresponding vibrations in his own aura, impose them strongly on the other’s, and produce the mood of friendliness in the other’s mind in place of anger.

It would be possible to put this how in terms of physical matter also, if there were more knowledge extant on the subject. But the experiments now being made with reference-
to the ptomaines, toxins, antitoxines, lysines, antilexines, perspirations, etc., or secretions generally, produced in the human body under various conditions and emotions—these experiments seem likely to show, later on, that the poisonous Jas a secretions, for instance, which cause a headache after a fit of anger suppressed by fear, etc., are counteracted and neutralised by the antitoxic sāţvīka secretions produced by the generous and beneficent emotions called up by reading a book of high and holy thoughts and deeds.
It may be useful to put the generalisations made above in the form of tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pride</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
<th>Love</th>
<th>Humility</th>
<th>Pride</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
<th>Love</th>
<th>Humility</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Fear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOVE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sight, in another, of

(a) Law No. I.

Superior

Will inspire in the ordinary

If it is

Equal

Inferior
(b) Law No. II.

The sight, in another, of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Will equally arouse in the definitely virtuous Jiva, if he is</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Inferior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pride or Benevolence</td>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Humility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger or Love</td>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Humility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear or Humility</td>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Humility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And in the definitely vicious Jiva, if he is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Inferior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER X.

EMOTION IN ART.

(a) POETRY AND LITERATURE.

So far we have dealt with Emotions as desires; and desire is their true and essential nature. In order to understand the philosophy of Poetry and Literature we have to refer back to that view of Emotion wherein it is regarded as a pleasurable or painful state sui generis. The paragraphs on the pleasurable and painful nature of the Emotions at pp. 25–27, might here be read over again. The Desire-Emotion specialised by the immediately surrounding circumstances of the particular situation is one thing, and the pleasure or pain specialised by its correspondence with such Desire-Emotion is another thing. The latter, the specialised pleasure, is, it would appear, the true significance of the Samskrit word r a s a , in Sāhītya, 'enjoyment, in company,' the Science of Poetry, etc. And it is in this sense that what Bain ¹

¹ On Teaching English, p. 214.
tentatively says is true: "To Emotion we must come at last in any precise definition of poetry."

The last word on the subject was said when it was declared that शाल्काम् रसार्मक्रमश्च काव्यम्, ‘Speech ensouled by रसा is Poetry,’ by Shaulçhoçani, Vāmana, Vishvanātha, and a host of others, all following the lead of Bharata, the sage who first expounded the Science and Art of Poetry and Drama in India. This word remains final, notwithstanding attempts made here and there, notably by Mammata in his Kāvya Prakāsha, to invent other definitions. These attempts are failures by the general verdict, and even the authors of them find themselves compelled to resort to the ordinary view again and again.

The most important word of this definition is clearly the word रसा. Many have been its interpretations and many its translations. Its ordinary non-technical meaning gives the clue to its true special meaning in the Science of Poetry—as declared by Bharata himself. That meaning is 'juice, sap,' and also 'taste, relish.' When an Emotion-desire appears in the mind, and is not allowed to rush out in its usual course into action, but is checked, held in, and circumscribed by the cognitive consciousness, and the pleasurable picture of the fulfilment of the desire is deliberately dwelt upon and leisurely enjoyed in the mind, even as a delicious morsel of food may
be detained and slowly and fully tasted in the mouth—then comes into existence this peculiar modification of consciousness which is called *rasa*. *Rasa* is the pleasurable consciousness, the feeling of specialised pleasure, accompanying the presence in the imagination of the picture of the fulfilment of a desire. Compare the use of the word, in some of the works on the methods of Yoga, in the expression *rasa*ṣvāḍa, used to indicate one of the activities of the mind, *viz.*, tasting the sweets of imagination, ‘building castles in the air,’ which is one of the obstacles in the way of gaining sāmāḍhi—fixity in the higher consciousness.

In *rasa* there is an intimate interblending of the cognitive and feeling elements of consciousness, with the result that each gains in surface and expanse, but loses in compactness and depth. It is as if two heaps of two different kinds of grain were shaken into each other. The whole new heap would acquire a new color different from that of either, and would be also larger in size than either. But the color would probably be vaguer, dimmer, less distinct and defined, than that of either. The resultant, in other words, gains something and loses something. The same result is noticeable in the case taken above from the gustatory consciousness.

Take another simile—a stream of water rushing onwards. If such a stream were led into a circular
basin whence there was no outlet, the stream would turn upon itself and revolve round and round and become a whirlpool, growing ever stronger in its circular rush, and ever deeper, if the inflow continued; or stiller and more equable and steady of depth if it were cut off. In either case a certain depth would be gained greater than that of the flowing stream, and a certain spread of surface would be lost.

The characteristic of Poetry is such r a s a. Its business is to call up an Emotion and then hold it in, so that its correspondent feeling of pleasure is 'tasted' at leisure.

The limiting, the circumscription, is provided by the patent fact that the story, the description, the occasion, is only an imaginary and not a real and personal one for the reader. He is reading the experiences in a book, and not passing through them in actual life. Later on, when the man is able to put himself in the position of the student and reader of life, and can regard his own and all other actual life as one great book merely, realising more and more the full significance of this endless drama and pastime of the world-process, including both the equal halves of all its tragedy and all its comedy, then he can treat this in exactly the same way as the reader of the book of ink and paper treats the story written therein; and then the emotions aroused by and in such actual life will have no
greater power over him than those aroused by a book of poetry. But it must always be remembered that, from the standpoint and for the practical purposes of the limited and individual human Jīva, the study and reading of life is not its own end. It is a means to the improvement of life as end. And, unless this aim is held constantly before the mind, great error will result. We meet with people here and there, and indeed more and more frequently in modern times, who have attained to that degree of self-consciousness that all their life has become deliberate ‘acting’; but inasmuch as the self, to the consciousness of which they have attained, is not the ‘united Self,’ the Supreme Self, the Pratyagātmā, their acting is aimless, purposeless, and in the end becomes very dreary and desolate, and remains such till they learn better.

Where the emotion aroused by the plain narrative is not sufficiently strong in itself, or the pleasure corresponding to it is of such kind that the author or reader wants it lengthened and continued, the device of ‘ornaments of speech’ is resorted to. The sole business of an ornament, of all ornaments, is to put a circle, a limit, round a special feature, to put a marker on it; to thus direct attention to it and intensify the consciousness thereof; and thereby to define and intensify the special beauty of that feature—for enhancement
of beauty here is literally nothing else than enhancement of the consciousness of that beauty.

Such 'ornaments of speech,' 'figures of speech,' in literature supply the place of the constant 'inflow' referred to above in the illustration taken from flowing water, and they give the further supply that is necessary to make the 'whirlpool' deeper and stronger and more lasting. The absence of the supply causes the rasa to lose its force and subside into placidity shortly.

From the above considerations it appears that the main and direct object of Poetry is, as Mammata says correctly in this instance, paras nirviṣṭi—great and peculiar pleasure. The other objects he enumerates, viz., instruction in the ways of the world, knowledge of old customs, counsel as to proper action in special situations, etc.—these are secondary and more in accordance with the views of the school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā as to the purpose of language generally, than with the views of poets.

(b) THE NATURE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN WITH REFERENCE TO VARIOUS CLASSES OF JĪVAS.

The object and nature of Poetry have been thus generally outlined. The nature of rasa, however, cannot be fully understood unless we enter into some little detail as to the nature of pleasure and pain from the standpoint of Meta-

1 Kāvyā-Praṅga, I., ii. (Kārikā).
EMOTION IN ART.

165

physic. We have tried to avoid doing so thus far, in order, if not altogether to preclude controversy —for it is not possible to obtain universal consent and unanimity on even a single proposition, however plain, unmistakable, and simple it may appear—still to avoid dubitable and debatable points as much as possible. But longer to shirk this is to leave the subject in hand disjointed and the conclusions thereon unsupported.

The Self has been stated to be the first and most indispensable factor of life. It has also been stated that, in the conscious individual condition, the self is always in a state either of Pleasure or of Pain. By careful examination it appears that Pleasure is the feeling of an expansion, an increase of the self.¹ The very essence of Pleasure is an enhancement of the self, its growth, its intensification, its superiority over others or over its own past states, its moreness in short—

¹ This has been found to be true psycho-physically. Thus Titchener, An Outline of Psychology, (1902), ch. V., p. 112, says: "We find that pleasantness is attended (1) by increase of bodily volume, due to the expansion of arteries running just beneath the skin; (2) by deepened breathing; (3) by heightened pulse; and (4) by increase of muscular power. Unpleasantness is accompanied by the reverse phenomena." But, it should be borne in mind, these are only general statements, which, as usual, have exceptions, 'which prove the rule,' and come under other rules.
moreness than before and as compared with others. These two comparisons, on analysis, come to mean the same thing, for the size, the measure, of a self, at any particular moment, must be a matter of comparison with others; so that, when we say 'superiority over or moreness as compared with its own previous condition,' we still implicitly compare it with others at least in the time of the previous condition in order to fix the size of that previous condition.

So Pain is the feeling of contraction, narrowing, *Pain, of* inferiority, *lessness* of the self than *a contraction* before and than others.

This seems to be as near an approach to a universally correct definition of Pleasure and Pain as is available.

But if Pleasure and Pain are capable of such uniform characterisation, how is it that in the concrete, in actual life, what gives pleasure to one Jīva gives positive pain to another, and *vice versa*? Do these facts contradict the definition or are they reconcilable with it? They are, of course, reconcilable with it; indeed it is out of all these facts that the definition has been generalised. The explanation is this.

It has been said before that a Jīva is a compound of the Pratyagātmā, the abstract Self, the One, and a portion of the concrete Not-Self, the Mūlapraṇa, the Many. Not till such a combination takes place is the multitudinous process of
s a m s ā r a possible. Self as such, the abstract Self, is incapable of being added to or subtracted from; it has no quantity; it is a bare, all-comprehending and all-other-denying unity. The Not-Self as such, the pseudo-abstract or concrete Many, is also incapable of being added to or subtracted from; it is only the implicit total, the whole, of all (particulars) and has no manifest and explicit quality. In order that there may be any definition, manifestation, v y a k t i, any definites, any particulars, individuals, v y a k t a s, the two A v y a k t a s, the Unmanifest Infinite and In-de-finite, Self and Not-Self, must be seen in Relation, in mutual transfusion and mutual superimposition, a ḍ h y ā s a. This superimposition brings out attributes in each, and, at the same time, imposes those of each upon the other, so that we have quantities, qualities, and movements, in the subjective, psychical or mental as well as the objective, physical or bodily, half of the individual Jīva. ¹

Now, when the Self has become identified with an

¹ We might round out here the line of thought a portion of which was sketched in the foot-note at p. 28, supra. Details as to the how and the why of all this, and of the Relation of Negation between the Self and the Not-Self will be found in The Science of Peace, as also indications of the endless triplets arising or existing within this primal Trinity (ch. xv.). One of the more prominent of these is the triplet of ḍ r a v y a, g u n a and k a r m a, or substance, quality and movement (ch. x). Substance, from one standpoint, appears as quantity.
upadihi, a portion of the Not-Self, when a Jiva proper, a conglomerate of self and not-self, the whole behaving and regarding itself as an individual, a particular self, a personality with a 'quantity,' has been formed, then contraction and expansion, pain and pleasure, become possible. And according as the nature of the particular, limited, individual, personal, self ¹ is, so will be its causes of pleasure and pain. Whatever helps to expand that particular nature will be pleasurable, the opposite painful. Herein lies the explanation of so-called morbid pleasures and pains. When the self happens to have become identified with what, from the

Now, by mutual superimposition of attributes, the self becomes an inner core-body or subtler sheath (ch. xiii.) and then shows out the 'properties' of quantity, etc. In psychical or subjective terms, quantity appears as tone, temperament, 'large-hearted, balanced, or narrow-minded,' 'cheerful, equable or gloomy,' 'sanguine, phlegmatic or melancholy,' etc.; quality appears as mentality, 'keen or dull,' etc.; and mobility as character, 'p r a v r i t t a or n i v r i t t a ,' selfish or unselfish,' 'worldly or unworldly,' 'pursuant or renunciant,' etc., with a medium third, or 'just,' between each pair. It must be remembered that this is only one of endless ways of looking at one of the endless aspects of the primal Trinity.

¹ In the earlier days of theosophical literature, a distinction was drawn between 'individuality' and 'personality.' Later developments show that what was meant was only the distinction between the relatively more permanent subtler bodies and the more transient grosser bodies.
standpoint of the majority, is called a diseased condition of the not-self, then appears the mysterious-looking phenomenon of pleasure—positive pleasure for the time being, however false and illusory otherwise—being caused by what actually promotes and perpetuates the disease and the feeling of the disease. 1

In view of the above remarks, for the purposes of the subject in hand, Jivas may be divided into two broad classes. 2 According to the general Law of Evolution in the world-process, during the first half of a cycle, whether large or small, the tendency is for the self to identify itself more and more completely with the not-self, to fall more and more deeply into matter, as it is sometimes described, to become more and more separate, exclusive, and individualistic, by means of immersion in more and more concrete and mutually-resistant forms. The reverse is the case during the second

---

1 For examples see W. James, Principles of Psychology, II, pp. 553-554. His explanations are different of course, however, from the one suggested above. To us, the worms that thrive in mire and the gods that are nourished on nectar and ambrosia are such only because the self is identified with what is called by human beings mire in the one case and nectar and ambrosia in the other, respectively. In the cases mentioned by James, the identification is very temporary. The key-note of the Samskṛt system of medical treatment is सांत्या, 'con-natural-less or identity with the self,' agreeing.'

2 See the Bhagavata-Gītā, xvi.
half, when the self dissociates itself more and more from the not-self, and tends more and more to revert towards its abstract unity. During the former period, accordingly, the period of the \textit{pravṛtti-mārga}, the path of pursuit of things worldly, of engagement in the world, the causes of pleasure and pain are respectively those that expand or contract the material, the more concrete, the separated self, the lower self, or rather the not-self that has assumed the mask of the self. During the latter period, the causes are those that enhance or narrow the spiritual, the more abstract, the uniting self, the higher self, the self that has assumed the mask of the not-self.

It should be remembered here that this is all a matter of grades and degrees, of relativity, of more and more, and less and less only; there is no complete, absolute, loss of the instinctive feeling of unity (which is the result of the presence of the Self) on the first half of the cycle; as there is no complete, absolute, loss of the instinctive feeling of separateness (due to the presence of the Not-Self) on the second half to its very end in \textit{pralaya} and Peace. The complete absence from manifestation of the one means the similar complete absence of the other, and the consequent collapse of the world-process into \textit{pralaya} for the time being; and thus it is that, during manifestation, Love and Hate are to be always found touching each other, from the very
beginning unto the very end, though, of course, their power and prevalence vary in the two stages, even as the height of the two ends of a see-saw might vary.

The result of all this is that during the first half of every cycle, large or small, representing the life of one human being or of a nation, a race, or all humanity, a globe or a kosmos, the separative emotions on the side of Hate and vice prevail. The greed for gain, for self-assertion, for individualism, for adding to one's own upādhi at the expense of others, the āsurī-prakṛṭi in short, is strong then, and jīvas predominantly belong to the class which is best described by the word 'selfish.' Later on, during the other half, when the power of the not-self decreases, and the Self is recognised as distinct from the Not-Self and as One in and with all selves, all jīvas, then the emotions that make for union, those on the side of Love and virtue and the dāivī-prakṛṭi, gather strength, and jīvas belong to the class 'unselfish.' The pleasure-seeking youth becomes the self-sacrificing parent; a conquering nation or race becomes the civiliser and uplifter of subject-races rather than their exterminator; an orb or kosmic system gives away its own life and constituent material to a younger orb or system instead of swallowing up its compeers and brothers as Mārtanda, the Sun, did in his younger days.
This law, it should be noted, is true only as a general law, in the case of the typical cyclical life. In the actual practice of the world-process there is such an infinite commingling of larger and smaller cycles, each being at a different stage, and the cases of special protection and guidance of and consequent absence of evil amongst early races, and of violent distortion from the ordinary path, of disease and premature death, amongst individuals as well as nations during certain other periods of the life of humanity, are so common in consequence of other minor laws, that it may well appear to the casual observer that there is no such general law governing the world-process. The Sanskrit saying is useful to bear in mind in this connection:

यक्षत् मृहतमो लोकेः यशच बुद्धे परं गतः
द्वारावेऽ संध्मेधेते हिस्वायन्ताति जनः

"He that is the dullest of the dull, or he that has attained to That which is beyond the buḍḍha — these two only are the happy in the world; the midway Jīvas are the unhappy." All these three stages are present everywhere and always, but, of course, also, only one is predominant and the others in abeyance at any one time and place, in the life of any one individual, race, system, etc.

Selfish Jīvas, as just said, find pleasure in whatever increases their material self, their physical possessions and belongings; hence with them 'taking' is the watchword of action. With
unselfish Jīvas, on the other hand, ‘giving’ is the guiding principle. Because, in the one case, the Jīva feels that the more he solidifies his material \( u \) the more he strengthens, perpetuates, and expands his self; while, in the other, he feels that the more he gives away of his \( u \), the more he attenuates and thins it, the more the possibility of his self uniting with other selves, the more its expansion and increase and assimilation to the One Self.

In consequence of subtle modifications, however, which take place inevitably, a ‘taking’ comes sometimes to be a taking in Love; it is accompanied with the desire to repay by grateful service, and hence has still the element of ‘giving’ in it, and therefore belongs to the side of unselfishness and unity (vide analysis of ‘Devotion’ supra). On the other hand, very often is ‘giving’ a giving in unwillingness; it is then a ‘loss’ and is accompanied by the wish to take back at the earliest opportunity. Such giving belongs to the side of selfishness and separation.

Bearing in mind the possibility of endless such modifications—all of which will be found capable of reduction by the general principles stated above—we may see that to one class of Jīvas the circumstances arousing the one class of emotions will be exclusively pleasurable and the opposite painful, whereas amongst the other exactly the reverse
will be the case. That it is so happens by the invincible necessity of conditions. In every scene of actual life, wherever there is occasion for the exercise of an emotion of the one class, there is present also, either as cause or as effect of the first-mentioned occasion, an occasion for an emotion of the opposite class. This will be treated of later, in dealing with illustrations of the character of literature.

It should be noted, meanwhile, that the desire of the Jīva is always towards 'moreness' and away from 'lessness.' It loves that which makes it more; it hates that which makes it less. But the it which is to be made more or less is very different in different cases. Desire itself, as such, may well be said to be neither pleasurable nor painful. That which is desired to be gained, and the condition of the self when it has been gained, are both called pleasurable. That which is desired to be avoided, and the condition of the self when it is not avoided are called painful.

(c) THE ESSENTIAL OBJECT AND CHARACTER OF LITERATURE.

Every desire is always accompanied by two more or less clear pictures in the imagination, one pleasant, of its fulfilment, and the other painful, of its defeat. The provision of pleasurable pictures, representations of the settings of pleasurable emotion-feelings or rāsaśās, is the
main business of one class of Poetry and Literature; but, of course, what may be r a s a to one person may be k u - r a s a (evil r a s a) to another differently constituted; and this is unavoidable.

The form of the poetry is allowed scant importance in the Indian science, though, in the West, metre, and to a less extent rhyme, have been held to be essential. Bain, and J. S. Mill before him, apparently approximate to the Indian view, which allows of such famous prose-poems as Kādambarī, Vāsavadattā etc., and, of course, includes the drama under poetry at large, as one of its species. Walt Whitman and his imitators also recognise in practice the accuracy of this view. It may be, however, that this view is correct only in principle and as a theory. In practice, the powerful additions made to the pleasures of poetry by metre and rhyme have considerably checked the growth of prose-poems and have thrown into the shade all but the very best. For similar reasons, just as the metrical poem is an advance upon the prose-poem, so recited poetry and the drama constitute an advance upon the metrical poem. To the musical effects of metre and rhyme, which enlist the services of the ear in furthering the pleasures of poetry, the drama adds the scenic effects which engage the eye also. The mental picture of the desired dénouement (referred to before) is, in the drama, made the vividest that is possible without
actually passing into the real. And hence the dictum "Amongst poems, the drama is the highest." For similar reasons, too, it is that dance and song of man and woman in company represent the culmination point of esthetic enjoyment, of pleasure, of 'moreness,' that is known to present humanity.

'Style' is obviously only a 'ruling passion' guiding the verbal expression. The very adjectives, 'dignified,' 'powerful,' 'pompous,' emotional,' 'sarcastic,' 'chaste,' etc., show this. To cultivate a style successfully is to cultivate the appropriate 'mood' so effectively that it becomes part of one's character and therefore automatically governs and shapes the utterance.

Form being thus discounted, it remains true that the primary business of literature as a whole, of all poetry, fiction, drama, and in a certain sense of biography, history, and narratives of travels also, is representation of Emotion-feelings (as distinguished from Emotion-desires) in their infinite combinations and permutations, as actually or potentially present in multifarious human life. A nation's literature is in truth that nation's instinctive effort to provide for each of its members vicarious experience of the Emotion-feelings of all its members in all its manifold variety of life—even as a world-system is nothing more nor less than a vast endeavor to provide for
its constituent Jivas direct experience of all possible pleasures and pains (corresponding to and being the actuals of Emotion-feelings), of all kinds of pleasures and pains possible within the spatial and durational limits of that particular world-system.

This also helps to explain how those writers come to be regarded as the greatest, and those works become the most permanent and the most prominent, that have seized and embodied the most permanent and prominent Emotion-feelings of humanity in the most remarkable manner.

So true is this that if the mental constitution of a race, a nation, be changed, all its literary idols and ideals would be replaced also. This truth is in fact embodied in all the trite expressions about change of fashion, change of taste, etc. Such expressions indeed appear trite only because applied to small and common matters. They are none the less true, and, in their full significance, important. What is true of the small is also true of the great. The histories of nations, the histories of races, the vast story of humanity as a whole—all are illustrations of changes of taste and changes of fashion. The inner life of the Self seeks ever new forms and ways of expression, expression of Emotion-desire and realisation of Emotion-feeling; and it is possible and instructive to read the stories of the different nations as the stories of the workings of single
ruling Passions and Emotions. But the basic Emotions—Love and Hate, Benevolence and Pride of heart, Humility and Fear—these persist throughout, however great the changes of taste as to the subtler combinations of them. They are understood always, at all times, in all places, and the great epics of the nations shall be always read and always honored because they comprehensively grasp and powerfully depict these basic Emotions. The subtler shades and combinations of them, on the other hand, elude the grasp of the general public, excite a temporary and evanescent interest, and remain confined to the few that by courtesy are called 'the poets of poets' of each time.

1 Thus: Indian story embodies Dharma, Greek, Beauty; Roman, Law; Persian, Dignity, and so on. See Annie Besant's Dharma.

2 As frequently noted elsewhere, at the present stage of humanity, the emotions cluster largely round the sexual emotion, or passion, as it is called when more intense and more physical. The latter appears largely in the class of literature to which the Katha-sarit-sagara, many Greek and Latin 'classics,' The Arabian Nights, Boccaccio's Decameron, Margaret's Hesperides, Gil Blas, many of Shakespeare's plays and poems (e.g. The Merry Wives of Windsor), and suchlike 'tales and stories' belong. In them all, the course and current of the human life is wound around the more or less obviously 'physical' aspect of love. Side by side with such works go the others, in which the physical side is more in the background, and the subtler and the more 'refined' and imaginative side is more prominently depicted. The two classes of works have thus gone together for thousands of years now, because both the sub-classes of Jivas, the 'younger'
EMOTION IN ART.

(d) ILLUSTRATIONS.

The rasas most common in the extant literatures of the world are, according to the Indian Science of Poetry, eight in number: (1) The Beautiful and Erotic; (2) the Comic; (3) the Pathetic; (4) the Heroic; (5) the Furious and Cruel; (6) the Fearful; (7) the Disgusting; and (8) the Sublime and Wonderful. A ninth rasa, śānta, the feeling of Peace and Renunciation of the world, is sometimes added to the list; but it is a rasa in a negative sense only, by opposition as it were to the rasas proper, whose gradual abolition constitutes the interest of the śānta. The rasa itself in actual life is to be found in all countries and times; wherever man has lived he has known frustration of desire, and the finer natures, i.e., the older or more advanced Jivas of every race, have drawn vairāgya and śānti and renunciation of the world from such frustration; but the poetical with the physical aspect predominant, and the somewhat older with developing ‘mental’ bodies, have been evolving side by side. The ‘passionate’ story suits the ‘younger’ Jiva, and the great cravings and blind devotions, the cunning, the devices and the frequent physical adventures, which go with it, agree with his dawning intellect; whereas the ‘emotional’ story appeals more to the other kind of Jiva with a more ‘inner,’ a less demonstrative, flow of feeling. Of course, these remarks apply to only two of the more typical classes, out of endless shades and mixtures.
representation and embodiment of this Emotion has been largely confined to India it appears.

The perusal of the above list at once gives rise to the question why poetry and literature allow a place to r as a s like the Furious, the Fearful, the Disgusting, and even the Pathetic. Why is it true, in the words of the ancient Indian poet, रसं बुक मङ्गो रस: “The highest of the r a s a s is Pathos”; and in those of the modern English singer,

Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought.

Why should there be such amazing outbreaks of the Horrible, the Disgusting, and the Cruel, in the literatures of the nations? Men desire only the pleasurable Emotion-feelings. And are not these painful ones? and if so, why are they cultivated?

The answer is to be found in all that has gone before, mainly in what has been said regarding morbid pleasures and pains; in the fact that these outbreaks in literature correspond with outbreaks in actual life.

The so-called ‘painful Emotion-feelings’ are (1) either not painful at all, but positively pleasurable, to the class of Jivas that seek them for their own sake; or (2) the scenes corresponding to them are necessary backgrounds for the play of the opposite emotions.

---

1 See p. 145, supra.

2 Shelley, The Skylark.
It has been said just now that with every Emotion-desire goes an Emotion-feeling, and that every Emotion-feeling is accompanied by two pictures in the imagination, one of the fulfilment of the desire and the other of its defeat. The former is pleasurable, and the latter only painful. And if this is so, it is easy to see how every Emotion-feeling that does not precede actual realisation in life may remain pleasurable.

Emotion-desires may loosely, and not accurately, be called pleasurable or painful in this sense, that the one set takes its rise in pleasure and the other in pain. In actual life the Emotion-feelings corresponding to the latter Emotion-desires are also painful. The painful picture is the most prominent in them; it is no longer imaginary; it is expected; the imagination has passed there into the more dense form of inference and expectation.

The Fearful. — An unarmed and defenceless man in the presence of a tiger feels the Emotion-desire of Fear—the desire to run away, to escape, to put distance and separation between himself and the animal. The Emotion-feeling here is purely painful, because the picture of the fulfilment of the desire is very weak indeed, while the other picture, matter of expectation, as just said, and not of imagination, is overpoweringly strong.

But let the incident occur not in real life but in a tale that we are reading. Now two kinds of
‘selves’ generally appreciate a story of danger and adventure: the actively timid spirit on the one hand, and the actively proud and strong spirit on the other. It looks like a contradiction in terms to say so, but he who has followed and seen reason to agree in the classification which ranges Pride and Fear in the same line, will easily see the truth of this also. The timid spirit contemplates the danger, the cause of Fear, and finds congenial occupation, interest, excitement, and expansion in devising plans to run away from the danger and avoid it. The pleasurable Emotion-feeling to it consists in the picture of successfully running away from the danger. This is the explanation of the fondness of children for blood-curdling stories, stories of ghosts and goblins and monsters and wild beasts, which make them shiver in ecstasies of fright. But in all these cases the enjoyment of the story and the eagerness for more of it would vanish at once if and as soon as it was realised by, really brought home to, the reader or listener, that there was actual danger present and no possibility of escape. In the other case, the proud and strong spirit also contemplates the danger, the cause of Fear, and finds congenial occupation, interest, excitement, and expansion, in devising plans to avoid the danger; but his plans are to avoid the danger not by running away from it but by suppressing it. The pleasurable Emotion-feeling to him consists in the picture of successfully coping
with and overpowering the danger in his own person in a similar situation.

Such seems to be the explanation of the existence of the literature of the Fearful.

The Cruel and the Disgusting.—The explanation of the literature of the Cruel and the Disgusting is similar. Those that are in sympathy with the corresponding Emotions enjoy such literature, and gloat over the destruction of the defeated victim or enemy in full sympathy with the author of the cruel act, the murderer it may be, or the successful schemer and intriguer, or the adulterer, etc. ¹

The Pathetic.—The opposite emotions also arise from the background of the above. The Pathetic. Thus ‘Pathos,’ ‘the Pathetic,’ is the counterpart of ‘the Terrible,’ ‘the Cruel,’ ‘the Disgusting,’ etc. The ‘sufferer’ naturally goes along with the author of suffering. In a scene thus involving the presence of both, are therefore present materials for the sympathy of both natures, the virtuous and the vicious. The former, sympathising with the sufferer, experience the rāsa of kāruṇā, Pathos, Pity. Their Benevolence is strongly aroused, and the picture

¹ Max Nordau’s book, on Degeneration, gives some apt instances of the outbreak of such evil emotions in life and in so-called realistic literature, even in times of peace. That they are very common in times of war is, of course, known to everybody. See also James, Principles of Psychology, II, p. 413.
of the fulfilment of their desire to help is the source of their enjoyment of a tragedy.

Let us see what happens in such a case. In an emotion of Benevolence, by pseudo-identification of the one, the superior, Jiva with the other, the inferior, Jiva, the former feels the pain of the latter. The desire arises in him to avoid that which is causing the pain, which is making the latter inferior, small, less. He forthwith tries to remove that which is causing the inferiority. The Self—wherein lies unity—being predominant in this relation, and the unity of the two being felt, there results inevitably the feeling of moreness and of pleasure, so far, to the superior; and the pain which is caused by the giving of a portion of the upāḍhī (not-self) to the other, to relieve his inferiority—though painful no doubt—is lost in the predominant pleasure. And, therefore, is 'the quality of mercy doubly blessed.' The superior feels the joy of identification of the two selves; and the inferior also partly that, and largely that of the gain to his upāḍhī and relief of positive pain. But let there be no doubt that to the material body, the not-self portion of the superior, the act of giving is a painful one. The mere fact of an unnoticed degree in small cases should not be allowed to hide the underlying truth which is recognised confessedly in all the associations of the word 'sacrifice.' That an act of self-sacrifice is pleasurable is true only so far as the Self-portion
of the Jiva is concerned; not as regards the Not-Self-portion. And in this last fact lurks the danger of much exercise of the emotion of the Pathetic out of actual life, which danger will be shortly referred to.

To return: while the action of adjusting the inequality is in progress, in fact as soon as the desire to associate with the inferior and lift him up arises in the mind of the superior, there also arises in his mind the picture of the end he seeks to secure and of what he seeks to avoid. The former, being a picture of the completed ‘association,’ and therefore of gained ‘moreness’ is pleasurable. The other is painful. The former picture is sought to be realised in outer life, in action, in reality. The other is similarly avoided; so much so that even benevolent people turn away from suffering they cannot help; it gives them pain only, without any possibility of the pleasure of relieving it, and they cannot bear to see misery that is hopeless. This in actual life. But in imagination, in literature, whatever the end of the story, whether a completed tragedy or not, the imagination always contemplates the possibility of relieving the distress and so can find enjoyment.

When such an Emotion is called up in poetry, by delineating the appropriate occasion and circumstances, the reading Jiva naturally, if he be so constituted as to be in sympathy with the subject (that is to say, if Benevolence be an Emotion
congenial to his self), pictures predominantly the pleasurable *dénouement* which he himself would create if he had the opportunity, and revolves it constantly in mind, exercising his benevolent propensities in all ways possible under the circumstances; and so he derives pleasure from the poetry. His ‘benevolent self’ is, so to say, intensified, made more, in the pictured *dénouement*.

But if he were not in sympathy with the subject, the poetry could have no charm, no interest for him; and if his Jiva belonged distinctly to the opposite class, then any expressions in the work calculated to evoke Benevolence or appearing to demand Pity would be positively painful to him, and he would only side with and enjoy the description of the deeds of the author of the suffering, in the work.

Therefore a great danger underlies the enjoyment of such scenes of pathos by even the benevolent and the full of pity.

There have been human beings who, originally virtuously inclined and taking pleasure in deeds of charity and help and service to others, have begun to take pleasure in mere tales or dramatic representations of such, and so have gradually sunk into being contented with purely imaginary exercise of their Benevolence. And they have fallen further, if their worldly position has given them the requisite power, into that awful condition of the apparently unintelligible human
monster who, not content with imaginary scenes for his imaginary Pity, devises actual real scenes of cruelty and torture to human and other beings in order to excite and expand his ‘pitying self.’ Lest this seem too far-fetched, consider the case of singing-birds separated from their mates and confined in different cages in order to make them sing more passionately and sweetly. The very commonness of the practice hides the subtle and refined cruelty underlying it, which is sometimes not even redeemed, as it partially, and only partially, is and can be, by the ‘petting’ of the animals; and it is no more noticed than the true significance referred to before of the fattening of animals for the slaughter-yard. Who knows but that the refined and cultured men that sat on the throne of decadent Rome, Caligula and Nero and their kin—who have been prominent in all nations in the days of their disruption, even as foul worms in a putrefying corpse; who were common in the mediæval ages of Europe as well as of Asia—who knows but that they have been really such ‘aberrations of nature,’ and not only wild savages, with merely the instincts of Hate predominant in them. These phenomenal Jivas seem to appear largely only at those stages in human history when a turning-point is reached, when the Self and the Not-Self elements of the Jiva are both almost equally strong, when the struggle between them is the severest, when Pity is necessary to indulge in, and yet the
pain of the sacrifice of the Not-Self, alluded to before, is so great as to prevent a real and true indulgence of it.

Of course, it may be that in any one or all of the particular instances referred to above, the Jivas were only purely vicious natures, in whom the element of Not-Self, and consequently the forces of separation, were overpoweringly predominant, and who therefore took a pleasure in the cruel sights of the arena only to gratify their Emotion-desires of Hatred and Pride. But the other view is not altogether useless. It supplies a possible explanation in certain cases which are otherwise inexplicable.

And in that explanation, perhaps, may be found a reason why the science of the Indian drama tacitly discourages tragedy-writing; why tragedies, songs 'Of old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago,' 'Sweetest songs that tell of saddest thought,' 'Songs of the separation of lovers,' belong not to the strongest and most vigorous stage in the story of a nation, but perhaps to the period of its weakness. The Indian view is so strong on this point that the author of the Uttara-Rāma-charīta—than which it is not easy to conceive a finer study of Pathos in any language or literature—has given a happy ending to his work, directly contradicting even the traditional history of the sage Vālmīki.
It is desirable in many ways that the valuable emotion of Pity should not be wasted on air. The literature and the scenic representation of the Pathetic should be only sparingly allowed, and used principally for the cultivation and development of the finer feelings, when such is deemed expedient and possible, in view of the ever-present danger of arousing sympathy in a vicious nature with the evil characters of the drama. In the words of Rāma to his lifelong servant and ceaseless devotee Hanūmān: "I do not wish at all to pay thee back the kindness thou hast done to me; to wish this were to wish that thou shouldst be in pain and need my help; and such wish is the wish of the false friend and not the true." To be always seeking in imagination, i.e., in imagined scenes of suffering, which is very different from prayer for the well-being of the world—for the gratification of one's benevolent propensities, is to be always desiring that others should be in misfortune. For similar reasons too, public instinct has always, in all times and places, looked more or less askance at the profession of 'acting'; for though, in a sense, the very quintessence of all the arts combined, the very perfection of them all together, yet it is also inseparable from 'putting on,' 'pretence,' 'masquerading,' 'make-believe' and 'insincerity.' So closely do good and evil elbow each other in
human life and so difficult is it to distinguish between them always.\(^1\)

It is clear that (1) The Beautiful and Erotic, (3) the Pathetic, and (8) the Sublime and Wonderful belong to the side of Love and Attraction, while (5) the Furious and Cruel, (6) the Fearful, and (7) the Disgusting, belong to the side of Hate and Repulsion. The interest of (2) the Comic, and (4) the Heroic is mixed. The Comic consists of Ridicule and Good-humor; while the Heroic is similarly made up of Pride and Self-Sacrifice.

\((e)\) **THE OTHER ARTS.**

What is true of poetry and literature, in that they are representations of the Emotions, is also true of painting, sculpture, music, architecture, and the other Fine Arts of the past and the future, with this difference; that in all these, in some more than in others, but still in all, the purely sensuous element, as distinguished from the emotional, is greater than in poetry and literature.

From what has been said above as to the nature of Emotion and as to the factors involved in it (ch. iv., vi., and x.) it will have appeared that Emotion, as distinguished from merely physical and sensuous craving, appears only between Jîva and Jîva. There is no Emotion between feeder and food,

\(^1\) These remarks might be regarded as illustrating one possible interpretation of *Bhagavad Gîtâ*, iv. 16, 17, 18.
It may be observed here that 'art for art's sake,' and 'science for science's sake,' have been looked upon in India, especially in the older, 'pre-classical,' times, before the Scythian and Greek invasions, before Vikrama and Kālidāsa, with depreciation and distrust, as more or less mischievous and dangerous. 'Art and Science for the sake of life,' for promoting the recognised ends of life (about which more later) have been always approved and encouraged. All 'thinking' artists and scientists are agreed herein. And hence the indefeasible and still lingering tendency in Sanskrit works, always 'to point a moral.' The view will be appreciated if we compare running, living streams, in the most rugged natural setting, with stagnant waters confined in the most highly and artificially ornamented reservoirs. The remarks made above in connection with 'the danger of over-indulgence in imaginary benevolence,' and 'the comparative absence of tragedy from Sanskrit literature' may also help to explain the reasons for this feeling. In
other forms of art sometimes do not aim at representing or arousing Emotion in this sense at all—a landscape, a sea-scene, a wordless melody may appeal to the purely sensuous consciousness, and may be 'beautiful' only as pleasing exclusively the eye or the ear. But this happens seldom; a 'human interest' is generally given to his work by the author; he introduces elements which arouse emotions of Love, or sympathetic Fear, or Pathos, or Heroism. Even architecture is either 'devotional,' or 'grand and sublime,' or 'stern and forbidding,' or 'strong and massive,' or 'dull and lifeless,' and so forth. At the present stage of humanity, combinations of Sense and Emotion are the most attractive and the most appreciated. That music is the most honored which is not only pleasant to the ear but also expresses an Emotion powerfully, either by suggestion and association, or

history, too, as a matter of fact, the peculiar stage of mind, the peculiar form of self-consciousness, which goes with the demand of 'art for art's sake' and 'science for science's sake,' instead of 'both for the sake of human life,' has generally marked the setting in of deterioration, the beginning of degeneration, the 'culmination' and ending of progress, the completion of the half-cycle of material progress and pursuit. Such culmination would be healthy if the next step of the self-consciousness were deliberate renunciation and self-sacrifice, the striving after moksha; otherwise it is unhealthy. Ordinarily, health consists in always looking ahead, and not stopping short, wherein begin stagnation and decay.
directly, by appropriate words, and so far is poetry. That sculpture, that painting, receives the most praise, which is not only faultless as a masterpiece of form or color, but also embodies a powerful Emotion with which the beholder’s temperament is in consonance.

It has been observed that in the power of works of Art to arouse pleasurable Emotion in a large number of persons, lies the possibility of its subserving the high object of ‘social consolidation’; this is nothing else, it should be noted, than increase of sympathy by increased realisation of the Common Self in consequence of pleasures commonly shared.

---

1 H. R. Marshall’s *Aesthetic Principles*, pp. 82-84.
CHAPTER XI.

THE IMPORTANCE AND PLACE OF EMOTION IN HUMAN LIFE AND THE SOURCE OF ITS POWER.

Bearing the facts set forth above in mind, it is not difficult to see that all life is only an unfoldment of the possibilities of Emotion-desires and Emotion-feelings. Every page, every paragraph, every sentence of every book of literature, directly embodies a phase of emotion. And it may be said, in a certain sense correctly, that such is the case with even every book of science, though indirectly, for the direct object of such is the collection of cognitions and not the representation of emotions. Very instructive exercise is it for students to try to specify these phases of Emotion. For literature is only a representation of actual life, more or less accurate. And every action, every movement, every spoken word, of every individual human being, and again his whole life
considered as a unity and in the mass, will be found to represent one 'ruling passion,' if he be properly studied.

Even as a single atom acted on simultaneously by the motions of millions upon millions of other atoms has one motion, which is the single resultant of all these numberless motions plus its own special motion, so the whole of every human life may be reduced to a unity of Emotion-desire and Emotion-feeling. And from this standpoint, as mere object of observation and study, each life, each phase of Emotion, stands on a level with all others. The picking and choosing amongst them comes later. For the time, the student only sees that Emotion-desire stands at the very centre of life; immediately directs all actions and movements whatsoever, as means of its own gratification; and indirectly guides the collection of cognitions, the acquisition of knowledge, as means to the proper performance of those actions.

From this standpoint, the life of an emperor of continents, the history of a conqueror of nations, the path of a Teacher of the worlds, is on the same level with the life of a nameless beggar, of a long-forgotten victim of proud tyranny, of the most ignorant of the ignorant. Each represents one of the infinite phases of the Abstract Self, Prāṭyāgāṃṭmā, in Relation with the Not-Self, Mūlaprakṛti.
Despite extremes of variation. Despite extremes of variation.

That such and such a particular one of all these phases, looms most largely before the gaze of a nation or a race, at any one time and place, is only part of the arrangement by which each phase gets its due turn. So long as humanity is different-sexed it will remain true that:

All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,
All are but ministers of love,
And feed his sacred flame.

It is the same with other Emotions. There comes a time in the life of every Jiva when the Self insists on exercising its omnipotence in the startling phase of the power of suicide, of denying and killing itself, when it says: "Only the Not-Self is; only matter is; there is no such thing as I, as the Self, the Spirit; eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die."

There comes another time when it runs to the opposite extreme of belittling and denying the Not-Self, and says: "There is no such thing as matter at all; no such thing as Not-Self; all is Spirit, all is I;" and it adds: "Take no thought for the morrow," drawing the same conclusion from infinitely different premises—the truth, as ever, lying between.

Thus, various phases of Emotion have their reign and dominance in human story by turns, and the literature of the day reflects them.

1 Coleridge: Ode to Love.
But, apart from this general importance of Emotion in life, what is the special source of its power in particular instances, what is the special food on which Emotion-desire nourishes itself and grows overpoweringly strong so as to sweep away reason—on ever so many occasions in life? This food is imagination. It has been generally remarked that imagination is an essential factor in all the more remarkable forms of Emotion. Thus, there is no horror where there is no imagination; an actual battle-field, with thousands slaughtered, is not so horrible as a mysterious murder. The reason of this is to be found in the very nature of Emotion as explained in chapter iv. and the laws which govern its provocation as stated in chapter ix. An Emotion is a desire plus an intellectual consciousness. Where the desire does not find immediate vent in action, it works in and around the intellectual consciousness, as expectation, as imagination, and thereby gathers strength in the manner described in the course of chapter x. But that strength is, because of the very manner in which it gathers, not real, true, and enduring strength, and when sought to be utilised in action it very often fails. This is very noticeable in much modern urban life. Because of the increase of intelligence, life has become largely emotional—in theosophical terminology, the astral consciousness is developed highly—and immense amounts of
misery and happiness are gone through by human beings for causes purely airy—as they would be called from the standpoint of the physical body. A very slight physical matter, some careless piece of behavior or mismanagement of affairs, entirely unimportant and trivial in itself, is made the basis of a large amount of imagined pleasant or painful situations and consequences and resulting pleasantness or unpleasantness. It should be noted that some basis, however slight, in physical conduct, is absolutely indispensable. The attempt to separate Emotion and hold it apart altogether from Sense is as futile as the endeavor to give a value to money apart from the things it can purchase. As the true use and destiny and fulfilment of the latter is purchase of articles, so the true fulfilment of the being of the former is wholesome, righteous vent in action in actual life. The non-recognition and non-realisation of this essential fact is the reason why, so very frequently, so-called spiritual loves 1 begun with-

1 See, in this connection, the footnote at p. 57, supra, as to other reasons why love passes into lust and vice versa. It must be obvious from all that has gone before that there are three main types of love, the parental, the conjugal, and the filial. What is vaguely called spiritual or non-physical or 'pure' love, when analysed, will always be found to come under either the first or the third. But, it is clear, neither is, in reality, wholly devoid of material considerations, in the strict sense, for the simple reason that spirit and matter do not exist
out definite ideals or with hazy ones, gradually descend into hysterics and idiocy, or, worse still, into sexual immorality and crime; and large fortunes accumulated by un-farsighted parents for mere miserliness and avarice, and not applied to righteous human needs, find their end in the dissipations of profligate descendants.

Apart from each other. Also, in these circumstances, the parental and filial types of love, where not fixed by blood-bonds and conventions, tend to pass into the conjugal, and, vice versa, the latter to diverge into the two others, for reasons involved in the equalising and 'unifying' power of love, and in the separating power of lust-oppression, taken together with the fact of each Jiva's alternation between pravrāti and nivrāti, egoism and altruism. For instances, see the description in the Pañcaratna Purāṇa of how the rishis, holy saints and sages, by excess of (filial) devotion to Viṣṇu, became the wives of Kṛṣṇa in a later birth; or, in Thackeray's Esmond of how a lady out of excess of (parental) affection, married a young man who had all along regarded her as a mother and called her so. It has been generally noted, that before marriage, a certain amount of contrast of feature and nature is necessary in order that young man and young woman may feel attracted towards each other; it has also been observed correctly, that after a certain number of years of married life, happily matched couples tend to resemble each other in nature and even features. Both these observations are correct, and the reconciliation apparently lies in what has been said above, of the gradual natural changes of types of love from one to another in normal individual lives. The psycho-physical explanation of the unblessedness of incestuous
The power of 'soulful' eyes, the source of many a young person's distractions, of eyes 'pensive and melancholy,' of glances 'fascinating' or 'weird' or 'serpent-like,' of looks 'suggestive' or 'speaking whole volumes,' is exactly this, that they marriages at the present stage may also probably be found in these same considerations. At this stage, when the 'separative,' egoistic, intelligence is sharply developed, a certain amount of 'lust' proper with its involved separateness, opposition, contrast, and the breaking down and overpowering of that opposition, (disguised, of course, and putting on the form of supplementation of each other, otherwise love and union would become impossible) is apparently necessary to a normal and fruitful marriage; for so only is the whole of all the two-sided constitution of each spouse brought into play. To these psychological circumstances, there will probably be found to correspond, on further investigation, organic chemico-physical affinities and antipathies between the individuals concerned. In these considerations will also be found the explanation of why love, unreciprocated, so often turns into active dislike—simply, because the desire to receive material pleasures in exchange is defeated. Self-deception, and the endeavor to convince others, is very common on this point: 'My love is pure; I want nothing; I want only affection in return.' But 'affection in return' means absolutely nothing else than the actual services and deeds and material pleasures and presents and sensations (however distant and subtle) that go with and realise affection. To understand this is to possess the means of resisting the wrong emotion, the tendency to hate and anger in such cases, by persistently remembering that the involved selfishness is unworthy of a Jiva on the path of renunciation.
are ‘suggestive’ of indefinite possibilities, and ‘speak whole volumes’—but when required in actual daily domestic life to throw all these ‘suggestions’ and ‘speeches’ into actualities, they naturally often fail woefully, and false expectations are properly disappointed. A single copper has often sufficed to build a castle, but only in the air; it will not buy one meal in common life.

As to what the significance is (for even exaggerated sentiments and castle-building being facts, ought to have a significance), from the point of view of evolution, of the endeavor to withdraw the emotions from the senses, the endeavor to live in the emotions rather than the senses, when such an endeavor is extensively observable in a large class of humanity, e.g., in an excess of imagination and literature over action, an excess of fine-drawn sentiment about an impossible spiritual condition absolutely free from all touch of matter—that significance seems to be that that class is seeking new senses in which to vent its emotions, the present ones having grown stale; that biological changes in the physical constitution of the race are impending.

Notice, in the current literature at the end of the nineteenth century, how the sex problem is being threshed out from all points of view, and how its sensuous and actual side is being thrown more and more into the background by the
mere Emotion-feeling element; how the feeling of ennui and weariness is spreading more and more; how there seems to be steadily growing, amongst men and women of culture and intelligence, a sense of disappointment and dissatisfaction with the present order and arrangement of nature. If this sense of dissatisfaction and weariness were to grow sufficiently strong and extensive, then it is conceivable that after the lapse of ages, after many relapses into the old conditions and temporary revivals of satisfaction and pleasure in them, radical changes in the physical constitution of man and his surroundings might come about, and humanity go back again through the bi-sexual to the a-sexual condition, with corresponding entire modification of the details—not the essentials—of intellectual and emotional constitution also, as some of the ancient books teach us.
CHAPTER XII.

THE HIGH APPLICATION OF THE SCIENCE OF THE EMOTIONS.

What is the practical application of the Science of the Emotions, a very brief exposition of which has been thus far attempted? How may this knowledge be utilised for the bettering of human life?

(a) To whom the Science is addressed.—What is true of all other knowledge is true of this. We know, and we strive in accordance with, and with the help of, our knowledge. But between the knowing and the striving there intervenes the wish for the object which is to be secured by the striving. Between the cognition and the action there interposes the Emotion, the desire, that connects the two. So, to connect the knowledge of the Science of the Emotions with the action for the improvement of humanity, there is needed the real, earnest, true wish to improve one’s own life and that of others. Otherwise the science is useless, as a looking-glass unto the blind.
Perhaps worse than useless. The unscrupulous may wrench it to suit their own evil purposes.

This wish cannot be forced. It must be left to come of itself. To what has been said before as to the broad division of Jīvas into two classes, and of the passing of each Jīva from the one into the other class, it should be added that the wish must come to each Jīva, at some time or other, in the course of its evolution, when that Jīva ceases to live for itself. When after a period of viṣṇāḍa and vaiṛāgya and blankness, of surfeit with the experiences of worldliness and the path of pursuit, of consequent great weariness and desolation, it seeks—still with a remnant of that purest selfishness which is the very beginning of unselfishness—for peace and rest and quiet for itself, then it realises that Peace, and realises in that same moment also that it has to live for others, by the supreme Law of the World-Process, which compels it to repay in love to others what it has itself received by love from others. And then the cṣaṭa-ṭrayam, the threefold ‘seeking’—for putra, viṭṭa, and loka, for progeny, for wealth, and for name and place in the world, i.e., for perpetuation and expansion of the self in children, in material possessions, and in the mind and good opinion of the world—which craving led it into the incurring of the rṇa-ṭrayam, the threefold debt—to the Piṭrs or Ancestors,
the Ṛṣis or Gods, and the Rṣhis or Teachers, respectively, (who severally give progeny, worldly possessions, and mind and knowledge,)—is reversed, and forces it to gird up its loins to discharge that r na - tar y a m, by transmuting the more and more personal e ṣ h a ṅ ā into the more and more impersonal kā m a, a ṛ ṇ h a and ṇ h a r m a, respectively—the three recognised ends of the worldly life, all under the dominance of m o k ś ha, the ultimate end of the unworldly life, by, respectively, rearing new generations (pu ṭ r o ṭ pā ṇ a n a), maintaining the world's stores of physical and super-physical wealth (ḍ ā n a - y a j a n a, etc.), and keeping alight the torch of knowledge (a ṇ h y - ṛ a y a n a, etc.). Then the Jīva sees the truth of what Kṛṣṇa said: "He who helpeth not to keep revolving the wheel of the cycles thus set going, but seeketh the pleasure of his own senses and liveth in sin, he liveth in vain indeed, O son of Pṛthā."

The reason why such time must come to every Jīva must be sought in the Metaphysic of the World-Process—of its How and Why.² It is enough to say here that in that time of v.ai r ā g y a and desolation which comes on the Jīva when the desire that guided it onwards down

---

1 Bhagavad-Gītā, iii. 16.
The Path of Action 1, fails and dies, all Sensations

1 The Path of Action is the path of attachment to, of engagement in, of pursuit of, the material life, the arc of the Jiva's descent into denser and denser matter, as opposed to the Path of Renunciation, the arc of its reascent into spirit, back through the planes of subtler and subtler matter through which it has 'descended' to its present condition. It may be said that almost the whole of the ancient Indian theory and practice of Life is embodied in these two words and their endless variants: Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti (Smṛtis and Purāṇas), sa-kāma and niṣh-kāma, sakti and a-sakti (Gītā, sarga and aparārga (Nyāya), Ṛukkha and nis-śreyas (Vaisheṣhika), karma and niṣh-karmya (Mīmāṃsā), Īhā and upārāma (Sāmkhyā), vyuṭṭhāna and nirodha (Yoga), bandha and mokṣha (Vedānta) sañcāra and prati-sañcāra (Jaina), tanha or tiṣṭhāna and nirvāṇa (Buddha), sin and salvation (Christian), evolution and involution, integration and disintegration (Modern Science). The underlying idea of all these pairs is the same. Each pair expresses only a somewhat different aspect or shade of the same fact. Indeed, it may be said, all pairs of opposites whatsoever are but expressions of the infinite shades of that same fact. The subtle final how and why and what, have led to much controversy and difference of opinion, though, even there, there is a more or less vaguely felt or thought unanimity, viz., that the ultimate secret is a secret, anirvachanīya, 'indescribable.' But the fact of the rhythmic swing remains indefeasible, patent. And on and around that fact was built the whole 'Code of Life,' in and through the physical and the superphysical worlds, of the ancient Indian Law-givers.

Ethically, the end of life, the sumnum bonum, for the first half, the arc of pravṛtti, is, in strictness, kāmā, per-
and Emotions—the highest, noblest, grandest, personal pleasure, taking, selfishness, worldliness, the contraction of debts. But if the matter were so put to a not very careful listener, kāma in him would defeat itself and commit suicide, in a riot of excess. The due realisation of kāma, of a human being, at least, is possible only in and by means of organised society. Hence, selfishness must be restricted and restrained by dhāma, individual liberty must be governed by law, the law of give-and-take in essence, without which that organised society would be impossible. The Law-giver, as law-giver, therefore, leaves kāma to take care of itself, knowing full well that it will always do so even more than is necessary, and insists on dhāma, with detail of natural penal consequences of breach thereof. As friendly counsel- lour, he also recommends or rather permits (for it too is self-assertive) as another end, aṛṭha, wealth, for without it kāma would remain unrefined, without due development, poor, poverty-stricken, unestheticised. Hence we have three ends ordained for the worldly half of life, viz., virtue, profit, and pleasure; virtue, for thence only profit; profit, for thence only pleasure. Health requires the balanced exercise of all three aspects of consciousness, cognition (or study), action (or physical work and exercise), desire (or play and enjoyment).

For the second half of life, the unworldly, the unselfish, that of giving, the giving up to others of worldly things and personal pleasures, the repayment of debts by self-sacrifice for others—for this the end prescribed is mokṣha or mukti, in all its many senses, as the most prominent. There are two other sub-ends here also, viz., bhakti (love of a Personal Ideal) and śākti or siddhī, ('divine' or superphysical powers), corresponding to kāma (which however, is not a sub-end, but the main end on the other side) and aṛṭha, respectively. But they are kept in the
dazzling and enchaining the mind, or the lowest, background by the Law-giver for reasons corresponding conversely to those for which kāma and artha are also kept in the background. As kāma, and also artha, obtrude themselves without help on the other side, so bhakti and śākta are naturally unavoidable on this. As artha can be kept before the eye on that path only by strenuous effort, even so mokṣa or nishta-kāma-ṭā (the positive opposite, and not the mere negative absence of kāma) on this. Very difficult it is for an embodied Jīva to realise the first truth of Vedānta and Buddhism that life, embodied and individual life, in any form, is essentially not worth living—because all its pleasure is embittered with pain, and, even more, because it cannot be maintained without the intense selfishness of unremittantly absorbing other individual lives. (Yoga-Sūtra and Bhāṣya, ii. 15; Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and Kaumudi, verse 50; Brahma-Sūtra and Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya, i. i. 4; Light on the Path, i. 4; etc., etc.). The glamor of personality is not easily got rid of; righteousness, self-sacrifice, saintliness, holiness, martyrdom, saviorship, the divine glories of yogabhisakti—through all these the forcible passion for personal stature, the subtly self-centred wish to be 'oneself a savior' rather than the wholly self-oblivious wish merely to help or 'save' others, may run and often does run, if the Purāṇas are to be credited. But if the goal of moksha is borne strenuously in mind by the aspirant, then that passion's strength is sapped, and it runs in ever feebler current, and all these states are regarded as inevitable and regrettable stages (—all covered by vairāgya, Yoga-Sūtra, iii. 37—) on the journey back; and then bhakti and śākta take their due position in relation to mokṣa.

While such are the 'ends' for the individual Jīva, the one sole end, which is also its own means, of the World-Process,
vilest, meanest, disgusting and revolting it—are all, is 'alternation,' give-and-take, justice which joins together and sums up both selfishness and unselfishness, equilibration, balance.

The King and Law-giver, as being a 'reflection' of this Providence of Balance, ordains and maintains laws for both kinds of Jivas subordinate to him, so that in the total result, the 'wheel of life' is kept going in his land, as in the World-Process at large. And so, our own Primal Father, Manu, Ādi-Manu or Adam, summing up past cycles in his memory, has framed a complete 'Code of Life' in the six words mentioned before, viz., the two paths and the four ends, and eight more besides, viz., the four classes, castes or vocations, and the four stages of each life. In these fourteen words and the details expounding them, may be found rules and laws and dharma covering all possible situations that can ever arise in the life of two-sexed humanity. In this scheme of his, if it were worked in the right spirit, without egotism, with due attention to both rights and duties, privileges and responsibilities, regarding both equally as constituent halves of dharma, and without grasping of the one and avoidance of the other, there would be found solutions for all the problems that would ever arise in the most complicated organisations of our race: problems, as mentioned in a previous note, p. 117, psycho-physical, domestic, social, economical and political; and their subordinate problems, regarding religious observances and moral and religious instruction and provision for or neglect of other worlds; physical development, health and sanitation; over and under-population; sex and marriage and conjugal relations; education; vocations and livelihood; professions, occupations, castes and classes; poverty and want of work; labor and capital; etiquette, mutual behavior, manners and customs; war and military expenditure; forms of govern-
without one single, solitary exception, seen to be

ment and national ideals, aristocracy, bureaucracy, demo-

cracy, and so on. Whole trainloads and shiploads of ink and
paper are wasted daily in the form of journals, magazines,
dailies, weeklies, books, pamphlets, all eternally going round
and round the same dozen or score of problems and making
no progress. Every remedy is suggested except the right
one. Just as, the older medical men and medical science
grow, the more they come back to dieting and nature-cures
from the endless drugs of their younger days, which only
produce new diseases, even so, when political science and
politicians are sufficiently old, they will have to go back to
the simple rules of the Manus, Budhhas, and Christs.

It is said the world has moved onward and cannot go back.
This is a mistake. The world is going both back and for­

wards, always; it is always moving round and round in
spirals. It is the mission of theosophical literature to bring
this idea home to modern humanity. If it succeeds, well for
the present races; the Manu’s ways will be adopted and
adapted, mutatis mutandis, quietly, and progress made
peacefully—for they are the only practical ways in which the
just maxim of true Socialism, (which is the same as Universal
Brotherhood and the joint Human Family,) viz., “From
each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs,”
can be really carried out in daily life. Otherwise, Arma­
geddons, Mahabharatas, and then—Manu’s scheme again.
To realise this significance and justness of Manu’s Code of
Life by attempting other schemes and finding them vain,
seems to be the main purpose of the fifth sub-race; to practice
that Code deliberately, the purpose of the sixth sub-race. The
Sixth Root-Race will probably realise Universal Brotherhood
in a fuller sense by gradually transcending sex-difference.
The child of Manu cannot get beyond “The Whole of
human wisdom”—as the books describe it—concentrated
THE HIGH APPLICATION.

The general correspondence, by predominance and not by exclusive definition, of the main facts of human life and organisation referred to above, may be shown thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Samvīt or Consciousness.</th>
<th>2. Shudra, 'man,' in general (the lower servant.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Jñāna or Cognition.</td>
<td>Brāhmaṇa or the Teacher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Ikṣa chhā or Desire.</td>
<td>Kṣatrita or the Protector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Kriyā or Action.</td>
<td>Vaishya or the Merchant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Sannyāsī or the wandering Renouncer (the higher servant.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Brahmachāri or the Student.</th>
<th>B. Gṛhasṭha or the Householder and 'private' worker.</th>
<th>C. Vanaprastha or the retired forest-dweller, the public worker.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Moksha or Emancipation.

- Dharma or virtue.
- Kāma or pleasure.
- Artha or profit.

5. Vāsanā or the wish to live.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Lokaiśhāna or the wish for name and fame.</th>
<th>B. Putraishāna, for progeny.</th>
<th>C. Viṭṭaiśhāna, for wealth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. Karma-banda or the bonds of Karma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rshi-rna, the debt to the Sages.</th>
<th>Piṭr-rna, to the Progenitors, lares and penates.</th>
<th>Deva-rna, to the Gods.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

7. Dharma or right-duty.

- Adhyayana or study and teaching.
- Puṭroṭpāda, the rearing of progeny.
- Dāna-ya jana, distribution of wealth.
ness and dream. In that time all the old motives fail, because the very fount of all such motives, the desire for experiences, is exhausted. But the one motive, the one desire, if it may be so called, remains, viz., the desire for Self-preservation, for Self-understanding. This desire is the instinctive grasping by the Self of Its own immortality in Its abstract, Prātyagātmā, aspect. Such is the supreme Love and Compassion of the Self for the Self that It always blesses Itself, mānabhruvamhiḥḥyāsaṁ, "May I never not be, may I always be." Out of this desire rises inevitably, necessarily, without fail, the understanding of the universal nature of the Self. This understanding is the essential liberation of which a great one has said: "Mokṣha is not a change of conditions but of condition," of the attitude of the Jīva to its environment.

1 See foot-note at p. 2, supra. In a certain sense a ham-kāra, egoism, is at its intesnest at this point, preliminary to emergence in the All-Self-Consciousness, like electricity brought to a focus preliminary to disappearance in space. The involved 'pessimism' is accompanied with a thousand aberrations of mind, at this stage, rājasī and tāmasī budhī, but the conditioning 'search' for the One corrects them all, and gradually the world that appeared all awry, acquires straightness, the fever-crisis passes into convalescence.

2 Yoga-Sūtra, Vyāsa-Bhāṣya, ii. 9; where the words are applied and interpreted in a different reference.
After the coming of such time is the Science of the Emotions mostly helpful. The Jiva cannot fully understand and realise the true meaning of Love and Hate, till it has, in some moment or other of its life, risen beyond them both into, and preserves the memory of, the region in which neither has existence and from which both take their birth. But having once seen them in their bareness and essence, having realised how all the Emotions are on the same level from a certain standpoint, the Jiva can thenceforth deliberately choose those on the side of Love—it is impossible for him to choose otherwise after such vision of Truth—for the use of humanity.

From that time onwards, with ever clearer vision, the Jiva, looking before and after, understanding the way it has come, understanding also the way it has to go back, knowing the nature of the desires that led it 'forwards,' into denser and denser material life and would now hold it there—the Jiva rises above them by that very knowledge, for to know is to be above and beyond that which is known; and day after day he uses them for the good of others, throwing off a

---

1 *Bhagavad-Gītā*, xvi. 7; see also xviii. 30.
2 *See Yoga-Sūtra*, i. 33.
fetter every now and then from his own limbs or from those of another, knowing that he cannot rid himself or others of all at once, until the final Peace is gained at the end of the destined world-cycle.

True it is what Kṛṣṇa said:

"The Jīva enwrapped in a h a m - kā r a (the feeling of a separate self), thinketh 'I am the doer.'"

True also is his riddle:

"All beings follow their nature; what shall restraint avail?"

But the truth is not as so many interpretations put it—an advice to feel a hopeless helplessness in the presence of a crushing, irresistible, and relentless Fate—an advice to follow blindly the instincts and impulses of one's lower nature, whether good or evil.

Such is not the truth. The truth is that the statements are an explanation, and not at all a direction. Wherever the feeling of Aham, of I, Self, Ego, is, there also is the feeling of 'freedom,' of 'power to act.' If the latter is an illusion, it is only because the former, in its individualised form, is an illusion too. Just as the separate self is a reflexion, in a mass of the Not-

---

1 More on this subject will be found in The Science of Peace, pp. 155-157.
THE HIGH APPLICATION.

Self, of the united, the abstract Self, the Praṭyāgāṭmā, so too, and in the same degree, is the feeling of free-will a reflexion therein of the 'unlimitedness,' the non-limitation by any else, of that Praṭyāgāṭmā. The two go hand-in-hand. It is not right to say 'I am,' and at the same time also to say 'I am compelled absolutely by something else than I.' The whole compels all parts, equally. The whole does not compel any one part by preference; nor can any one part compel any other part, absolutely; and compulsion which is equal for all is compulsion for none. The nigrāha, restraint, in the verse, means restraint by one weaker part exercised against another stronger part of, and not the whole of, prakṛti. For, otherwise, restraint is also part of prakṛti. And advice and counsel and direction, instruction and command, are addressed, and should be addressed, only where the possibility of their proving effective, of their being listened to and followed, is already in the bud. Were it not so, advice and instruction, and deliberation between two possible courses, and choice had all long been abolished from this world. The truth underlying them is that he to whom they are addressed and recommended, however outwardly impervious and adverse to them, has in him, by mere fact of being human like him who addresses them,
The need and significance of counsel; and of why the counsel of this science may be addressed to all.

the possibility of the wish to follow them. ¹

Thus, then, may the Science of the Emotions be addressed to all, though all may not now obviously and openly be in sympathy with its practical purpose. For, hidden away in the heart of each member of the human race, is the seed of vairāgya. And there is no mystery in this. Desire is in the human heart. And desire carries with it its own frustration and in the frustration is vairāgya.

Cultivate vairāgya, then, my brothers and my sisters! and when the seed of it begins to show soft sprouts within your minds, nourish and guard them carefully.

Cease to live for the separated self; begin to live for others. There is no fallacy in spreading broad this counsel, friends! For though it has been said just now that there is that in every human heart which is potentially pervious

¹ Goethe is credited with the saying that there is something hidden away in the heart of our dearest friend which, if we could learn it, would make us hate him. Lytton, in his excellent tale, Kenelm Chillingly, has worthily supplied the other half of this half-truth by saying that there is something hidden away in the heart of our bitterest enemy, which, if we could learn it, would make us love him. The Not-Self and the Self constitute, respectively, the explanation of the two half-truths,
to this counsel, yet only in a very few has that seed germinated so far that the water of this counsel will help it to grow.

There seems to be an inconsistency herein, thus:

An objection and the answer.

there is the possibility of vairāgya and of living not for one's own separated self, but at least also for others in the heart of every Jīva, and so this counsel to live for others may be addressed to all. But there is also the impossibility of all living for others, and so an impropriety in directing the counsel to all? The explanation of the inconsistency is this: that what is impossible simultaneously is perfectly possible in succession; all may live for others, not at the same time, but successively. In the majority the seed of vairāgya is yet lying asleep; it has not found the soil and the season in which it may awake and grow. Long yet must they continue to live for the separated self in the course of the Law. This science and this counsel will not reach their ears, or if their ears, then surely not their hearts. Their turn will come much later, and when it comes, then the endless flow of Māyā will have provided other Jivas for whose good these later comers will be living then. We are taught as children, realise when grown-up, generation after generation, turn by turn.

And, listening to the counsel, what remains to do? The outer life of him 'who has thus achieved the true intelligence' who is kṛṣṭa-buddhi,
who has seen and is 'full of the Self,' ātmāvan, has made his Self; created it anew, regenerated it, is kṛtātmā, has been 'born a second time,' is ṝvi ṇa—his outer life will be the same as that of all good men, only more good, more self-sacrificing. For is he not deliberately living now for others, while the ordinary good-hearted man is obeying the inclination of his heart unconsciously, under the dictates of the special past karma which connects him with those to whom he does his service?

Such a man becomes, by constant practice, the master of emotions from having been their slave; and by and bye, with much further long-continued practice, he learns to guide the emotions of his fellow-men also into the better ways. And so he can preserve his calm unshaken always, doing all his duties with a mind at perfect peace, unagitated, undisturbed by anything, and so pass on from stage to stage of evolution till the end in Peace.

(b) Human Life.—What are the stages through which the Individuality of the Jīva grows and passes?

1 See Yoga-Sūtra, i. 12, and Bhagavad-Gītā, vi. 35.

2 The outline, sketched in this sub-section on 'Human Life', is based on Paurāṇika, Vedāntīka and Theosophical literature, and deals practically with the second half-cycle, the ṝvi ṇa-paṟārdha of Brahmā, the gradual reascent
ality of Jiva means gradual development.

We are told that in the evolution of a Jiva there are three unvarying stages:

1. The stage of consciousness—very latent and unmanifest, it may be, as in the mineral or vegetable condition, or massive and gregarious and racial, as in the herds of lower animals, or separated and strong, as amongst the lower human races.
2. The stage of self-consciousness—when one's self is more or less distinctly felt as different from the body and from other selves, and is treated as such implicitly; when it is distinctly recognised as a one, as an individual, amongst many ones and individuals, as in the more advanced

of the Jiva from matter towards spirit looked at from the large standpoint of Brahmā's cycle. The first half of this large cycle, the descent of spirit into the dense materiality of the mineral stage, through subtler and subtler planes, maḥa-tāṭaṭṭva, budhyāti, etc., is not dealt with here, not being relevant to the practical purposes of the moment, which is to indicate the bearing of emotional psychology on future human evolution. That belongs to what may be regarded as the pravṛtti half of the life-cycle of Brahmā. But of course, there are endless repetitions, on larger and smaller scales, of both halves, within each half, 'cycle in epicycle, orb in orb.' Hence in the gigantic second half of Brahmā's life, we have thousands, perhaps millions, of whole cycles, consisting of both halves, of individual Jiva's lives, but the prevailing and dominating spirit is that of nivṛtti.
classes of humanity. And (3) the stage of All-Self-Consciousness, when the Self is recognised as one in all selves, and realised as such, as in Those who have gone beyond humanity.

Through these three stages, the one Praya-gätmä, limiting itself into separate individuals, is always returning again to its original Unity in the illusion of the World-Process.

In practice, these stages of the Jiva’s evolution are accomplished by means of different and distinct kinds of material bodies, the number and density of which apparently differs with different world-systems.

In our own system it seems that in the earlier forms, which we call the lower and the grosser, the Jiva lives entirely in the outer sheath. Its cognition is almost identical and coincident with its desire, its desire almost identical and coincident with its action. Its life is constant actions, constant movements of the physical body. It reaches out at once for whatsoever it desires, however passingly; it runs away as immediately from whatever causes it aversion; without the slightest pause, the least deliberation, without thought, in short. This is the (almost) purely physical stage.

By-and-by, when separateness, ‘manyness’, increases between the growing Jivas, conflicting desires and aversions move each Jiva simultane-
ously. The consequence is a deadlock in the physical body and great activity in the Jīva, which begins to realise itself as separate from the body, regarding the latter as an instrument, as something belonging to it, in short, as *its* and not as *itself*. But how can the Jīva be separate and active without an *ūpādhi*, a sheath? Forthwith it begins to utilise more largely the subtler astral body, the *sūkṣhma sārīra*, and as it progresses, this is formed of finer and finer matter.¹

Indeed, as copies of copies of copies may be made *ad infinitum*, so consciousness and imagination may draw further and further inwards and go further and further outwards *ad infinitum*. The more outwards they go, the greater the sense of separateness and mutual resistance, the denser the matter; the more inwards they recede, the less the sense of separateness and mutual resistance, the finer and subtler the matter, speak-

¹ At a certain stage, people not only love and hate, *i.e.*, perform the physical actions which are the primary expression of the emotions, but also find it necessary to say emphatically, 'I love you,' or 'I hate you,' (apart from all pragmatic bearing, as in courtship, where a declaration of love is needed for the practical purpose of marriage). It would seem that this becomes possible, and occurs, after the Jīva has attained to (the lower) self-consciousness and the mental body is functioning, and is anxious to participate in the emotion, and so to feel more alive.
ing comparatively from the standpoint of any one plane.

So, again, with a still more extensive growth of manyness and separateness and much complexity and multiplicity of desires and aversions, when the Jīva comes to see and feel that the entertainment of even these desires and aversions is pleasant or painful—when it comes to cognise the nature and aspects of rāsa—then the desires come to a deadlock, and the Jīva picks and chooses among them deliberately. The literary stage, the increase of mind, though yet in the sense of the lower intellect, results. The careful following out of the consequences of desires and aversions, and of actions in accordance with them, expands the lower intelligence enormously (if as yet un-self-consciously), and great intellectual results, in social life, in trade and commerce, in literature, physical science, and the arts, proceed from this stage of the Jīva's life. The Jīva, in order to pick and choose between desires and aversions and connected actions, has to bring into play another and still finer upādihi, the mental body or the manomaya kośha.

By-and-by the processes of the lower intelligence, the mind, become so complex, so extensive, so multifarious, that the Jīva becomes tired of them, and has to pick and choose between them. Its constant and increasingly intense struggles with others, throw it back again and again on itself, and the self-consciousness of the kāraṇa-sharīra,
or causal body, arises at this stage. But the self-consciousness is the consciousness of the individual separate self. And this is a very subtle and strong body and hard to transcend. The āhamkāra, the I-ness, is subtlest and strongest at this stage, and in conjunction with a highly-developed mental body and intelligence, there appears within it the phenomenon of desires being ‘desired.’ The real thing desired is of course the material object of the desire, and not the desire itself; but with the excessive and lop-sided development of the Intelligence (the fifth principle, in theosophical terminology, the characteristic of the 5th race) and the exhaustion of the ordinary Sensations and Emotions, we see that phase of life which is described as the ‘craving for Sensations and Emotions,’ the ‘craving for a great Love, or a great Hate,’ ‘the blankness and craving due to the absence of a motive.’

This stage of self-consciousness, concentrated into utter isolation and blankness, naturally and immediately precedes the next, wherein the life of the individual separated self is seen to end in pain only, where pleasure was expected and desired. At this stage arises that comparatively unlimited vairāgya, which is based on the pain and despair born of separateness, of manyness itself.

1 Vide The Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha, Mumukṣhu Prakaraṇa.
And then 'the bonds of personality are loosed' and the Jīva recovers its lost memory of Oneness. A remnant, however, lasts, of its separateness and individual existence. The return journey may not be accomplished in a moment, when the outward journey has occupied so many ages and æons.

This remnant, combined with the Jīva's new insight and belief, builds the buddhisic or māhā-karana, etc., sheaths. While former ones reached out from the one to the others around, this seems to reach in from the all-around to any particular one, the process corresponding to the process of the highest and truest Metaphysic. And yet this is not in reality so. The inversion of the point of view causes this apparent inversion of method of action also. Inasmuch as the essential nature of all action, all movement, is the same, and there is no action or movement possible without limitation and separateness, the inversion is only apparent, and due to extreme rapidity of motion and the preponderance of the All-Self-consciousness over the mere self-consciousness. Where formerly the Jīva thought: "How may I benefit myself at the expense of others?" and looked out from one point towards his surroundings, his circumference, he

1 Light on the Path, Comments, ii. 10.
now places himself at the circumference, grasps in consciousness, in greater or lesser degree, and with greater or lesser comprehension of detail, the whole sphere of the kosmos, of which he is a part, and from that standpoint looks in at any particular Jīva-point that is requiring help, and thinks: "How may I, the whole, benefit this, the part?" The touch of separateness and illusion that now exists is the almost wholly sātvikā, 1 the nearly pure, part of Avidyā, Primal Nescience.

As the All-Self-Consciousness becomes overpoweringly predominant, there results the nirvāṇic or ātmic body, and still beyond come the still higher and at present inconceivable stages of consciousness and bodies lasting to the end of the activity, and the commencement of the pralaya, or dissolution, of the particular kosmos we are concerned with.

Such seems to be the evolution of the Jīva, and the growth (and, in a certain sense, the decay also) of his individuality. Individuality is "memory and expectation centred in a one." The longer that one can look backward into the past and forward into the future, the stronger and larger is the individuality. The more constantly one can preserve the memory and expectation, the clearer one's higher consciousness of unity with the Praṭyagañgamā, the finer that individuality. The growth of the indi-

---

1 Vyāsa, Yoga-Bhāṣṭya, i. 2, and iv. 29.
viduality corresponds with the growing refinement of the encasements. It should be remembered that in the case of each of these encasements it is as much a 'body' as the 'physical,' in the sense that it is still *material*, still made of *Mūlaprakṛti*, still different from the inner aspect of the Jīva, the *Pratyagātmā*; and the names given to the bodies indicate only that that particular aspect of *Pratyagātmā* which gives the name is the most predominant and prevalent in that body. It does not mean that that aspect forms the *material* of the body. Jīva is *Pratyagātmā* from the mineral stage to the *nirvānic*; *upādhi* is *Mūlaprakṛti* from the mineral stage to the *nirvānic*. So, too, the three aspects of the concrete, individual Jīva, *viz.*, Jñāna, Icchā, and Kriyā—knowledge, desire and action—correspond to the three aspects of the abstract, universal *Pratyagātmā*—Chīt, Ānanda and Satt; as also the three aspects of the concrete, individual *upādhi*, *viz.*, Guṇa, Dravya, and Karma (attribute, substance and motion), correspond to the three aspects of universal *Mūlaprakṛti*—Sattva, Tamas and Rajas; these also persist from the lowest to the highest. ¹

¹ Details about these triplets, as also some further discussion of the other points touched on in this sub-section, will now be found in *The Science of Peace*, and very much more in the Prāṇava-Vāda, an English summary of which it is hoped will be shortly published.
Many problems are cleared up by this view of the growth of individuality. Many a crystal, many a flower, many an animal, in its perfection, is far more beautiful than a sickly human child; many a human child is far more beautiful than a sickly human youth or weak old man. And yet each succeeding one of the list looms larger in our mental perspective than the preceding ones; and we unconsciously, instinctively, welcome its growth and preservation, or regret its loss and destruction, accordingly. This is due solely to the fact of a successively larger and firmer individuality.

Let us, then, strive to grow the bhūtātic body and the bhūtātic consciousness, and let the lower bodies take care of themselves; or rather, indeed, let us try with all our might to rise above them once for all; and so when they in their due course—for the Jīva must pass through them unavoidably—take definite form, still they shall not be strong to hinder us and delay our journey onwards in the process of evolution.¹

There is no impossibility in this. At the great turning points of cycles the Jīva catches a glimpse of all the future stages, and he may attach himself deliberately to a distant one rather than a nearer, regarding his necessary passage through the nearer ones—for he cannot alto-

¹ See Yoga-Sūtra, iii, 36, 37.
begether overlap and avoid them—as only a temporary necessity and means; or he may attach himself to a nearer one, when he will have to pass through the turning-point of vairāgya again and again before he gets hold of the next goal. In exact proportion to the stretch and extent of his vairāgya is the Jiva's stride of progress in evolution.  

It may be that the outer circumstances of the majority of students are not favorable to conduct and life such as are required by a developing buddhic consciousness. But all can try to approach to an ideal, perfecting their consciousness and their conduct side by side, by constantly maintaining the breadth of the consciousness so as to include all: by always regulating conduct so as to seek in love the good of all; these are the means whereby the buddhic consciousness and body are developed and at last perfected in the course of many births and ages. And in helping towards such perfection lies the true use of the Science of the Emotions.  

(c) How Human Life is helped by this Science.  

We have seen how the very root of all the virtues is the Emotion of Love; how the very Essence of

---

1 Yoga-Sūtra, i. 16, 22.
2 Ibid, i. 33.
3 Vide footnotes pp. 206 and 218, supra. It should be noted here that the remarks which follow, and the Emotions therein dealt with, apply and are appropriate, generally speak-
Love is the realisation of the unity of all Jivas; how this realisation is the very heart of the Higher Consciousness. To those who have passed through the vast toil of the mental journey through the wildernesses of doubt and the deserts of despair is now secure the reward of being able to deliberately and consciously cultivate and compel the growth of Love in the soft and fruitful soil of their minds, by persistently feeding it with the waters of the perennial stream of the only Truth, the unity of all Jivas, all selves, in the One Self. To others who have not undergone this labor, Love is only an instinct, a flickering and fitful flame, uncertain, doubtful, to be lit by passing pleasures and extinguished by passing pains; burning stronger and longer in some natures, dying down quickly in others, and, by reaction, leaving behind more strong the foul smell and smoke and darkness of Hate. And also, to these others, Love is an instinct in and of the upādhi, the Not-Self, ing, mostly to the life of the Jiva that is more or less consciously or unconsciously near or on the Path of Renunciation, at the present stage of humanity, midway between and including elements of both prāvṛtti and nivṛtti. For details regarding all the main types of human life, the four castes and classes and the four stages of each, we have to go to the Samhitā of Manu and the works of the other Law-givers. A popular exposition will be found in the Text-Book of Hindū Religion and Ethics (published by the Central Hindu College, Benares); and also, in some of their aspects, in Pt. II of Annie Besant’s A Study in Consciousness.
the separated Self, the mere reflexion of the true Self; such Love, too, is therefore only the reflexion of the true Love, and it is invariably and in its deepest hiddenness the love of the personal self, the separate self, and therefore never free from the taint and the danger of latent selfishness. But once the Truth of truths has been clearly seen, the flame has been lit for ever, and, though it may and will be weakened now and again, it can never entirely die out; and the Love so compelled to grow is the impersonal Love, the love of the United Self, a Love that always turns its face towards, and is always reaching out to, the abstract Prāṇāyāgātmā, and so cannot be limited and selfish. God is Love, because the Supreme God is the One Self, and the One Self is all selves, and the feeling of this Truth of truths is Love.¹

Feeding then this flame of Love constantly with the oil of that great Truth, we can see and secure for the use of ourselves and of all humanity all the gems and jewels of the other virtues. So bearing ever in mind the untruth of the manyness of Jivas, bheḍa-buddhi, we can forcefully, untiringly, struggle against Hate and all its band of vices. Knowing the true nature and essence

¹ For details as to how this Truth has the same significance as Love as regards a foundation for a scheme of virtues and vices, see The Elementary Text-Book of Hindū Religion and Ethics, Part iii. Chapter V.
of Emotion—desire, we can watch every thought and word and action of our own in the constant light of self-consciousness and self-analysis, and those of others in the light of the All-Self-Consciousness, whereby we see that the desires of all are as the desires of each. And so watching, and knowing that whatever of us and from us causes pain and hurt and harm to another is due to our desire to live for our separate self, to foster our own so insidious a h a m kā r a, to gain something for ourselves at the expense and pain of our brother—even though the gain be the merest fleeting feeling of pleasure, an emotion-feeling, a r a s a, of pride or scorn—so watching and so knowing we shall gradually pass beyond the power of that vā s a nā, tī s h nā, tā n hā, desire, which has so long tied us to re-birth, which is the cause of so much misery to humanity, which has, no doubt, already been defeated in the great struggle of the period of vā i rā g y a, but which yet lifts again and again a rebellious and treacherous head, seeking for opportunity to regain and re-assert its sovereignty.¹ Very subtle are the workings of a h a m kā r a and its manifestations. Let us guard against them carefully in ourselves by the only means of Self-watchfulness, and imperceptibly but powerfully we shall help others who come into relations with us to guard against them in themselves.

¹ Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. xix., 7-9, etc.
Avoiding provocation of ill and promoting evocation of good emotions in others.

Knowing too the correspondence of the emotions, knowing how they create in ordinary humanity—as fire does in ordinary combustibles—their own likeness, we shall be able deliberately to avoid creating in the minds of our fellow-beings any of the Emotions on the side of Hate and Vice; and we shall be able to create in them the Emotions on the side of Love and Virtue.

When we see Fear, we shall not show the counterpart of Fear, i.e., Scorn; we shall behave not as the ordinary combustible, that itself flames up at the touch of a flaming substance, but as gold that melts and becomes the purer the more it is exposed to the fire; we shall respond with Benevolence and tender Pity to Timidity.

When we meet with Pride and Disdain we shall not respond with Fear, as will the common weak nature, or with greater Pride and Scorn as will the common strong nature, but with Humility; and so responding with Humility, we shall transmute the other's Pride into Benevolence—for in ordinary humanity, to which most possessors of Pride belong, the counterpart of Humility is Benevolence—and thus we shall create in the other's mind a noble Emotion which will uplift him and be of use to others who need his help, though we ourselves may not need his Benevolence.

Or, if we are not sufficiently masters of our-
selves to force Humility upon our mind in response to the other’s Pride, and our nature, partaking overmuch of the common strong nature, surges up with the consciousness of our own superiority, then, at the least, we can add Love to that consciousness of our superiority, and transfuse the whole into a quiet Pity and Benevolence for the other’s ignorance and Pride and Superciliousness. But let us remember that this is not always the best way, but dangerous; for it may foster Pride in our own inner heart, and the Pity may become a false and sneering Pity instead of true Benevolence. For very fine are the transformations of ahamkāra and asmitā.

The test of whether our pity is false or true is whether we are or are not anxious to express it, in such a situation, on our face or in words. If we are thus anxious to make it be seen that we are pitying the other’s ignorance, then we are not feeling genuine pity but only our own superiority. True pity, on the other hand, being one-pointedly anxious to help, confines itself to earnest endeavor to rectify or convince. So, too should a false humility be guarded against, lest the other be confirmed in the wrong course, as it appears to us.

Sāntvam,1 ‘earnest conciliation,’ is the golden

---

1 The ideas referred to in the text may be expanded and illustrated somewhat in a note. We have to remember that Emotions are not ordinarily matter for unconditional
mean that reconciles all such opposing difficulties of dealing with emotional situations. For "every question has two sides," and "truth ever is in the mean between extremes," and "even virtues become vices by excess"; as the Sanskrit saying is, आश्चर्येन्मध्यमं बुद्धिमोति सर्वेष वर्ज्येत्।

contracts, to be supplied by one on the demand of another, without reserve—even although the situation arising from an Emotion may make it necessary to provide against the mutable nature of that Emotion by a contract which secures the outer relations and actions induced by it, as in the case of marriage, where the needs of children and other economical and social requirements (reducible, on examination, into terms of a deeper emotion) demand the permanancy of the tie. In such case, where the Emotion has unfortunately vanished, a high sense of duty may maintain outer harmony, and may even ultimately restore the original tie on a loftier and more permanent level. But for this there must be, on both sides, an understanding of the position of the other, and a resolute self-analysis to discover one's own mistakes. A husband, a wife, a friend, says to the other: "You do not love, or honor, or respect, or compassionate me as you did before, as you promised to do," etc., etc. Then comes answering reproach from the other party: "You do not behave, as you gave promise of doing," etc., etc. Mutual recrimination proceeds, and the breach widens. How should this lamentable but too common difficulty be met and be turned to good result instead of evil?

First, it needs to be remembered that pity, affection or respect depends upon two facts: (1) the pleasurableness of the association of the two parties; and (2) the inner feeling of superiority, equality or inferiority existing between them.
THE HIGH APPLICATION.

Do not let us laugh very often or very loud. There are more grounds for sorrow than for laughter in our present world. The great Teachers have laughed but seldom or not at all. Laughter means a sudden and excessive feeling of superiority and moreness;

Avoidance of much laughter;

When young folk vow eternal fidelity to each other, the vow arises from a time-effacing exuberance of emotion; but an unconscious implication is always there from the very nature of things, "so long as the conditions exist which have given rise to our present emotion." When conditions change, mental moods change with them. Yet, also, the inner feeling of permanency in a love-relation is the persistent testimony of the Self to its own Love-nature, and in that lives the possibility of transcending alike conditions and moods.

Let us analyse the Emotions of the person against whom the complaint is levelled. He has probably passed through a long series of painful Emotions before his outward conduct has shown any change. The close relation, marital or other, has brought into his view flaws where he had expected flawlessness, as the smoothest skin shows roughness under the microscope. He has struggled not to see them, has had them forced on his attention. He has suffered the pain of doubt, has been disillusioned. And, finally, despite many an effort, he has been swept away on a current of disappointments, suspicions, misunderstandings, and a bitter resentment gnaws at his heart and beclouds his understanding. How shall he face the situation that has arisen? First, he may remind himself that the reproach, though harsh in form, is a cry of love and longing, and shows the value set upon himself and the pain caused by his imagined or actual change. Then he may consider that the flaws made visible by propinquity
as explained before. People often laugh in Scorn. We should no longer be actuated by Scorn. "But they laugh in Joy and pure Good-humor too, as it is called. May we not laugh with them?" Let us analyse that Joy and that Good-humor, and then were always there, and that imperfections are inseparable from human nature, even if highly developed; and that the other also has had to face a similar process of disillusionment as regards himself. He should, therefore, try to regain a sense of proportion, balance the merits and demerits of the other, and see if he is letting a plate, held close to his eyes, shut out the sun. If the relation is one in which the complainant has been treated as superior, and he thinks that a h a m k a r a, Pride, Vanity, Jealousy, desire to rule and dominate, play a large part in causing the reproach, and persuades himself that it is his duty to resist these by ceasing to show any of his habitual respect, he should then—understanding the action and reaction of wrong Emotions—ask himself whether he himself is not suffering from those very Emotions, whether he will not strengthen them in the other by such resistance or withdrawal, and, finally, whether he will not, by resolutely assuming the truth of his earlier judgment, cause the other most strenuously to live up to the ideal he has conceived. But, of course, while so keeping up his behavior in accordance with that earlier judgment, he must convey to the other, in gentle form, the doubts that have arisen in his mind, otherwise the other's attention would never turn to the need for a more strenuous endeavor to live up to that ideal. In this way he may do his part in restoring the beauty and happiness of the relation as it was, and may even lift it to a higher level.

Let us now analyse the emotions of the complainant, and see how he should seek to turn the undesirable emotions
THE HIGH APPLICATION. 237
determine for ourselves. Very often that Joy
means the Joy of gain at the expense of another.
"Even in jest?" we ask. Yes. The laughter of
jesting consists in this: that one person makes believe that he himself is superior and another is

aroused in him into the desirable. If he is on the prāvṛtti-mārga, these may be wholly undesirable—wounded pride and self-love, desire to rule, to humiliate. In such case no doubts can arise as to the proper course. The man must change his whole attitude and conquer his wrong emotions. Or, being more evolved, the complainant may feel some wounded love, with a large amount of the above-named evil emotions. There he must strive to maintain the love-emotion, although it be wounded, and to lessen the evil ones by reflecting on his own faults and on the good points of the complainant. But let us suppose that he is on the nivṛtti-mārga, and is sincerely desirous of living up to his ideals of unselfish, unexacting love, that he has rejoiced in the tender tie with his younger, and suffers keenly from the withdrawal of the latter’s trust and reverence. How shall he then meet the situation that has arisen? In this case the bulk of the Emotion is love, and he suffers from its frustration. (Analyse carefully the significance of this expression in the light of the remarks at p. 41, supra, and elsewhere, as to the nourishment of the mental body.) But is this the only feeling? Let him rigorously analyse his own emotions, and especially where he feels the condemnation of his younger to be unjust, let him scrutinise himself to see whether there are no elements of truth in it; let him unflinchingly see whether, indeed, such elements of truth in it are not the keenest point of the sting, and whether the injustice that rankles does not lie merely in the exaggeration. Let him search his own heart and see if there does not lurk some
inferior; this is done to bring out fictitious points of his own superiority and those of the other's inferiority, and so to secure a laugh. This 'laugh at another's expense' is harmless, or supposed to be harmless, only so long as it is understood that the whole is a make-believe, and that there is no wounded pride masquerading as wounded love; whether the hurt or resentment felt at being degraded by one who had exalted is not due to too much r a s a-b u d h i, feeling of personal enjoyment, having been taken in the previous exaltation; whether there is an exaggerated sense of humiliation when honor is replaced by criticism, and whether it is not due to unquestioning honor having begun to be expected; whether there is not in his own mind some exaggeration of the faults of the complained against, in the ascription to him, as motives, of pride, fickleness, and desire to give pain, where the motive may largely be honest disappointment? Let him then call to mind the words of Manu (ix. 109) how 'the elder protecteth or destroyeth the family'; let him remember that the gods have placed the greater burden of responsibility on the elder and the stronger, and that, if he must look for compensating reward, he should look to Those whom he is endeavoring to serve; let him resolutely exclude from his mind the faults of the other, and concentrate attention on the virtues which should replace the faults imputed to himself; let him accept the criticism and sedulously cultivate humility, thinking of himself as having the faults imputed, and striving to eliminate them wholly; let him remember that if he has not kept the good opinion he had gained, it is because he himself has fallen short of the ideal, and that, in his own case, closeness of contact has revealed flaws that distance had concealed—a fact for which neither he nor the other is to be blamed.
real superiority or inferiority on either side. But, apart from the merits or otherwise of so making-believe, and approaching falsehood even in jest, we see how often jest passes into earnest, and why? In trying to bring out the points of inferiority of others, people too generally pass from the fictitious

Then, turning to what he feels to be the main part of his emotion, frustrated love, repulsed desire to help, let him examine even this to make sure that his ‘desire to help’ is not predominantly a ‘desire to be regarded as a helper’, that his ‘love’ is not predominantly a ‘desire to be loved’; let him recall and meditate on the ideal of selfless love and seek to pour out without asking for return, remembering that the other is himself, clothed in another form; let him remind himself that noble qualities influence by existence, not by being self-asserted orally; people love the sun, not because it asks for love, but because it warms and enlightens; so also, if he show venerability, he will be venerated; if he show love, he will be loved; if he show greatness, he will be respected.

And let us also always remember that whenever situations are complicated, and it is not easy to determine readily what is the proper virtue to exercise, what the proper mood or Emotion to call up—as is frequently the case in our complex life—that then the virtue of śanāt vām, earnest effort at conciliation, is, in a sense, all-comprehensive and never inappropriate, as the Preceptor Bṛhaspaṭī said to the King Indra (Mahābhārata, Shāntiparva, lxxxiv. 2, 3, 4); for gentleness maketh the gentleman, and claims are futile, and life is all-compelling—if not in this birth, then in another, when the ruit is ripe. Thus out of pain shall the nivṛtta pluck progress and out of disappointment success.
to the real and touch sore parts; and the result is that the laughter rapidly changes from the humorous into the bitter. Let us not go near such dangerous shallows. What sad mistakes arise in life between the nearest friends! Expressions and gestures of Sympathy and Goodwill are mistaken for the very opposite. How great the danger, then, of the self-assertion involved in even the laughter of jesting becoming hurtful.¹

The great ones seldom laughed. But they have smiled very often; smiled in tenderness and sadness; sad to see another’s pain, tender to relieve it; smiling because of their ability to do so, or at the unreality of the pain and its fleetingness; and in any case, smiling because of the increased ‘moreness’ of the Self in themselves instantly acquired by the recognition of its identity with the Self in the person before them. As a general rule, the violent outward physical laugh is the laugh of the gross sense of the moreness of the material separated self, while the quiet, tender, inner, ‘spiritual’ smile is the smile of the subtle sense of moreness of the spiritual united self. And yet there is inevitably a touch of comparison in the purity of the latter also, a comparison of the strength of the united self which has overpowered and transcended the strength of the not-self, the separated self, and

¹ See an illustrative story, that of Mañkaṇaka, in the Kūrma Purāṇa, II. xxxv.
it is this comparison which—being misinterpreted naturally as invidious by the evil natures in which the separate self is strong—causes the hatred of 'spiritual faces' which is unhappily not an uncommon phenomenon amidst materialistic present humanity.

Let us distinguish well between this smile of tenderness and the smile of bitterness or of despair, wherein the self snatches, it may be, a fictitious consolation for actual present loss, from its own imagined greatness and another's littleness. And so distinguishing, we shall see why

Mockery is the fume of little hearts,

and

Manners are not idle, but the fruit
Of loyal nature and of noble mind.¹

And for reasons similar to those which make jesting and laughing dangerous, are also much talking and discussion dangerous. Let us ask a question when we really require some information; let us listen attentively to the reply, ponder it carefully, and ask again, if necessary. But why should we expound our own views uncalled for? The danger of self-assertion

¹ Tennyson: Guinevere. Compare:

कृष्णो राज्यसमाहृतवाचमुन्मत्सदित्योः : I
सा योगि: सर्वदेवरणां सा हि लोकन्य निर्णयि : II

Uttara-Rāma-Charitam: "The sages name 'demoniac' the speech of the inebriate and the arrogant; it is the very womb of wars, it is the death of the world."
is there. But, if we are desired to state our views on any question, then we may certainly do so, if we can help another thereby, giving our statements in the way of the answers we ourselves would seek if putting questions. Because of the danger of self-assertion and a m kāra hiding within much speech is silence golden.

We shall also not waste our time, our energy, and our new higher nature in meaningless and objectless reveries and imaginations. They are the k aṣ hāya, sourness, and the r aṣ vāḍa, sweets of imagination, that the Y o g a warns us against. How often we discover with a start that we are imagining all sorts of situations of Anger and Discord between ourselves and those who are, or ought to be, most dear to us. We imagine them behaving wrongly to ourselves, and we revenge ourselves upon them by behaving equally wrongly to them in return—also in imagination! The real reason is that in an unguarded moment, an unrestrained element of evil emotion in us has taken advantage of some very slight and small discomfort, and has run away with the whole of our mind, subdued it and turned its powers to its own uses. If we are pained in any way, and fail in a moment of carelessness at once to check off that pain,

1 Manu, vi. 47.
2 See remarks regarding imagination, at p. 153, supra.
as an item of past kārmic debt cleared off, to welcome it as a piece of service done to another, then the ahām kāra-consciousness asserts itself, bases a desire for separation—an emotion of Anger and Hate—on that pain, the mind begins to work in the imagination, and we at once find ourselves in the midst of all kinds of disagreeable scenes. And persistent failure in this respect confirms and condenses the imaginings into physical action with all its grievous results. This is how by assuming enmity we create enmity.

Allied to this is the mistake of openly attributing to a person an evil Emotion against which he may be struggling with might and main. His struggle and resistance against that emotion cease at once and he breaks down, thinking it is useless for him to struggle, for others have decided that he has failed. As said before, by action and reaction, ever taking a new starting point in the last outbreak of the other person, the emotions between man and man go on perpetuating their own endless flow. Wise are they that fix one starting point, and so enable themselves to close the accounts.

1 Note how, as we are helped or hurt by it, the same quality in another appears to us as a virtue or a vice; frankness becomes indiscretion; discretion, secretiveness and guile; conceit, dignity; discernment, hyper-criticism; and so on. The end of the man who has 'retired from competition' with his fellow-men should be justice, and his means 'charity.'
Thus, knowing the root of Desire, knowing that it is of the nature of the separated self, knowing that we have no separate self, we shall not fall a prey to such Desire-Emotions, and to such imaginings and mistakes. But, on the contrary, as far as may be, we shall give credit even where none is due in strictness; for, by exactly the same process as that just described, we shall thus create in the mind of the other that which will be really worthy of credit.

And as we shall avoid imaginings on the side of evil Emotion, so also we shall avoid much useless imagining on the other side, for the reasons set forth in the preceding chapter in connection with the Philosophy of Poetry.

Knowing that the upward Path of Renunciation is a very long and laborious path of unremitting repression of a hamkāra, that what the poet says,

That men may rise on stepping stones
Of their dead selves to higher things,

is true in a very deep and literal sense indeed, for the subtle bodies mentioned before have to be left behind successively in the course of ages; knowing all this, we have to grasp the whole individuality firmly and maintain a constant struggle against this lower self, this egoism with its infinitely varied and elusive shades, and against all its brood of Pride, Anger and Fear and their endless progeny, particularly Pride, which is the very alter ego and synonym of a hamkāra, its con-

---

1 Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, i.
centrated essence, to the attacks of which the aspirant with his developing intelligence is especially liable. And, on the other hand, we have to cultivate assiduously to the best of our ability, Compassion, Love and Humility and the other virtues laid down for the Y o g a-student, herein making use of a chastened and ennobled imagination so far as it is helpful.¹

Thus steadfastly guiding our evolution, life after life, pure and serene, for ourselves and, so far as may be, for all those who are our fellow-passengers upon the road of evolution and have been bound to us by the bonds of karma; bearing ever in mind that "There is no purifier like unto knowledge." ²

---

¹ Yoga-Sūtra, i. 33, and ii. 38.
² Bhagavad-Gītā, iv. 37, 38. At the end of the book may be repeated what was stated at the beginning: "The hard in heart cannot see God," that is to say, the ethical condition of vairāgya, wherein the hard 'heart-knot' of intense personal feeling, 'I and thou,' 'mine and thine,' separatist individualism, is loosened, is indispensable to, is only the other aspect of, the intellectual condition of illumination, 'the vision of God, the All-Self,' the jñāna of the Truth, and also of bhakṣī, devotion and self-surrender, and active self-sacrifice and renunciation. This is why all scriptures say that until we turn from sin, in spirit, at least, and sincerely, peace is not attainable, for sin goes with intense personality; as the Bhāgavata says, avidyā, kāma and karma on the one hand, and jñāna, vairāgya and bhakṣī, on the other, always go together.
which distinguishes the permanent from the fleeting; turning ever more and more away from the fleeting, the selfish and personal; fixing our gaze constantly upon the Eternal; living in the Eternal; realising that "Nothing that is out of the Eternal, nothing that is less than the Eternal, can aid us"; treading ever more and more firmly, in the onward journey; seeing ever more and more clearly all in the light of the Self; may we hope to pass into the Final Peace, into the perfect realisation of the Paramātmā, in which merge both Pratyagātmā and Mūlāprakṛti.

"The man of serene mind who rejoiceth in the Self, and is contented therein, to whom pleasure and pain are as one, he becometh fit for immortality."

"Moksha lieth not hidden on the back of the heavens, or on the surface of the earth, or in the depths of Pātāla; the dissolution of ahamkāra on the disappearance of all desire—such is Moksha, as the Scripture sayeth."

1 Light on the Path.
LAST WORDS.

My reader! Never again, after having read this booklet with understanding, can you be altogether without the self-examining consciousness and the self-mastery that makes you turn again and again upon yourself to watch and regulate what you are thinking, saying, doing; and even if with this there should come upon you a harassing weariness and sense of emptiness of life and constant defeat of pleasure, you will not think that this is due to your new habit of self-analysis. You will know that this has come to you with the partial cessation of Desire, which has made it possible for you to turn inwards towards the Self, and understand the Science of the Emotions as one important portion of the Science of the Self. And you will know that it is this very Science that will help you to successfully struggle against and gain victory over that dreary emptiness and dull harassing weariness, by enabling you to cultivate Love universal and the capacity for work in identification with the cosmic life of Ishvara, and
gradually to find greater and greater joy in sacrifice for others, even as He finds joy in sacrifice for His worlds. Long do the uses of this Science last—indeed, all through the life of the cosmic systems. For, wherever and whenever is the Jīva-self, there with it go its threefold activities of Cognition, Desire, and Action, Thought, Emotion, and Occupation, and therefore always is it useful to know and bear in consciousness the inmost nature of these three. Facts of outer science are useful or useless according to the outer material surroundings. The chemistry of an element, the physics of a force, are useless in a world where that element or that force is not. But there are no worlds where Jīvas are not; and therefore are the facts of the inner Science useful always; therefore is the Science of the Self, Ādhvā-yā-tma-Vidya, the highest of the Sciences.

ॐ
शुभं बल्तु सर्वंगतं,
सर्वो भद्धाणं पश्वत,
लेक्षं समस्तं: सुखिनों मन्तनु;
ॐ

PEACE TO ALL BEINGS.
INDEX.

Abhorrence, 84, 129.
Absolute, the pairs of opposites must exist outside, 58
Action, volition distinguished from, by Westerns, 22; volition identified with, by Easterns, 22, 21; an aspect of the manifested Self, 23, 25, 27, 226; regarded by Easterns as mental, 23; true fulfilment of emotion, 198; power of, inherent in the Self, 214; desire identical with, in lower forms, 220; separateness inherent in, 224.

All-Self, 29.
All-Self-intelligence, 6.
Aññajah (egg-born), 111.
Anger, distinguished from desire by Westerns, 21; repulsion between equals, 41; caused by desire for separation, 60; leads to separation, 73; a factor in worry, 147-8; indulgence of, imagination, 242-3.

Aññajah. 82, 122 seq.
Aññajah, 51.
Aññajah, 122.
Aññajah, 119.
Aññajah, 127.
Aññajah, 221.
Aññajah, 197.
Adoration, 50.
Adulation, 220.
Adultery, 116-118.
Affection (see also Love, 35.
Ahamkāra (individuality), growth of, 33; strongest stage of, 223.
All-Self, 29.
All-Self-consciousness, third stage in Evolution, 220; results of predominance of, 224-225.
INDEX.

desire for union implied by, 32; memory and expectation of pleasure implied by, 32; with consciousness of equality = affection or love, 35; benevolence arising from, 36; appearing in the motionlessness of the Supreme, 36; inferior moves towards superior in all cases of, 36; to an equal causes reciprocation, 47; in lesser degree towards inferiors = kindness, 55; culminates in the equality-union of love, 57; enumeration of virtues, arising from, 80.

Aversion, see Repulsion.
Awe, awesomeness, a complex emotion, 84; root of, on the side of hate, 104; nature of, 104; contrasted with admiration, 124; related to wonder, 129.

Bain, cited, 159, 175.
Beauty, the Beautiful, 130-1.
Being of the All Self, 29.
Belief, 93.

Benevolence, arising from attraction, 35; three subdivisions of, 56; love showing itself as, 68; surrender implied by, 69; in war, 73; misplaced, 121; allied virtues of, 121; smile of, 143, 240; pleasure of, in the Pathetic, 183-6; humility productive of, 232; to be opposed to fear, 232.
Benignity, 101-5.

Bhagavad-Gītā, quoted, 118.
Bhāmaṭi, quoted, 16.
Bṛāraṭa, reference to, 10, 160.
Būhina, reference to, 153.
Bhīṣma, reference to, 60; quoted, 89, 110.

Buddha (true philosophy), 3.
Bravery, 84, 89.
Brusqueness, 50.
Buddha, the Brāhmaṇa-body of, sacrificed to the tigress, 68.
Buddhistic body, stage of building of, 224; method of development of, 228.

Cannibals, 70-1.
Causal body, 223.
Cautiousness, 84.

Charu charati manasi ("that which dwells in the mind"), 131.
Cheerfulness, 146.
Circumspection, 84.

Cognition, an aspect of the Self, 15, 22, 25, 27; first mental function 21.

Comic, the, 190.
Commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras of Gaṅgādaśa referred to, 10.

Compassion, defined, 56; love the meeting-point of humility and, 57; majesty produced by pride and, 86; majesty, heroism, 89; imagination helpful to, 245.
Confidence, 84, 91 seqq.

Consciousness, phenomena of, from Western and Eastern standpoints, 22-3; mind and, regarded as synonymous by Westerns, 23; answers to external
impermeable, 24; can never imagine its own cessation, 65; duration of, 65-6; first stage in evolution, 219.

Contempt, see Scorn.

Contraction, pain defined as, 166.

Correspondence of emotions, 149 seqq.

Courage, 84, 89.

Craftiness, 122.

Criticalness, 84.

Crookedness, 84, 122.

Cruel, the, pleasure afforded by representations of, 183.

Cruelty, nature of, 84, 120; form of, practised on singing birds, 187.

Curiosity, defined, 125-6; a double desire, 138.

Dāna-vīra, Dayā-vīra (the heroic giver), 89.

Desire, essential nature of Jīva, 4; attitude of Self towards that which causes, 18; included with volition pleasure in Western classification, 21; Eastern classification of, 22; regarded as mental by Western psychologists, 23; passing into action = Prayaṭṇa, 24; an aspect of the Self, 25, 27; relation of pleasure and pain to, 27; two elementary forms of, 28; emotions = desires, 28; basic forms of, 31; precedence of pleasure or, 31; as distinguished from emotion, 32; emotion = intellectual consciousness and, 34, 197; mental character of, 194.

Devi-Bhāgavatā, quoted, 66.

Devotion, constituted by Self-surrender, 54; defined, 55, 96 seqq.; distinct from worship, 56, 96; a complex emotion, 84.

Diffidence, a complex emotion, 84; nature of, 90-1; admiration contrasted with, 124.

Dignity, 84, 86.

Discretion, 84.

Discrimination, 3.

Discussion, dangers of, 241.

Disdain (see also Scorn), 62.

Disgust, 84, 129.

Disgusting, the pleasure afforded by representations of, 183.

Dislike, pain connected with, 19; Sub-division of, 41-2.

Distinctionless, the, One and Many arise in, 35.

Distrust, 84, 91 seqq.

Doubt, master pain of, 3; allied to distrust, 94.

Drama, nature of, 176; tragedy discouraged in India, 188.

Duryodhana, reference to, 153.

Dveṣṭha (hate), 19.

Ecstasy, 51.

Education, science of emotions applied to, 11.

Eka-tā (oneness), 29.

Emotions, no organic connection between the, according to Western science, 9; beneficent results from the application...
INDEX.

Emotion—desire, emotion-feeling distinguished from, 34.

Endeavour, 23.

Ends overpowered by means, 4 seqq.

Endurance, 84, 83.

Enmity, 60.

Envy, 84, 120.

Eśānātrayam (the three-fold seeking,) 204.

Emotion—feeling, 34.

Emotion-feeling, 34.

Esteem, 40, 124.

Ethics, the principle of action, 7; metaphysic of, 82.

Evolution, three stages of, 219-220.

Expansion, pleasure defined as, 165-6.

Expectation, 33.

Faith, 84, 98.

Fatalism, 214.

Fault-finding, 84.

Fear, where object is superior = repulsion, 42; caused by repulsion 61; pride and, generated by anger, 73; an element in disgust, 129; to be met with benevolence, 232.

Fearful, the pleasure afforded by representations of, 181-2.

Fidelity, 108.

Force, metaphysic necessary to the understanding of, 35.

Fortitude, 84, 89.

Free will, 215.

Friend, six-fold characteristic of the, 49.

Friendship, reciprocation, and, 48-9.

Giving, kinds of, 178.

Gladness, 146.

Grandeur, 84, 129.

Greed, 130.

Grief, luxury of, 145.

Hate, desire of separation, the instinct of, 19, 23, 69, 72; a primary desire emotion, 28, 31; signifi-
INDEX.

cance of, 29; Sub-divisions of, 41; love and, possible only where forms exist, 47; neither selfish nor unselfish, 57; love compared with, 57-8; insatiable, 59; relation of murder to, 64, 66, 70; = pride, 67; = pride plus tyranny, 69; conflict of manifest, 70; love and, sometimes lead to similar treatment, 71; succeeded by remorse, 74; binding power of, 75; vices = emotions on side of, 78; enumeration of vices arising from, 80-1; loathing and abhorrence allied to, 129; meaning of, understood only from beyond love and, 213.

Heroic, the, nature of, 190.
Herism, a complex emotion, 84; active majesty, 89; qualities and grades of, 89.
Horror, 61.
Hostility, 60.
Humility, love the meeting-point of compassion and, 57; to be opposed to pride, 84.
Humor, 84.
Ichchhā (desire), 22.
Ideal, attainment to an, 98.
Identification, love ceases in, 48, 58.
Imagination, similarity of expectation and, 38; power of, 197-8; dangers of, 242; legitimate uses of, 245.
Imitation, 50.
Impertinence, 84.
Inanimate nature, emotions aroused by, 129.

Indifference, 17.
Individuality (ahamkāra), growth of, 33; strongest stage of, 223.
Insolence, 84.
Intellect, intelligence, development of, by Aryan race, 4; to expand into Self-intelligence, 6; psychology of, 7; present in emotion, 197.

James and Lange, theories of, as to origin of emotions, 14 note.
Jealousy, 84, 106.
Testing, danger of, 237.
Jīva (separated Self), relation of, to pleasure and pain, the subject of ancient philosophy, 3; desire-emotion in nature of, 4; absolute union impossible between two Jivas, 32; life of the, apart from a physical body, 64; bound to others by love or hate, 75; two classes of, 169; emotion possible only in mutual relations of Jivās, 190; three-fold aspect of, 226, 248.
Jīvātmā, essential underlying unity of each, with all others, 29; emotion and the, 33.
Jñānam (cognition), 22.
Joy, smiles and tears of, 143.
Kādāmbari, referred to, 175.
Kant, referred to, 21.
Kāntī (is loved), 131.
Kāvyā Prakāsha, referred to, 150.
INDEX.

Kindness, 55, 143.
Kirātārjunīya, 72.
Kṛta-buddhi, 217.
Kṛśṇa, 218.
Kriyā (action), 22.
Laughter, a complex emotion, 84; defined, 142, 235; moderation desirable in, 235; contrasted with smiles, 241.

Life, Self and Not-Self two indispensable factors of, 16-17.
Liking, 18.
Literature (see also Poetry), province of, 176; completer in emotion than other arts, 190.
Loathing, 84, 129.
Love, desire of union, the instinct of, 18, 29, 36, 47, 57; distinguished from desire by Westerns, 21; a primary desire-emotion, 29, 31; how developed from attraction, 35, 47-8, 57; in its action leads to equalisation, 37, 47, 57; hate and, possible only where forms exist, 47; perfection of impossible, 48; greatest possible, can only exist between beings of opposite sexes, 49; equality union of, the culmination of attraction, 57; hate compared with, 58; insatiable, 59; relation of self-sacrifice to, 64, 66, 68-9; benevolence developing from, 67; rarely demands surrender of physical body 68; hate and, sometimes lead to similar treatment, 71; the emphasising of the United Self, 72; binding power of, 75; virtues = emotions on side of, 78; enumeration of virtues resulting from, 80; = highest reason, 87; physical aspect of, 110 seqq.; predominance of emotion of, 196; meaning of, understood only from beyond hate and, 212; personal and impersonal, 230.

Loyalty, 103.
Lust, 84, 108 seqq.

Maḍa (opposite of benevolence), 67.
Magnanimity, a complex emotion, 84; higher than self-control, 105; allied virtues of, 121.
Magnets, analogy of, 166.
Magnificence, 84, 120.
Mahābhārata, quoted, 1, 89, 118; referred to, 60, 153.
Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa, quoted, 2.
Majesty, a complex emotion, 84; compounded of compassion and pride, 86; symbols of, 86; in action = heroism, 89; awesomeness and benignity, aspects of, 104.
Malice, a complex emotion, 84; = hate plus fear, 120; craftiness allied to, 122.
Mammata, referred to, 160, 164.
Man, knowledge of, the highest science, 6.
Maṇju (is well known), 181.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>vii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mano ramam (pleases or steals and attracts the mind), 131.</td>
<td>Not-Self, Self and, always inseparable, 12; Self felt to be different from, 16; an indispensable factor of life, 16; response of Self to, 25; metaphysics of the, 28; Self identified with a portion of, 29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manojñyam (knows or fills the mind), 131.</td>
<td>Oneness, inherent perception of, 29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning, 84, 121.</td>
<td>Ornaments of speech, 163.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means, ends overpowered by, 4 seqq.</td>
<td>Pain, cause and remedy of, 2-3 seqq.; pleasure or, constantly accompanies the Self, 17; repulsion and dislike connected with, 18; a degree not a form or aspect of the Self, 25; relation between desire and, 27; special degree of Self-cognition, etc., 31; defined as contraction, 166; morbid nature of, 168.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental body, 222.</td>
<td>Painting, emotional, 192.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental functions, Western divisions of, 22.</td>
<td>Pañcādāśī, quoted, 65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental moods, emotions and, 42.</td>
<td>Pañcājanañā (intelligence), 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysics, of the Self, 18, 28, 82; of Ethics, 82.</td>
<td>Parabrahman, pairs of opposites must exist outside, 58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Indian view of the form of poetry, 175.</td>
<td>Paramātmā, pairs of opposites must exist outside, 58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind, Western use of the word, 22.</td>
<td>Para-nirvāṇa, object of poetry defined as, 164.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misgiving, 94.</td>
<td>Pathos, the Pathetic, a complex emotion, 84; described, 145; pleasure afforded by representations of, 180, 183-4; danger of, 185-8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moha (unconsciousness), 17.</td>
<td>Peace, science of, 8; of the Supreme broken up into Pleasure and Pain, 35.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moksha, non-eternity of, 59; defined, 246.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Persistence in emotions, 148.
Philosophy, origin of ancient, 1 ; object of ancient, 3 ; new forms of, needed, 3 ; modern view of relation of, to Truth, 7-8
PindaJta (sexual humanity), 111.
Pity, defined, 56 ; constituent of the emotion of the Pathetic, 145 ; danger of inward pride in, 233.
Pleasure, pain or, constantly accompanies the Self, 17 ; attraction and liking connected with, 18 ; a degree not a form or aspect of the Self, 25 ; relation between desire and, 27, origin of, 31 ; special degree of Self-cognition, etc., 34 ; defined as expansion, 165 ; morbid, nature of, 168.
Poetry, emotional nature of, 160, 190 ; form of, 175
Politeness, 48.
Power, metaphysic necessary to understand meaning of, 35.
Prayānā (bow), 49.
Prayāyātmā, inseparable from Mūlaprakṛti, 12 ; unity in the Being of, 29 ; Jīva compounded of, and Mūlaprakṛti, 106.
Prayāñā (desire passing into action), 23.
Pride, real nature of, 67 : = tyranny and hate, 69 ; anger resolved into fear and, 73 ; Majesty compounded of compassion and, 86 ; vanity modification of, 139 ; pleasure of, in representations of the Fearful, 181 ; to be met with humility, 232.
Prudence, 84.
Psychology of senses and intellect, modern philosopher's interest in, 7.
Psychology of the Emotions, The, referred to, 9 note.
Purānic Rishis, Tapaḥ of, 54.
Qualities, emotions distinguished from, in ordinary language, 85 seqq.
Rāga (love), 19.
Rāga-Dveṣham (love-hate), 7.
Rage, 60.
Rāma, taught by Vasishtha, 2.
Rape, 114.
Rasa a specialised pleasure, etc., 159 seqq. ; kinds of, 179 seqq.
Rasāṣṭāda, dangers of, 161, 242.
Reciprocation, desire for union by, 48, 57.
Re-incarnation, emotions in view of, 73.
Remorse, hate succeeded by, 74 ; akin to self-pity, 145.
Repulsion, connected with pain, 18 ; a primary desire-emotion, 28, 31 ; appearing in the motionlessness of the Supreme, 35 ; dislike and hate sub-divisions of, 41 ; the motor-power in the way of vice, 57 ; nature of, between equals, 59 ; enumeration of emotions caused by, 61 ; leads to separation, 73.
INDEX.

Reserve, 59-60.
Respect, 49.
Restraint, 215.
Reverence, arising from attraction, 35 ; = devotion to a superior, 50, 98.
Ridol, referred to, 9.
Ridicule, 84.
Rn̄a-ṭrayam, nature of, 204.
Robbery leading to murder, 70.
Ruchiram rochale (that which shines or pleases), 131.
Rudeness, 59.
Sādhhu sādhnōti (fulfils desires), 131.
Sadness, 146.
Sāhitya, 10, 145.
Sa-kāma-ṭaṭa (worship, etc., with an object), 58.
Samādhī (fixity in the higher consciousness), 161.
Samsāra, conditions of process of, 167.
Scorn, caused by repulsion, 62 ; defined, 129, 145 ; to be met with humility, 232.
Sculpture, emotional, 193.
Self, Not-Self and, always inseparable, 12 ; elementary factor in life, 15 ; certainly felt as to existence of, 16 ; an indispensable factor of life, 16 ; pleasure and pain associated with the, 17 ; metaphysic of the, 18, 28, 82 ; mind and, 22 ; sensation the substance, bulk, and form of the, 26 ; three aspects of the, 27, 248 ; attainment of union endevoured by the, 29 ; identified with a part of the Not-Self, 29.
Self-assertion, 241.
Self-cognition, 34.
Self-complacency, 139.
Self-consciousness, mood of the Self towards itself, 15 ; pleasure and pain special degrees of, 34 ; "acting" of life a result of, 163 ; second stage in evolution, 219 ; of the Kāraṇa-Sharīra 222.
Self-control, a complex emotion, 84 ; foundation of majesty and dignity, 86 ; emotion-nature of 87, seqq. ; related virtues of 105 ; magnanimity higher than, 105.
Self-feeling, 34.
Self-importance, 61, 139.
Self-intelligence, 6.
Self-pity, 114.
Self-possession, 84, 86.
Self-preservation, instinct of, 112.
Self-realisation, 34.
Self-respect, 86.
Self-sacrifice, = true devotion, 53 ; relation of, to love, 64, 66, 68 ; where there is no belief in immortality, 65 ; less common than murder, 70.
Self-satisfaction, 139.
Self-scorn, 145.
Self-surrender, nature of, 52 ; absolute only when superior gives himself to inferior, 67.
Selfishness, first half of cycles characterised by, 471.
Recognition of sensations as on same level, 206-211.

Senses, psychology of, 7; search for new, 201.

Separateness, hate a desire for, 19, 28, 69, 72.

Sex, relations of, 101, seqq.; predominance of problem of, 201.

Sex-jealousy leading to murder, 70.

Shame, 139.

Shankaracharya, referred to, 16.

Shanta, negatively a Rasa, 179.

Shavraka-Bhashya, referred to, 16.

Shobhanam (shining), 131.

Shuka, address of Vyasa to, 1, 7.

Shyness, 84, 90.

Silence, desirability of, 232.

Slanderousness, 84.

Smile of benevolence, 143, 240; of bitterness, 144, 241; contrasted with laughter, 240.

Spencer, Herbert, cited, 145.

Spitefulness, 84, 122.

Spirituality, of face, common, hatred of, 241.

Su udati (that which attracts), 131.

Sublimity, 84, 128.

Sundaram, su driyate (that which is loved), 131.

Superciliousness (see also Scorn), 61, 139.

Surprise, 128.

Sushtamam (unobstructing), 131.

Suspicion (see also Distrust), 94.

Svedaja (sweat-born), 111.

Table showing correspondence of emotions, 157-8.

Taking, kinds of, 173.

Talking, moderation desirable in 241.

Tantalisition, 130.

Tapas of Puranic Rishis, 54.

Tears, joy and grief expressed by, 143 seqq.

Tenderness, 55, 97.

Tennyson, quoted, 144.

Terror (see also Fear), distinguished from desire by Westerns, 21; caused by repulsion, 61.

Tragedy-writing discouraged in Indian drama, 188.

Trust, 84, 95.

Truth, relation of, to philosophy, 7; Truth, the, of truths, 229-230.

Tyranny, mada, nearly expressed by, 68; pride and; = hate, 69; in war, 73; a complex emotion, 84; nature of, 120.

Udhvijja (fission), 111.

Unconsciousness, a third state of the Self, 17.

Union, desire of the instinct of attraction and love, 18, 28, 32, 36, 47, 58; by dissolution of forms, 47; impossible where forms exist, 50.

Unselfishness, second half of cycles characterised by, 171.

Upadhis (forms), Jivas embodied in, 88; must break up before absolute
INDEX.

union, 50; Self’s attitude towards, 168, 171, 193; three-fold aspect of, 226.

Vāchaspati quoted, 16.

Vairāgya (dying away of desire), true philosophy springs from, 2, 7-8 seqq.; seed of, in every individual, 216; rise of unlimited, 223.

Valor, 84, 89.

Vāmana, quoted, 160.

Vanity, 138.

Vāsavañjā, reference to, 175.

Vāsiṣṭha, Rama taught by, 2.

Vātāyana, reference to commentary of, 10; quoted, 17.

Veneration, 50.

Vice starting from anger, development, 57.

Vices, = emotions become permanent, 78; enumeration of, arising from hate, 80-1; eradicated by regulation of emotions, 82.

Virtue, development of from compassion and humility, 57.

Virtues, = emotions become permanent, 78; enumeration of, arising from love, 80; cultivated by regulation of emotions, 82.

Vishvāmiitra on discrimination, 2.

Vishvanātha, quoted, 160.

Viveka (discrimination), 3.

Volition distinguished from action by Westerns, 21; identified with action by Easterns, 23.

Vyāhayah (moods, functions or desires), 22.

Vyāsa, address of, to Shuka, 1, 8.

War, benevolence and tyranny in, 73; evil emotions prevalent in time of, 183 note.

Whitman, Walt, reference to, 175.

Wisdom, how attained, 2.

Wonder, 84, 124-8.

Worry, 146-7.

Worship, likeness produced by, between devotee and object of devotion, 51; to gain an object, danger of, 53; devotion distinct from, 96.

Wrath, 60.

Yoga - Vāsiṣṭha, reference to, 223 note.